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Abstract
In the following work I examine the long-standing dispute between the moral
relativist and their opponent, who I call the moral universalist. I examine this
dispute from a coherentist perspective. For both moral relativism and moral
universalism I identify a key conviction underlying the position and I attempt
to deliver a theory that accommodates both of these two convictions in a
coherent fashion. This involves distinguishing between distinct types of moral
principle and showing how the relativist's conviction is a reaction to one type
while the universalist's conviction is a reaction to another type. These types of
moral principle are not mutually exclusive, however, and a large pan of my
project will be to explain how each type of principle is able to be included as
part of a coherent whole.
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Part One
Introduction
1.1 An important question.
For almost as long as there have been philosophical questions, one of the more
contentious has been the following:
Ql) Is morality relative?
In some moods this can appear to be one of the most significant philosophical
questions that may be asked about morality. Producing an answer to Ql might
be thought to be logically prior to the discussion of ordinary everyday ethical
questions and being able to give a plausible answer can be seen as a
precondition for being able to say what we ought and ought not to do. This is
because if Q I is answered in the affirmative then our everyday ethical
discussions may have to proceed along rather different lines from those along
which they proceed if Q I is answered in the negative. Since a major goal of
our everyday ethical discussions is to produce moral judgements telling us
how we ought to conduct ourselves, the judgements we produce will to a
greater or lesser degree depend on how we answer Q I .
The implications of the disagreement about the correct way to answer this
question extend beyond the merely theoretical and affect our thinking about
how to live our day to day lives. The importance in a pragmatic sense of
finding a plausible answer to Ql should not be overlooked. Perhaps this is one
of the reasons why moral relativism is, even among the non-philosophical
public, quite a widely known (although not necessarily widely understood)
phi Iosophical position.
My own experience of this comes from trying to run reasonably structured
discussions of controversial moral issues whilst a tutor in applied ethics
courses. Inevitably, at some point during the course a student would bring up,
with varying degrees of sophistication, a view that could be called some
variety of moral relativism. The student might suggest that the moral
discussion that was taking place was a pointless debate that could never be
resolved, because: "Each side is right from their own point of view", or a
comment along similar lines to this. Sometimes this sort of comment was
deliberately used as an attempt at an 'argument-stopper', particularly when
disagreement was intense.
To agree that what the student had said rendered the debate pointless
would imply that there was little to be gained from further participation in the
discussion, not a useful result when participation in the discussion was the
purpose of the tutorial. However, to disagree would mean the discussion
would have to become more self-consciously metaethical, so that the merits of
possible answers to a question like Ql could be debated. Generally I would
attempt to neutralise the objection so that the moral discussion could continue.
The possibility of moral relativism must almost always be dealt with at
some point when running tutorials in an applied ethics course and there were a
number of ploys I used to defuse this objection. Perhaps the student in
question had expressed and argued for a certain moral view on one of the
previous controversial issues in the course and was at that earlier time not
prepared to accept that the views of those who disagreed might be the corect
moral viewpoint for them. Pointing out the inconsistency here would often be
enough to make the student forego their moral relativism, as they were more
firmly committed to their moral stance on the previous issue. Occasionally the
student would instead choose to relinquish their previously held moral stance
in favour of a commitment to moral relativism, or perhaps the student had not
previously taken any strong stance on a moral issue. At that stage I generally
preferred to suggest that for the remainder of the course we would be
assuming for the sake of argument that moral relativism was not the case.
Furthermore, in order to avoid derailing the topic of the tutorial, that was
unfortunately all that could be said about the matter.
While a response such as this was sufficient to bring the discussion back
onto the topic, it is not the most intellectually satisfying of responses and the
neophyte moral relativist who is thus rebuffed may complain with some
justice that their point has not been addressed. Of course, making an
assumption in order to facilitate discussion is not something that is peculiar to
moral discussion in applied ethics tutorials; there are many sorts of
philosophical discussions for which fundamental assumptions, sometimes in
themselves quite philosophically controversial assumptions, must be made
before the discussion can even get off the ground. For instance, a paper in
philosophy of mind may begin with the declaration that the author assumes
that the so-called 'problem of other minds' has already been adequately
addressed, so that a certain proposed solution to the problem will be taken as
given.
Even making this observation, however, is to concede the point that a
question like Ql and the issues that it raises must be acknowledged and
somehow dealt with on the way to a fully philosophically satisfactory
excursion into questions in applied ethics. Some attempt at an adequate
answer to Ql must be on hand if we want to take our moral discussions with
the seriousness they warrant.
We do want to take our moral discussions seriously because of their close
connection to our actions. Morality advises us about what we ought to do,
about the actions we ought to take, and so the theoretical foundations for such
advice will ideally be as firm as possible, if our actions are not to be arbitrary
and subject to capricious whim. Anyone, but especially a philosopher, who
wishes to offer ethical instruction to others must be able to face and give a
response to a question like Ql, and to give reasons why they answer it as they
do, before they can have much credibility when venturing moral advice.
Yet despite the apparent desirability of coming up with a plausible answer
to Ql, the question has remained recalcitrant. Many would answer the
question, even as it is posed above, with an emphatic 'No!' but there have
always been those who answer oYes', and in the absence of any clear
consensus here the question continues to be a live one. The unresolved nature
of the question has the unfortunate result of lending an air of fatuity to our
everyday ethical discussions 
- 
if we cannot settle Ql prior to these discussions
then it seems we must admit to some possible uncertainty about the status of
our ordinary moraljudgements and it may fairly be wondered what business
we have making these moraljudgements with any conviction. Do we have to
put our moral lives on hold until some exceptional philosopher answers Ql
once and for all? I think not, and will try to show why below.
1.2 Clarifying the question
Stated in the form it is above, Ql is vague and its significance is unclear. The
question seems to be incomplete without some indication of what morality
might be supposed to be relative to. Before a serious attempt to answer Ql can
be begun the question itself must be examined and made more precise. Part of
the goal of this first chapter will be to do this, and also to raise some
preliminary points that must be dealt with before any effective treatment of
Ql can begin. The question is further complicated by the way in which it is
often entangled with other issues that are not directly relevant to it. One of the
major themes of this study will be the necessity of preventing the investigation
becoming sidetracked into other metaethical issues. In this chapter and also
throughout the work I will continue to try to clear away those concerns that
are peripheral to the main topic, and maintain the focus on matters that are
central to the question.
As a first stab at the philosophical notions that are at work when the
proposal is made that morality is relative, consider the ancient Greek practice
of keeping human slaves. To those living in Western democracies in the early
2ltt century it is uncontroversial that the practice of human slavery is morally
wrong, but our view about this seems on the face of it to be different to the
view of those living in ancient Creece in the 5th and 4fr centuries B.C.E. When
someone answers 'Yes', to Ql they are saying something like the following:
the ancient Greek view of the moral status of human slavery actually is the
morally correct view for the ancient Greeks, but not for us, and our apparently
incompatible view of the moral status of human slavery actually is the morally
correct view for us, but not for the ancient Greeks. It is not just a case of
'when in Athens, do as the Athenians do', but that what the Athenians do in
Athens is what is right for Athenians to do whilst they are in Athens.
In Plato's dialogue Theaetetus the philosopher Protagoras is reported to
have said that: "whatever any community decides to be just and right, and
establishes as such, actually is what is just and right for that community and
for as long as it remains so established." (177d). This looks like a
philosophical claim similar to the one made in the previous paragraph. The
kind of moral relativism advocated here is that what is morally right is relative
to each community, so that a claim about the morally just and right way in
which to behave must contain a reference to the community in which this
behavior is to take place.
Nowadays we find contemporary moral relativists saying much the same
sort of thing as Protagoras may have said. Gilbert Harman's recent
characterisation of his version of moral relativism is a good example of this:
(M)oral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and
vice, etc.) are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is
morally right in relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in
relation to a different moral framework. And no moral framework is
objectively privileged as the one true morality. (1996, p 3)
In this quotation Harman's abstract idea of a framework has replaced the more
prosaic notion of a community, but the sort of position he is offering seems
not dissimilar from the one attributed to Protagoras. Harman's position will be
examined in detail in Part Two, but for now his framework metaphor provides
us with one possible way of answering Ql in the affirmative, by stating what
it is that moralitv is relative to:
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Al) Morality is relative to a moral framework.
However, it seems to be inevitable that different moral relativists will have
different views about the best way to answer Ql in the affrrmative. For
instance, David Wong is a moral relativist who gives a different answer to Ql:
Al') Morality is relative to the extension of the phrase 'adequate moral
system'.
The notions that Harman and Wong are relying on here, and the exact
ways in which their versions of moral relativism differ, will be explored in
depth in sections 2.5 and 2.6. Different versions of moral relativism offer up
different ways of answering'Yes'to Ql, but they all agree to the extent that
an affirmative answer is the correct one to give. On the other side of the fence,
there also appear to be a variety of ways that Ql may be answered in the
negative, although this is not as straightforward as it seems. The person who
answers 'No' to Ql wishes to deny that morality is relative to anything, but it
proves to be somewhat tricky to delineate the exact nature of the claim that is
being made here. The range of different positions available on either side of
the question increases the complexity of the task of finding an answer to Ql.
This is not helped by the vagueness of the two key terms in Ql, 'morality',
and 'relative'. I propose to replace both of these words with terms that I
believe make the question more precise and thus more easily answered.
However, before doing this there are some preliminary matters to be dealt
with.
1.3 Preliminaries
Firstly, according to the traditional distinction between metaethics and
normative ethics, Ql would be considered a metaethical question.
Traditionally, metaethics is the philosophical discipline of reflecting on moral
discussion, both disputes and agreements, while normative ethics involves
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actually taking part in moral discussion. For example, it would be an exercise
in normative ethics to argue that human slavery is morally wrong, while it
would be an exercise in metaethics to argue that such a conclusion does not
apply in societies in which human slavery is routinely practiced and accepted
by all. while the distinction does at times become a little blurry, my study is
an attempt to put forward a metaethical theory and not a normative view.
Secondly, when discussing moral relativism, the metaethical issue must be
kept separate from what could be called the descriptive, or the empirical issue.
one of the necessary features of any adequate metaethical discussion of Ql
will be the taking of some sort of stance towards apparent moral diversity. The
moral relativist stresses the relativist implications for morality of the apparent
diversity in customs and values across time and across cultures and across
groups within cultures (and perhaps also across individuals). It seems to be a
matter of empirical fact that there is, or at least appears to be, such diversity,
and in what follows I will take it as given that (at least apparent) moral
diversity of the sort described above has been established through empirical
disciplines such as anthropology and others. Granting this does not, however,
mean that there may not be some essential underlying similarities across what
appear on the surface to be diverse moral systems. This very issue of what
metaethical conclusions to draw from given empirical evidence is one of the
hotly disputed aspects of the argument between the moral relativist and his or
her opponent.
Thirdly, it is worth noting the distinction between what has been called
discriminating relativism and indiscriminate relativism. (Snare, p 9l) The
latter position holds that in some important sense everything, all claims about
anything whatsoever, are relative, and moral relativism is just one instance of
this overall relativism. The former position holds that morality is relative in a
way that is somehow due to the nature of morality itself. lndiscriminate moral
relativism may be an interesting position but it is doubtful whether it is a form
of moral relativism at all. The issues that it raises in metaphysics and
epistemology do not seem to be distinctively metaethical issues. To
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investigate them properly would take me too far from my intended area of
inquiry, so in what follows I wilt focus exclusively on discriminating moral
relativism.
Fourthly, in my examination of moral relativism I will restrict myself to
explicit consideration of the so-called categories of deontic evaluation, that is,
the moral rightness or wrongness (or optionality) of actions, rather than the
so-called categories of value, that is, the goodness or badness (or value-
neutrality) of people and things. (Timmons, p 7-10) what is said about the
former categories will be capable of being rephrased so as to apply to the
latter categories as well, although it would be unnecessarily cumbersome to
continually keep doing so.
Fifthly, I will sometimes use the phrase: "the practice of morality''. For my
purposes, the practice of morality includes (at the least) both normative moral
discourse as well as actions that are, so to speak, morally inspired, or taken
with the purpose of doing what is morally right. In general moral action is
preceded by moral discourse about the action. ln what follows I will focus on
moral discourse about actions rather than actions considered in isolation, as
the former seems to be the ground on which the disagreement between the
moral relativist and their opponent is most straightforwardly contested. When
I mention actions I take it that these are actions that are subject to moral
discussion for the purpose of making moral evaluations about them.
Finally, the issue of cognitivism versus noncognitivism is another subject
of much metaethical dispute, although it does not have such a long history and
is not so widely known about in non-philosophical circles. The cognitivist
believes that moral claims may be literally true or false whereas the
noncognitivist denies this, believing that moral claims are instead expressions
of emotion that are not literally true or false, although they may still be
meaningful. This is not an issue that separates moral relativism from its
opposition, as the philosophers I examine, both those who are moral relativists
and their opponents, are all cognitivists. This is not because I think
noncognitivists have nothing important to contribute to the discussion, but
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merely to avoid becoming entangled in issues surrounding the dispute
between cognitivists and noncognitivists. Hence, I will overlook this dispute
in what follows.
1.4 Moral principles and moral judgements
The presence of the less-than-exact term 'morality' in Ql contributes to the
vagueness of the question. I propose to sharpen the focus of my investigation
by replacing this term. To do so I need to distinguish between what I will call
'moral principles' and what I will call 'moral judgements'. Moral principles
occur in moral discussion as standards by reference to which actions are
judged. They are quite general rules, for example: 'Breaking a promise is
morally wrong', or 'Human slavery is morally wrong'. When moral principles
are combined with facts about the circumstances of a particular situation they
give rise to moral judgements. Moral judgements are specific instructions
about what is the morally correct thing for a particular person to do in a
particular situation. Ql seems to be an attempt to frame a metaethical question
about moral principles and not about moraljudgements.
For instance, consider two moral agents, both of whom perform an action
of type A. Let us assume that A is in itself a morally neutral action. If one of
the agents has previously made a promise not to A and the other agent has
previously made a promise to A, then moral judgements would likely be
forthcoming that the first agent ought not to A, while the second agent ought
to A. Supposing that there is a general moral principle that requires agents not
to break promises they have made, we can say that this one moral principle, in
conjunction with different circumstances on the part of different agents, that
is, the different promises they have made, leads to different moral judgements
about the actions of each agent. This is one way in which moral judgements
may be said to be relative; they are relative to the circumstances of the agents
whose actions they are about.
The moral relativist seems to be making a claim that is over and above this
one, however. They are claiming that it is the moral principles themselves that
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are relative, although what they are said to be relative to will vary depending
on which moral relativist is making the claim. If the moral principle requiring
agents not to break promises is, as Harman puts it, relative to a moral
framework, then it is conceivable that both of the agents in the example above
might have made a promise not to A, and yet have different moral frameworks
in place, so that all other things being equal it is morally wrong for one of
them to break a promise but it is not morally wrong for the other one. This
would of course also lead to different moral judgements being made about
each of the agents as before, but this time the reason for the difference is due
to the relativity of moral principles rather than the difference in circumstances
that we saw in the first example. The versions of moral relativism that I will
be examining, and it seems to me any interesting version of moral relativism,
will take the view that it is moral principles as well as moraljudgements that
are relative, and not only moral judgements by themselves-
There are of course numerous other metaethical questions that might be
raised about moral principles and moral judgements and the relationship
between them, but as I have mentioned above, I want to bypass these as not
directly relevant to my discussion of moral relativism. The ontological status
of moral principles and moral judgements and whether one, both, or neither
'exist' or are 'real' will be overlooked. Questions about the possible
psychological processes going on while moving from moral principles to
moral judgements, where exactly the line must be drawn as to the level of
generality required of a moral principle, and whether'morality' might contain
more elements than these two, must all be skirted in order to focus on the
matter at hand. I intend the distinction between moral principles and moral
judgements to be a neutral one that leaves it open just what sort of method of
moral discussion might be used to move from moral principles to moral
judgements. It might involve some sort of utilitarian calculation, an
empathetic identification with others, some kind of rational deduction, or any
of a number of other possibilities. I do not want to rule anything in or out
regarding matters such as these, as their impact on my topic is minimal.
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I propose to replace Q I with Q2, a replacement that I think makes the
question more precise:
Q2) Are moral principles relative?
What I want to achieve with this replacement is to emphasise the difference
between the commonplace and metaethically uncontroversial observation that
moral judgements are relative to the circumstances of particular cases and the
controversial metaethical claim that moral principles are relative. I take it that
it is not an argument for the relativism of moral principles to point out that
moral judgements are relative. It may be accepted that moral judgements can
be relative without such acceptance in itself committing one to the view that
moral principles are also relative. In what follows I will focus on the question
of whether moral principles are relative.
1.5 Opposition to moral relativism
ln this section I will argue that, despite the longevity of the debate, the
traditional dimensions along which the dispute between the relativist and their
opponent has been characterised are misleading and inadequate. Progress can
be made towards clarifying the meaning of the word 'relative' as it occurs in
Q2 by examining more closely the position occupied by those who would
answer 'No' to this question. Two common labels are used for the person who
answers 'No' to Q2. The labels are oAbsolutist' and 'Objectivist'. Neither of
these are entirely suitable.
'Absolutist' is an inaccurate label for the opponent of the relativist because it
implies that answering Q2 in the negative commits one to a belief in absolute
moral principles that may not be ovenidden. To an absolutist there are no such
things as defeasible moral principles or mitigating circumstances concerning
the obligations that arise from moral principles 
- 
if one has a moral obligation
to perform or refrain from an action then this obligation is unconditional,
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indeed, it is absolute. According to the absolutist, morality is in an important
sense an all or nothing affair. Moral dilemmas are only apparent, so that the
notion of weighing moral obligations one against the other and deciding that a
moral obligation may have been outweighed in a particular situation is not the
correct approach to morality. Now, some who answer Q2 in the negative may
indeed be absolutists, but it is not clear that all who do so must be committed
to such an uncompromising view of morality. Someone may believe that
moral principles are not absolute and yet this belief in itself need not make
them a relativist.
Furthermore, there is no contradiction in the position of someone who
answers 'Yes' to Q2 and at the same time takes an absolutist stance towards
moral principles. one may believe that moral principles impose absolute
requirements to perform or refrain from certain actions while also maintaining
that these principles are relative. For instance, a relativist may hold that it is an
absolute moral requirement that those living in 2l't century democracies not
keep human slaves, and that there are no possible mitigating circumstances
that would make it morally permissible for such people to keep human slaves.
This belief need not conflict with their belief that it was morally acceptable
for the ancient Greeks to keep human slaves.
So it seems that answering 'No' to Q2 is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for being a moral absolutist. Not all those opposed to
relativists need be absolutists, and some absolutists may be relativists. The
question of whether moral principles are or are not absolute is separate from
the question of whether moralprinciples are or are not relative.
'Objectivist' is also an inaccurate label for those who answer 'No' to Q2, for a
similar reason. The metaethical dispute between the moral objectivist and
their opponent the moral subjectivist, is distinct from the issue that the moral
relativist is seeking to raise. The objectivist has the view that moral principles
are in some way ontologically separate and independent of the cognitive
states, in particular the beliefs, of those who are bound by them, while the
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subjectivist has the view that moral principles are somehow dependent on
these cognitive states. There seems to be nothing inconsistent in the claim that
moral principles are objective and yet also relative. On this view it would just
be an objective fact that the ancient Greeks were bound by a different moral
principle regarding human slavery from the one that we are bound by. An
analogy here would be with the legal rules of the road. It is an objective fact
of the matter as to which side of the road a driver must drive on, but this fact
is relative to the part of the world that the driver is driving in. It seems that
even moral principles held by but a single person could be objective in this
way; it may objectively be the case that someone has done something morally
wrong according to their own personal standards.
Furthermore, the subjectivist's rejection of extemal moral principles need
not necessarily commit them to moral relativism. It may be held that moral
principles are dependent in some way on cognitive states but that the relevant
cognitive states are ultimately the same in all moral agents so that the same
moral principles are ultimately behind all of the apparent moral diversity that
the moral relativist points out.
So, as with the absolutist above, answering 'No' to e2 is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for being an objectivist. What I have said
in the above paragraphs is not to deny that many or even most of those who
oppose moral relativism may also happen to be absolutists or objectivists or
both absolutists and objectivists. The point is that neither the moral absolutist
nor the moral objectivist are necessarily in opposition to the moral relativist
with regard to the central issue that the relativist raises.
I want to suggest that a more accurate label for the person who answers 'No'
to Q2 is 'Universalist'. Given the above difficulties with the labels
'Absolutist' and 'Objectivist', in what follows I will use the term
'Universalist' to refer to the person who is opposed to moral relativism. I
believe this term shows most clearly just what it is that opposition to moral
relativism commits one to. The universalist wants to assert that moral
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principles are universal 
- 
they apply to all moral agents across all times and
cultures and across all groups within cultures. According to the universalist
there is one and only one correct set of moral principles, so that, for instance,
there is one and only one correct stance to take towards a moral question such
as the question of the moral status of human slavery. If we differ with the
ancient Greeks about this status then one (or possibly both) of us must be
incorrect. To the universalist there is a logical connection between moral
agency and a single set of moral principles.
As an aside to forestall possible confusion, the position of universalism is
not especially connected with the formal principle of universalisability. As
applied to moral judgements, formal universalisability means that if a moral
judgement is made about a moral agent in a particular set of circumstances,
then any other moral agent in that same particular set of circumstances would
be subject to the same moral judgement as well. So if somebody makes a
moral judgement that someone else has a certain moral obligation to them,
then they must be prepared to admit that they themselves would be likewise
morally obligated towards this other person if their positions were reversed.
This formal principle is something that the moral relativist may accept as
easily as the moral universalist. Formal universalisability is not an issue that
separates the moral universalist and the moral relativist, in spite of the similar
sound of two of the words. (See Singer, p 822-3 for an account of the
difference between formal universalisability and substantive principles such as
Kant' s categorical imperative.)
I contend that the moral universalist is the true opponent of the moral
relativist. To answer 'Yes' to Q2, as the moral relativist does, is to commit
oneself to the possibility that there could be more than one set of moral
principles - that no one set of moral principles is universal. Because of this,
the moral relativist thinks that asserting a moral principle on its own without
giving any context for the principle is not something that can legitimately be
done in moral discussion. Some reference must always be supplied to indicate
the group (or perhaps the individual) that any given moral principle is relative
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to. In other words, to the moral relativist moral principles are ineducibly
context-dependent. I think that these observations put us in a better position to
see more clearly just what is being asserted or denied when an answer to Q2 is
given. we can rephrase the question once more to reflect this insight. I
suggest replacing Q2 with Q3:
Q3: Are moral principles context-dependent?
Answering 'Yes' to this question is to assert the view that a moral
principle is analogous to a statement like 'lt is ten to five'. The latter
statement may be pragmatically adequate if the context is sufficiently obvious,
but it is accepted that it is an a breviation. A complete statement of the time
must include a reference to the location in which the utterance is made and the
moment at which it is made 
- 
something like: 'lt is now ten to five in
Wellington, New Zealand.'A statement about the time is relativised to place
and moment and these context-dependant elements are an irreducible part of
such statements, although they may often be omitted as unnecessary because
of the obviousness of the context. When asked for the time it would seem
overly pedantic to respond: 'Do you mean the time at this moment and in this
location?', but that only underlines the irreducible context-dependency present
here. The likely response to the latter question will be, 'Yes, of course!' and
certainly not, 'No, I want to know the time in a universal sense, without
relativising it to anything. I am aware that at different moments and locations
people may give differing answers when they are asked for the time, but I am
not interested in that. I want to know which of these answers (if any) gives the
universally correct time.'
The situation is quite different if asked a question such as: 'What is the
moral status of human slavery?' Certainly someone may ask this question in
the same way in which people ask for the time. Perhaps a trader in human
slaves may be trying to ascertain the business prospects in a new city.
However, until we can give a plausible answer to Q3 it is not obvious how
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appropriate it would be to declare: 'l am aware that at different places and
times people may give differing answers when they are asked about the moral
status of slavery, but I am not interested in that. I want to know which of these
answers (if any) gives the universally correct moral status of human slavery.'
Notice that, even if the universalist (who does, of course, declare this)
thinks that they are able to supply the answer to the question about human
slavery, this answer in itself will not enable them to answer the question: ,ls
'Human slavery is morally wrong' an objective or a subjective moral
principle?'Nor will it enable them to answer the question: 'Is 'Human slavery
is morally wrong' an absolute moral principle or not?' This again emphasises
the difference between the moral universalist and the moral objectivist and
moral absolutist. Of course the universalist does need to take a position on the
latter two questions, but their commitment to universalism need not force their
hand as to what their position will be.
The above analogy between moral principles and statements about the
time has its limitations. There is, at the level of normative ethics, a degree of
controversy about moral principles that has no echo in statements about the
time. The controversy is evident from the example, commonly raised by moral
relativists, of the dispute over the moral status of abortion. This heated quarrel
divides members of our own society in a way that they are never divided over
statements about the time. Not surprisingly, the dispute over the moral status
of abortion is perceived differently by the moral relativist and the moral
universalist. To the relativist both the pro-abortion advocate and the anti-
abortion advocate are making a metaethical etror in believing that there is a
universally correct moral principle to be fixed upon here, while to the
universalist both sides are metaethically correct, although only one side (or
perhaps neither side) can be said to be advocating the correct approach to
abortion at the normative level. Needless to say, the moral relativist and the
moral universalist may agree (or disagree) at the normative level about an
issue like abortion without this affecting their metaethical disagreement. I will
retum to the examples of human slavery and abortion later in my discussion.
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As I have already said, the answer one gives to e3 has practical
implications for the way one does ethics and it will impact on the moral
judgements one makes as well as the attitude one has towards moral
principles' Q3 has considerable ramifications for ordinary everyday normative
ethics. Depending on how one answers this question, the practical business of
making everyday moral judgements will have fundamentally different
theoretical underpinnings that will effect the process of making these
judgements. To the moral relativist, having some workable means of
determining the relevant and appropriate context upon which moral principles
are dependant will be something of crucial importance. conversely, moral
universalists must have some workable way of determining just what the one
universal set of moral principles is, even if this way is nothing more
sophisticated than an appeal to authority or to tradition. These two different
approaches to the practical business of making moral judgements may not
necessarily lead to moral relativists and moral universalists giving different
moral judgements about a particular case, but even if their moral judgements
concur it would be something like a happy accident that they have reached the
same destination by taking different paths. Any differences due to their
metaethical disagreement would be over and above any variation in moral
judgements that may occur as a result of using different methods to move
from moral principles (whatever their status is thought to be) to moral
judgements.
1.6 Relativism, scepticism and nihilism
Now that I have clarified the metaethical position of the person who answers
'No' to Q3, I think it is necessary to make a brief but important point about
the position of the person who answers 'Yes' to Q3. Although it is sometimes
presented as such by the universalist, moral relativism in itself has nothing at
all to do with the metaethical positions of moral scepticism or moral nihilism.
Although there may be a number of varieties of moral scepticism, the essence
of the position is to doubt either the legitimacy of moral principles or the
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possibility of making moraljudgements or both, while the moral nihilist is of
the opinion that there are no legitimate moral principles or that it is impossible
to make moraljudgements or both.
In the absence of an argument demonstrating otherwise, there seems to be
nothing inherent in the position of moral relativism itself that entails either
moral scepticism or moral nihilism. To the moral relativist the context-
dependency of moral principles by no means renders them illegitimate, and
according to the moral relativist it is indeed possible to make moral
judgements. It mafters to the moral relativist what is right and wrong just as
much as it matters to the moral universalist, and the relativist is willing to
engage in moral discussion to try to discern the correct moral judgements to
make in particular circumstances, possibly even more lengthy and
complicated discussion than the moral universalist sees the need for. As we
saw above, the moral relativist may be both an objectivist and an absolutist,
and they may make their moral judgements as fervently and with as much
commitment to morality as the moral universalist.
That moral relativism actually leads inevitably to moral scepticism or
moral nihilism is something that would have to be established by argument.
some have tried to do this. In section 2.3 below I wilt look at an argument
from the moral universalist Pojman, who tries to discredit moral relativism by
arguing that it leads towards nihilism about morality. J. L. Mackie also argues
that moral relativism leads towards nihilism about morality, but with the
rather different goal of discrediting the institution of morality by showing that
all moral claims are actually false. Mackie's argument will not be examined as
he targets the objectivity that he thinks is built into moral language, rather
than universality, which is my focus.
1.7 An irresolvable dispute?
Although the moral relativist themselves may not necessarily be sceptical or
nihilistic about morality, the long-standing opposition between the moral
relativist and the moral universalist casts a shadow over the operation of
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norrnative ethics. It is as if these foes inhabittwo sets of ancient fortifications
set up opposite one another and between which the business of making moral
judgements must be conducted. Taking into account their theoretical polar
opposition to one another, not to mention the practical ramifications of their
dispute, it seems that in order to maintain their own credibility there is a
pressing need for the moral relativist and the moral universalist to each refute
the other. unless one side or the other is abre to emerge triumphant, moral
judgements made by the supporters of either faction may continually be
sniped at from the other side. However, each side has become entrenched in
their respective positions, and each of them are able to make what seem to
them to be reasonable enough criticisms of the other side. This has made an
outright victory on the part of one side or the other elusive.
For the universalist, a fundamental flaw in moral relativism is that it
appears to lead to an unacceptable situation in which 'anything goes' as far as
moral principles are concerned. The moral universalist places great weight on
what for them is a elementary consideration. The consideration may be
expressed by saying that there are some kinds of acts, such as for instance
murder or breaking a promise, that must always be regarded as being of moral
concern. The very notion of what constitutes morally acceptable behaviour
means that such acts must come to our notice and that we must have something
to say about them when we are making moraljudgements.
As I have argued above, the universalist is not necessarily an absolutist, so
they may believe that there could be situations in which, once all things have
been considered, we may make a moral judgement that an act of murder or of
breaking a promise is required in order to do what was morally right. But such
a situation would be one in which the moral agent was forced (hopefully with
regret) to commit a murder or break a promise. The universalist will here call
attention to the distinction between giving an excuse and giving a justification
concerning such an act. An excuse provides mitigating circumstances to show
why an agent has been forced to do something that still remains morally wrong.
They may have had to choose the lesser of two evils. A justification shows that
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the sort of action the agent has taken is not morally wrong at all. The
universalist view is that a particular murder or breaking of a promise might be
able to be excused, but not justified. An act of murder or of breaking a promise
is itself still immoral and an object of concem to us when we are making moral
judgements. (See section 3.3.2 for more on this)
Taking as an example the idea that moral principles are dependent on the
context of a moral framework, consider how we would react towards someone
who agrees that an action they are contemplating is unquestionably an act of
murder, but who says that they use a moral framework according to which
murder is not something that is of moral concem, and so the fact that an action
is a murder is morally irrelevant. Our reaction could be that such a person
seems to be missing something important about morality. The moral
universalist accuses moral relativism of being unable to accommodate this
reaction. To the moral relativist just about any act, including murder, could be
regarded with moral indifference, or even approval, provided that a suitable
moral framework were in place. 'Murder is of moral concem in your moral
framework, but not in ours', seems to be an intelligible statement under moral
relativism. The universalist may think that this makes a mockery of the very
notion of morality. As we will see in section 2.3 below, pojman attempts to
develop this concern into the argument that moral relativism does inevitably
lead to moral nihilism.
Furthermore, moral relativism also seems to open the possibility that
apparently morally irrelevant aspects of life could be treated as being of moral
concern: 'Whistling on a Tuesday is of moral concern in our moral framework,
even if it is not of moral concern in yours.' A discussion in which the
accusation of murder earns no more than a shrug of the shoulders, but the
accusation of whistling on a Tuesday elicits condemnation in the strongest
terms would seem to the universalist to be a discussion that has little to do with
morality. Whatever sort ofjudgements are being made here, they are not moral
judgements. This line of thought will be further developed in section 3.3.2,
where I propose a mechanism to accommodate this universalist concern.
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The relativist, on the other hand, may be guided by the consideration that
universalism refuses to adequately take into account the implications of moral
diversity. To the relativist, universal moral principles are something that
nobody can ever really be in a position to claim that they have access to.
Articulating such principles would seem to require the ability to step outside of
one's own personal and cultural context and pronounce upon morality with an
impossibly impartial eye. To the relativist there appears to be more than a little
high-handedness and wishful thinking in the notion that the universalist
considers it possible make such pronouncements. This is especially so when
universalism means that large segments of our society, and indeed entire
cultural groups, must be somehow incorrect in following the moral principles
that they do, or have done. There must be some more convincing way to
account for this than just to say that a lot of people are simply mistaken. The
apparent possibility of such widespread error about moral principles severely
damages the credibility of moral universalism, the relativist may claim.
Each of the considerations put forward is tikely to be dismissed bythe other
side as instances of question-begging. The moral relativist may say that they do
not have to accept that there are any moral principles that are above rejection
by some group or groups, while the moral universalist may say that they do not
have to accept that there is any difficulty with some groups being incorrect
about the set of universally correct moral principles. What I propose to do is to
develop a metaethical theory that will give weight to both of these
considerations and show how they may co-exist within the same theory.
so, there are two fundamental convictions that need to be adequately
accounted for. I will call them conviction u and conviction R:
I) The moral universalist's fundamental conviction (Conviction U): At least
one moral principle is universal, that is, it counts whenever moraljudgements
are made, and it counts in the same way.
ll) The moral relativist's fundamental conviction (Conviction R): At least some
moral diversity is due to different groups being committed to different moral
26
principles. Not every instance of moral diversity can be explained away as due
to mistake or misinformation.
These apparently opposing convictions lead the universalist and the relativist to
give differing answers to Q3. In my thesis I propose an approach to e3 that
attempts to find a compromise between universalism and relativism and that
will leave room for both Conviction U and Conviction R.
1.8 A coherentist approach
In what follows I will offer a compromise between the two apparently
incompatible positions of moral universalism and moral relativism. I aim to do
justice to the legitimate concerns of both the moral universalist and the moral
relativist while at the same time avoiding the problems that I will raise with
the various theories I examine during the course of my study.
My approach to the dispute between the moral universalist and the moral
relativist could be characterised as a coherentist approach (or coherentism).
The long history of the dispute and the current impasse between the
protagonists strongly suggests that we do not have available a metaethical
decision procedure that directs the complete ruling out of either moral
relativism or moral universalism. Neither Conviction U nor Conviction R is
able to emerge completely triumphant over the other. This implies that it may
be more fruitful to seek a means of allowing these two fundamental
convictions to co-exist with each other. The nature of the compromise that I
offer will be a metaethical theory that has room for both Conviction U and
Conviction R.
In doing this I am advancing a metaethical version of a method that is
more often seen at the level of normative ethics. In order to motivate my
brand of coherentism I will first look briefly at how the coherentist approach
has been employed by others in the normative arena. Norman Daniels is a
prominent advocate of a coherentist approach towards normative questions.
He calls this 'owide reflective equilibrium." According to Daniels this
involves, "attempting to produce coherence in an ordered triple of sets of
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beliefs held by a particular person, namely, (a) a set of considered moral
judgements, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background
theories" (p 22).He distinguishes this from "narrow reflective equilibrium,',
an approach that only recognises the first two sets of beliefs. Daniels' idea is
that any of the above three sets of beliefs may be adjusted in the light of any
of the others, in order to find a stable point at which further adjustment would
only reduce coherence. The overall goal is to, '.render theory acceptance in
ethics a more tractable problem" G 2l), by providing a method that
recognises the role played by nonmoral background theories in normative
decision making. There is no decision procedure available that allows us to
favour any one of these sets of beliefs over the others, and so all three must be
taken into account.
The coherentist approach at the normative level has been taken up and
further developed by David DeGrazia, who places emphasis on the theoretical
virtues to be sought from the method. DeGrazia exptains that coherentism
aspires to more than just logical consistency, but also what he calls
"argumentative support" and "global illumination" b l4-5). The first is the
demand that something that counts as a reason or justification in one area of a
coherentist theory must be recognised as counting as a reason or justification
across all parts of the theory. The second is the demand that, ,.there must be a
tolerable amount of illumination over the whole" of a coherentist theory. The
theory must be able to explain how its various elements fit together,
particularly if they seem initially to be at odds.
An example of how DeGrazia employs the coherentist methodology is his
investigation into the question of the nature and extent of the mental lives of
animals. It is worth looking at how he does this, to see whether there is any
parallel between his project and mine. He seeks to fit together evidence about
mental life from four different sources: human phenomenology, the study of
animal behaviour, functional-evolutionary arguments, and physiological
evidence (p 77).He says: "The idea is to treat with respect each kind of
evidence 
- 
without prioritizing any of them 
- 
and work toward theses about
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animal mentation that do justice to all of the available evidence. The four
(sub)methods approach mental phenomena in different ways, but they are
compatible" (p78).
DeGrazia's first source of evidence is human phenomenology, that is, how
things seem and feel to humans. This is useful both as a means for setting the
agenda about what mental life in animals could be like, and also as a starting
point for understanding the qualitative features of mentation. The second
source of evidence, observations of animal behaviour, is valuable because of
the close connections between behaviour and mental life. This includes
observations of how animals behave both in laboratory studies and also in
their natural habitats. The third source of evidence, functional-evolutionary
arguments, involves investigation of the possibility that possession of mental
states confers a selective advantage on the possessor. The fourth source of
evidence, animal physiology, also includes neurophysiology, the study of the
brain and central nervous system, and reflects the importance of
understanding the physical systems most likely to be associated with mental
life (p 78-84).
DeGrazia says that, although to him it seems obvious that all four of these
spheres of evidence have relevance in looking at the question of the mental
life of animals, many philosophers and researchers tend to prioritise one
source of evidence to the exclusion of the others. For instance, DeGrazia
mentions Descartes and other dualists as prioritising phenornenological
evidence, behaviorists and functionalists as prioritising behavioral evidence,
and so-called 'tough-minded' scientists as prioritising physiological evidence
(p 88-92). Trying to make results from all of these disparate sources of
evidence fit together into a coherent whole requires the jeftisoning of
prejudices about one source or another taking precedence over the rest.
DeGrazia's actual investigation of the mental life of animals, during which
he draws upon all four of these sources of evidence and works their results
into a coherent whole, is not easily summarisable. Fortunately such summary
is unnecessary for my purposes, The point of bringing up this example is to
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highlight the coherentist methodology DeGrazia pursues. Four sources of
evidence normally taken to be divergent can be shown to fit together when
they are all taken on an equal footing with none being given priority over the
others. The parallel between DeGrazia's project and mine is that in both cases
apparently conflicting considerations must be made to cohere.
I can see no reason why coherentism must be restricted to the normative
level. A coherentist approach is attractive in any situation where we do not
have an acknowledged decision procedure that allows us to settle on one of a
number of conflicting views, and I will try to show this to be the case with the
dispute between the moral relativist and the moral universalist. In relocating
coherentism to the metaethical level I will take the core methodological
recommendations articulated by Daniels and DeGrazia and apply them to the
problem of the dispute between the moral universalist and the moral relativist.
The coherentist method essentially requires the fitting together of diverse
ingredients into a consistent theory and so I will try to achieve a metaethical
account that shows how Conviction U and Conviction R can fit together.
Rather than attempting to appeal to some elusive master principle or over-
riding decision procedure that rules out one or the other of these convictions
once and for all, I will not deny or privilege either of them. My goal is a
maximally coherent account that has room for both convictions. The most
coherent account in this case could be seen as a form of compatibilism, as the
two convictions to be fitted together seem to oppose each other and so must be
shown to be compatible.
DeGrazia notes two criticisms that coherentism faces. Both of these
criticisms focus on the initial elements that the coherentist tries to fit together,
and could even be said to be different versions of the same criticism. They are,
firstly, that coherentism is only fruitful if there is some sort of credibility
attaching to the initial elements (p 19-22), and secondly, that the initial
elements may be biased towards or against some norrnative position (p 22-31).
However, the opposition between Conviction U and Conviction R protects the
metaethical coherentism I am putting forward from these criticisms. Firstly, the
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credibility of both Conviction U and Conviction R has already been thoroughly
tested during the course of the long-running dispute between the moral
relativist and the moral universalist. Although neither side may believe that
their opponent's fundamental conviction is very credible, there seems to be no
argument that clearly discredits either of them. This is, of course, the main
reason why the dispute has proved so intractable. Secondly, it would be stating
the obvious to say that Conviction U is biased towards moral universalism and
Conviction R is biased towards moral relativism, but this is not a problem as
these opposing biases balance each other out. Making room for both of these
convictions and not privileging either of them prevents my approach from
being biased towards either of them.
I do not try to say that either the moral relativist or the moral absolutist is
completely correct while their opponents are completely incorrect. To
anticipate, my answer to Q3 ('Are moral principles context-dependent?') is,
roughly, oThere are two types of moral principles, those that are context-
dependent and those that are not', although this answer requires a number of
clarifications and qualifications to be made in due course. With this answer I
try to undermine the supposition that all moral principles are either context-
dependent or not context-dependent, a supposition that appears attractive to
both sides of the dispute. For this reason, the theory I advance may possibly
not be palatable to hard-line advocates of either moral relativism or moral
universalism. However, it seems to me that the hard-liners have fought each
other to a standstill on this question, and that the time is ripe for a
compromise. I hope to do sufficient justice to both sides so that the
compromise I offer is seen as a viable way forward.
One of the primary merits of the coherentist approach to the metaethical
dispute between the moral relativist and the moral universalist is the
implications it has for the practical business of making everyday moral
judgements. In showing how Conviction U and Conviction R can coherently
fit together I hope to go some way towards easing the metaethical anxieties
fueled by this dispute. For instance, undermining the force of the challenge
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raised by the student in the applied ethics tutorial who maintains that moral
relativism makes any moral discussion pointless. Much metaethical work
remains to be done even if my approach is acceptable, but I believe something
significant will have been achieved in showing that the two convictions that
motivate the moral universalist and the moral relativist need not necessarilv be
assumed to be incompatible with one other.
1.9 Thesis plan
Pressing the case for a coherentist accord befween conviction u and
Conviction R requires that I make an in-depth examination of the current state
of the dispute. [n Part Two I will take a close look at moral relativism and the
details of the theories of some prominent moral relativists. First I survey some
universalist criticisms of moral relativism along with relativist replies to these
criticisms before focusing on the theories offered by three prominent
contemporary moral relativists. These relativists are Harman (who has already
been mentioned), David Wong, and Robert Anington.
In tuming to examine moral universalism I am presented with an
immediate difficulty. Rather than three prominent theorists, it is fair to say
that there are literally scores of moral philosophers who could be seen as
presenting theories that are universalist to some degree. Added to this is the
problem that these theories seem to be only partially or indirectly universalist
and defend moral universalism in conjunction with a defense of moral
absolutism andlor moral objectivism. This is connected with the confusion
discussed in section 1.5 over just which metaethical position is opposed to
moral relativism. When I come to discussing universalism in Part Three I will
therefore take a different tack from that of the discussion of relativism in part
Two. I will focus on universalism from a more general perspective, attempting
to separate out the issues that confront moral universalism as a position, rather
than pursuing close criticism of individual theorists.
In my discussions of these positions I will be looking to decide whether
there is a reason to privilege the fundamental conviction that lies behind each
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of them, Conviction U in the case of moral universalism and Conviction R in
the case of moral relativism. The most obvious way to privilege one of these
convictions would be to rule out the other. To anticipate, I find that there is
not a r€ason to privilege Conviction R, as the discussion of Part Two will
show that the three most prominent contemporary versions of moral relativism
all contain serious flaws. But nor is there a reason to privilege Conviotion U,
as it is plausible that there are more types of moral principle than only
universal moral principles. I put forward a conception of what such universal
moral principles are like in Part Three, and then in Part Four I present a theory
about the nature of the contextdependent moral principles that are also a
legitimate part of the practice of morality.
33
Part Two
Moral Relativism
2.1 Introduction
Moral relativist Gilbert Harman has an interesting analogy between morality
and motion that he uses to help clariff what his view of moral relativism is.
He reminds us that it is only possible to judge whether something is in motion
or at rest relative to some spatio-temporal framework. For example, a
passenger sitting in the dining car of a train willjudge that a cup of tea in front
of him is not moving, and relative to his spatio-temporal framework it is not; a
person standing beside the tracks watching the train go by will judge that the
cup of tea is moving, and relative to ftis spatio-temporal framework it is.
Morality is relative in a similar way to the way in which motion is relative,
suggests Harman. (1996, p 3-4) It is only possible to judge whether something
is morally right or morally wrong relative to some moral framework. For
example, an anti-abortion advocate judges that abortion is morally wrong, and
relative to her moral framework it is; a pro-abortion advocate judges that
abortion is not morally wrong, and relative to her moral framework is it not.
Furthermore, just as there is no spatio-temporal Archimedean point from
which we can judge whether something is 'really' moving or at rest, so there
is also no moral Archimedean point from which we can judge whether
something is 'really' morally right or morally wrong. Everything depends on
the framework within which we make our judgements, either about motion or
about morality.
Harman does not present this analogy between morality and motion as an
argument for moral relativism. The analogy is an elucidatory device designed
to bring out the importance for him of acknowledging the differing moral
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frameworks within which people's moral judgements are made and their
moral principles operate. while other moral relativists may not agree with
Harman that moral frameworks are what morality is relative to, his analogy
between morality and motion still manages to convey a nice general image of
what the moral relativist is claimine about moralitv.
2.2 Some initial universalist objections
As well as the general universalist worry surrounding the perceived relativist
threat to Conviction U, there are a number of other more specific universalist
criticisms that may initially come to mind when moral relativism is advanced.
In this section I will review some of the opening objections that might be
made against the view that moral principles are context dependant and some
possible replies that moral relativists could make to these objections.
Criticism I) Moral relativism is inconsistent.
The universalist might accuse the relativist of inconsistency (See Anington, p
201). If one answers 'Yes' to Q3, then they are asserting that all moral
principles have a context-dependent element (or elements). But this relativist
assertion is presumably meant to apply to all moral principles in any situation
or cultural context, and there is no mention of such a relativist assertion itself
having any context-dependent elements. In other words, the relativist is
making a universalist assertion in the very act of stating their thesis. The
relativist will be able to meet this objection by noting that the position they are
advancing is a metaethical one, the assertion they are making when stating it
is not itself a moral principle and so no problem of inconsistency arises here.
Once this version of the inconsistency objection is cleared out of the way,
there is another sort of inconsistency that the moral relativist may be guilty of.
Moral relativism may be accompanied by the claim that tolerance should be
exercised towards those who operate in contexts other than ours (See Wong, p
175-190). This would include both those in other cultures as well as those
within our own culture who disagree with us on controversial moral issues.
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It would be inconsistent of the moral relativist to claim that tolerance
followed from moral relativism, as the normative claim that we should be
tolerant of others is itself an expression of a moral principle that will, if the
relativist is correct, be context-dependent. To be consistent, the moral
relativist would have to say that whether or not we should be tolerant of others
depends on the context. Of course, a metaethical commitment to relativism
does not prevent the moral relativist from arguing for tolerance (tolerance
within a certain context) at the normative level. Wong is a moral relativist
who takes this avenue (see section 2.6.6). Arrington, on the other hand, is a
moral relativist who argues against tolerance (see section 2.9).
Criticism II) Moral Relativism is incoherent.
Moral Relativism is incoherent because it entails that moral principles are
both true and false. Take the claim 'Abortion is morally wrong.' If moral
relativism is the case then this is true when spoken by an anti-abortion
advocate and false when spoken by a pro-abortion advocate. Hence, the
principle is both true and false, an insupportable situation (See Arington, p
201). This objection has effectively been blocked by the replacement of Q2
with Q3. The sort of moral relativism endorsed by someone who answers
oYes' to Q3 is one that sees a moral principle like 'Abortion is morally wrong'
as being irreducibly context-dependent, so that the truth value of this moral
principle is always linked to the circumstances in which it is uttered. If the
moral relativist is conect and moral principles are context-dependent then this
means that 'Abortion is morally wrong' may be true in those circumstances in
which it is uttered by an anti-abortion advocate and false in those
circumstances in which it is uttered by a pro-abortion advocate, but this is no
more problematic for moral principles than for any other context-dependent
statements in which the truth-value of the statement is tied in some way to the
circumstances of utterance. '[t is now ten to five' may be true when spoken in
Wellington and false when spoken in Ohio, but this variation in truth value is
a harmless feature of the context-dependency of statements about time.
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Criticism III) Moral disagreements become pseudo-disagreements.
This follows on from criticism II. If the correct answer to e3 is 'yes', and
moral principles do actually contain context-dependent elements, then this
means that the so-called moral disagreements that people appear to have are in
reality merely pseudo-disagreements (See Anington, p 201-2). The anti-
abortion advocate and the pro-abortion advocate, for instance, despite the
often bitter and intransigent nature of their dispute, are actually only appearing
to disagree with one another, or they are quite simply mistaken about whether
there is a matter for disagreement here. surely this is implausible, the
universalist may say; there really is a genuine dispute about whether or not
abortion is morally acceptable. We have to make moral judgements about
abortion in particular real-life cases, and some are willing to kill and die for
the sake of their side of the dispute.
However, while there is no doubt that arguments about what should be
done in particular cases does occur and that there must be a clash of some
kind going on when the pro-abortion advocate and the anti-abortion advocate
argue, this in itself does not guarantee that the dispute is a genuine one in the
sense that the universalist intends. The mere fact that there is a difference of
opinion about something does not necessarily mean that one side must be
correct and the other side incorrect. Certainly, if the moral status of abortion is
the sort of issue for which it is possible to apply a non-context-dependant
moral principle, one either permitting or forbidding it, then the debate over
abortion is indeed a genuine one, and one side or the other has the conect
answer while their opponents are incorrect. But this is not the sort of thing that
the universalist can afford to simply assume if they want to avoid begging the
question. First of all an investigation must be conducted into the issue of what
the correct or most plausible answer to Q3 is, before the universalist can be in
any position to make a judgement about the genuineness of the disagreement
between the pro-abortion advocate and the anti-abortion advocate. But even if
the universalist concedes this, they may insist that the burden of proof is now
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more heavily on the moral relativist at this point. The relativist witl need to
give some sort of account as to how such a situation could arise and why both
sides could be so mistaken as to the nature of the disagreement that they so
fervently fight over.
Now the relativist may not be overly distressed at having to do this.
conviction R is itself partly a response to the observation of moral
disagreement and diversity and the relativist claims that the wide variety of
incompatible moral principles at large in the world is a feature of morat
discourse that favours moral relativism rather than moral universalism. The
relativist may suggest that passionate disagreement over a question in
normative ethics such as the moral status of abortion really lends strong
support to the relativist position on the metaethical question of whether moral
principles are context-dependent, in spite of what those who actually argue
about abortion may think. It could be that those who are embroiled in the
normative dispute over abortion are unable to see metaethical matters very
clearly in their desire to condemn the moral stance of those who disagree with
them about the normative question. The moral relativist may give an account
of the origin and causal development of moral discourse that tries to explain
how and why moral principles have come to be context-dependent. Below I
will examine the theories of two moral relativists, Harman and Wong, each of
whom give their own such account in support of their own theory.
Criticism IV) The Genetic Fallacy.
At this point the universalist may introduce a fresh criticism - that the
relativist is now in danger of committing the error is reasoning that is known
as the genetic fallacy. (Snare, p l16-7) The genetic fallacy is a species of the
naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy originates with G. E. Moore's
objection to the notion that it is possible to define a moral term like 'good' in
terms of a natural property such as pleasure (Moore, p l3-a). Moore argued
that a definition of this kind would always be vulnerable to his open-question
argument. There will be properties about which it would be possible to
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intelligibly ask: 'such-and-such is pleasant, but is it good?' As the answer to a
question like this could still be open, that is, the answer would not be self-
evident just from knowing the meanings of the words involved, then the
question is a legitimate question. This means that the purported definition of
ogood' must have failed to fully capture the meaning of the word. However,
the naturalistic fallacy is not only restricted to attempts to strictly define moral
terms or phrases, but also works against attempts to analyse moral concepts in
such a way that the analysis is vulnerable to an open-question argument.
The genetic fallacy is an instance of this. It applies to attempts to fully
analyse moral concepts by giving a causal explanation of the genesis of the
concept. For instance, a theorist might claim that for an action to be morally
wrong is just for it to be disapproved of by those in authority, and support this
claim by providing a causal explanation giving empirical evidence about how
the concept of an action being morally wrong arose as a means for authority
figures to control certain sections of society. This claim would be vulnerable
to an open-question argument. It could always intelligibly be asked: 'Such-
and-such is disapproved of by those in authority, but is such-and-such
wrong?' The critic who proffers the open-question argument here would be
supposing that the answer to the question was not self-evident merely from
understanding the concept of moral wrongness. This means the question
would be a legitimate one and the purported analysis would fail to adequately
capture the moral concept. The critic is not saying that the causal explanation
that was given was false, but even if it were true or likely to be true it could
not do all the metaethical work that was required of it and so it could not
constitute a complete analysis of the moral concept under investigation.
The genetic fallacy (and the naturalistic fallacy) rest upon the familiar
fact/value distinction. This distinction is a recognition of the logical gap
between saying that something is or is not the case, and saying that something
should or should not be the case. A moral relativist would be committing the
genetic fallacy if they were attempting to infer the metaethical conclusion that
moral relativism is the case solely from empirical premises about the causal
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genesis of the diversity of moral principles, A causal explanation giving
empirical evidence as to why various different groups may adhere to the
differing moral principles that they do is not sufficient to establish the
metaethical case that moral principles are context-dependant. Although it is
well known and accepted that the genetic fallacy is a error in reasoning, it
never the less appears in the work of a number of ethical theorists (and not
only moral relativists) in various different disguises, as I wilt rry to show
below.
Moral relativism is not automatically vulnerable to the genetic fallacy. It
may be possible to explain why moral principles are context-dependent just by
making use of other moral notions and without any explicit reference to casual
origins. I will investigate this possibility below. In any case, while the moral
relativist who is able to come up with a causal explanation for moral diversity
may accept that this does not by itself suffice as a complete metaethical
argument for moral relativism, they may well allege that the burden of proof
has now been passed back to the universalist. It is now up to the universalist to
give their account as to why there is only one correct set of moral principles,
so that for any normative controversy such as that surrounding abortion, one
(or perhaps both) of the sides to the dispute must be mistaken at the normative
level.
Clearly more could be said by both the moral relativist and the moral
universalist about the criticisms raised above, and the above argument
sketches may be only the opening moves in a long and complicated
metaethical campaign. What has emerged from the above brief discussion is
that anyone who seeks to adjudicate between the moral relativist and the
moral universalist and present a view as to how best to answer Q3, must be
able to give an account of the nature of moral diversity and disagreement.
Such an account must take seriously the points made above by both the moral
relativist and the moral universalist. That is one of the things that I will try to
do in the metaethical theory that I present over the course of this study.
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Continuing the review of moral relativism, I will now look at some more
criticisms of moral relativism that have been offered by two universalists,
Louis Pojman and James Rachels. I find that their criticisms are directed
against certain specific versions of moral relativism, and while their
objections may be successful against these versions of relativism, they will
only work against a moral relativist who makes some quite specific
commitments.
2.3 Pojman and individualistic moral relativism
One criticism that might be advanced by a universalist is directed towards a
certain interpretation of moral relativism. Moral relativism might seem to
offer the unwelcome possibility that it could be up to an individual to decide
for themselves just what moral principles it was appropriate for them to
follow. This interpretation of moral relativism (l will call it individualistic
moral relativism) is the target of criticism from Pojman, whose argument I
will now examine.
According to the view offered by individualistic moral relativism each
individual is the sole judge as to what are the morally correct principles for
them. On such a view an individual's present acceptance of a moral principle
is both necessary and sufficient for that moral principle to apply to them. Such
acceptance may or may not be the result of some form of reasoning that leads
to the principle. It may seem that even to speak of moral principles in
conjunction with individualistic moral relativism would be going too far 
- 
it
seems that it would be possible for the individual to make a fresh decision in
each case about what it is morally right for him or her to do, without regard to
previous decisions made in similar situations.
This is the very difficulty that Pojman finds with individualistic moral
relativism (he calls it "subjectivism", although it is a different view from the
view I called subjectivism in section 1.5). To Pojman's subjectivist, the
morally right thing to do at any given moment is what one feels like doing.
This view, says Pojman, entails that: "little or no interpersonal criticism or
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judgement is logically possible." (Pojman, p 509) The ramifications of such a
stance will be that individuals are morally inconigible, or unable to be
corrected on moral matterso and their moral judgements are not open to any
real discussion, except perhaps about the accuracy of their reports as to what
they feel like doing. An individual may feel like committing a murder on
Monday and so would be doing nothing morally wrong in committing murder
on that day, but come Tuesday they may feel differently, and so whether it is
wrong for them to commit murder on that day will likewise fluctuate. This
may reveal hypocrisy on their part, but so long as they feel like being a
hypocrite, their apparently unprincipled behavior may not be questioned on
moral grounds. Pojman: "For [the individualistic moral relativist], both
hypocrisy and nonhypocrisy are morally permissible." As Pojman insists, the
resulting inconigibility of moral agents robs moral discourse of its normative
character, and o'makes morality a useless concept." (p 509) Pojman is trying to
show that individualistic moral relativism leads inevitably to moral nihilism.
However, while there is clearly something faulty about the individualistic
moral relativism that Pojman describes, it is worthwhile looking at just why it
is flawed. While individualistic moral relativism may not be criticised at the
normative level on the grounds of hypocrisy, it may be criticised at the
metaethical level on the grounds of the inconigibility it leads to. Presumably
it is this deficiency at the metaethical level that Pojman rightly finds so
objectionable. Whatever we may think, normatively speaking, of the
hypocrisy of the individualistic moral relativist described in the previous
paragraph, it is their outright incorrigibility at the metaethical level that makes
them appear so unreasonable. If we take the stance Pojman describes to be the
paradigm of individualistic moral relativism then the incorrigibility of this
view may indeed be criticised, as Pojman himself does. The very point of the
concept of morality would, as he says, be under threat if such incorrigibility
were permitted at the level of metaethical examination. The individualistic
moral relativist comes across as really being an eliminativist about morality.
Proposing to follow a system in which corigibility has no place is proposing
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to follow a system that is not a moral system. Inconigibility leads straight to
nihilism.
But it seems possible, given that inconigibility is the stumbling block for
Pojman's subjectivist, for there to be a version of individualistic moral
relativism that avoided this weakness. Such a view could be called principled
individualistic moral relativism. Here the individual, while following a set of
moral principles that is unique to themselves, tries to follow their own
singular moral principles as consistently as they possibly can, and is
furthermore prepared to change their intended actions in the light of criticism
from others that they are not consistently adhering to their own principles.
A position such as principled individualistic moral relativism would be
possible to hold without violating metaethical scruples about incorrigibility
and so not threatening the very concept of morality. Given this, it seems that
the size of the group or groups that morality might be relative to does not
matter all that much. It is the incorrigibility of the unprincipled individualistic
moral relativist that is their undoing, not the fact that they follow a singular
moral code. Pojman's criticism of this interpretation of moral relativism does
make an important point 
- 
that any position that does not allow for the
normative nature of moral claims cannot be a form of moral relativism
(although it might be some other kind of relativism).
So it seems that whenever moral relativism is interpreted in an unprincipled
individualistic manner it will be vulnerable to Pojman's criticism. However,
there are other (more plausible) varieties of moral relativism that are neither
unprincipled nor individualistic. Some of them I will examine below. Pojman's
criticism does not offer any threat to them, as it is so specifically directed
against unprincipled individualistic moral relativism only. In what follows I
will proceed under the assumption that the theorist attempting to articulate the
most reasonable possible version of moral relativism will avoid the version that
Pojman identifies and criticises.
2.4 Rachels and cultural relativism
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James Rachels is a universalist who gives a number of criticisms of a position
that he calls cultural relativism. It emerges that cultural relativist positions
form a subset of relativist positions. It is worthwhile looking at the arguments
that Rachels has to offer against cultural relativism both in order to bring out
the nature of the difference between cultural relativism and moral relativism,
and also to serve as a first glimpse at what seems to be a ubiquitous theme in
universalist arguments against relativists.
According to Rachels there are six principles of cultural relativism:
L Different societies have different moral codes.
2. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one societal
code better than another.
3. The moral code of our society has no special status; it is merely one
among many.
4. There is no "universal truth'n in ethics 
- 
that is, there are no moral
truths that hold for all peoples at all times.
5. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that
society;that is, if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is
right, then that action is right, at least within that society.
6. It is mere alrogance for us to try to judge the conduct of other
peoples. We should adopt an attitude of tolerance toward the practices
ofother cultures. (Rachels, p a89)
From the point of view of the dispute I am concerned with, between the
moral relativist and the moral universalist, principle I is an empirical claim
that both can accept, and principle 2 is an objectivist claim that need not be a
point of difference between them (see section 1.5), unless principle 2 is
understood as: "There is no single objective standard that can be used to judge
one societal code better than another", in which case the universalist must
reject it. Principles 3, 4, and 5 seem to have the most bearing on the dispute,
particularly principle 4, which I have characterised as the chief matter of
contention between the moral relativist and the moral universalist. Principle 6
is an explicitly normative principle, and hence different in kind from
principles l-5 (See section 2.2). lt may be that Rachels conceives cultural
relativism as a sort of hybrid theory that contains both metaethical and
normative commitments. In order to focus on metaethical argument, I will
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ignore principle 6 in what follows. Rachels gives some uiticisms of the
cultural relativist who adopts principles l-5. t will evaluate his criticisms.
Rachels condemns a certain type of argument that might be given for
cultural relativism, one he calls the cultural differences argument. He
characterises this argument as follows: "The strategy used by cultural
relativists is to argue from facts about the differences between cultural
outlooks to a conclusion about the status of morality.' O 489) He rejects this
argument because it commits the genetic fallacy 
- 
the failure to distinguish
facts about the causal origin of moral betiefs from arguments that establish the
metaethical status of these beliefs (see section 2.2). This seems to be quite a
respectable line of argument, as a bare appeal to facts about diverse moral
beliefs will not in itself establish moral relativism.
However, as I mentioned in section 2.2, a universalist will have to say
something themselves about diverse moral beliefs. Of the many varied moral
beliefs that have been and are curently subscribed to, some convincing
account needs to be given as to what makes only one particular set of these
moral beliefs correct and the rest of them incorrect, and also an account of
how it is that some people could come to be in error about which are the
correct moral principles. Rachels shoulders the burden of proof here by
arguing for "a general theoretical point ... that there are some moral rules that
all societies will have in common, because those rules are necessary for
society to exist." 0 a93) The problem for Rachels is that this argument itself
commits the genetic fallacy. I will look at this further below.
Rachels also presents a modus tollens argument designed to show that cultural
relativism is not the case. He puts forward three implications he thinks follow
from cultural relativism, and then tries to show that as these implications
cannot be accepted, neither can the view that leads to them. Rachels says that
if cultural relativism is the case then the following claims are true:
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l) We could no longer say that the customs of other societies
morally inferior to our own.
2) We could decide whether actions are right or wrong just by
consulting the standards of our society.
3) The idea of moral progress is called into doubt. (p 490-l)
But Rachels believes that that l) 
- 
3) are not true; we can say that the
customs of other societies are inferior to our own, we cannot decide whether
actions are right or wrong just by consulting the standards of our society, and
moral progress has undoubtedly occurred. Hence, according to this argument
cultural relativism cannot be the case.
Underlying Rachels modus tollens argument against the cultural relativist
is an appeal to Conviction U; the notion that there are some kinds of acts that
are morally intolerable and the resulting fear that moral relativism may open
the door for such acts to somehow become morally justified in certain
circumstances. This is a legitimate concern and I propose a way of addressing
it when I present my own view in 3.3.2 below. The point I want to make here
is that Rachels' modus tollens argument does not succeed in harnessing this
intuition in a way that poses much of a challenge to the moral relativist.
The first thing to notice about this argument is that the statements l) and
3) are really different ways of saying the same thing. To claim that moral
progress has occured just is to claim that the customs of societies in the past
are morally inferior to our own. But when he makes his assertions that l) and
3) are false, it is difficult to see how Rachels is doing anything other than
begging the question. The claim that we can say that the customs of our own
society are morally superior to the customs of other societies, whether these
are societies that existed in the past or those that are contemporaneous with
our own, is one of the very things that is at issue between the moral
universalist and the relativist (whether a cultural relativist or a moral
relativist).
46
Rachels' claim that l) and 3) are false certainly has the potential to be an
effective rhetorical ploy to use against the cultural relativist, and Rachels
does make full use of the rhetorical possibilities here, invoking slavery, anti-
Semitism, and gender inequality as instances of customs of other societies
that are morally inferior to our own, but this ploy does not, of course,
constitute an argument against cultural relativism. Rachels is not likely to
have many of his readers disagree with him when he says, for instance,
"slavery and anti-Semitism seem wrong wherever they occur." 0) 491, italics
in original) But this is to be expected given that his probable audience will be
made up of members of his own society. But so long as'seem wrong'means
no more than Judged by members of our society to be wrong', this would
show only that applying one group's moral standards to the customs of
another group will be likely to lead the first group to judge that the customs
of the second group are morally inferior.
The cultural relativist (and the moral relativist) can accept this, as it does
not damage cultural relativism (or moral relativism) for members of our
society to judge that the customs of other societies are morally inferior.
Undoubtedly members of other societies would judge that the customs of our
society are morally inferior. After all, this is just what we would expect given
that moral diversity occurs and that diflerent societies have different moral
codes.
However, it is here that an extra dimension to cultural relativism
(according to Rachels' interpretation of the position), and the factor that
seperates it as a distinctive subgroup within moral relativism, emerges.
Rachels says that, according to the cultural relativist, believing in moral
progress, or judging another societies customs to be morally inferior to one's
own, "make[s] no sense." (p 491) This is a quite singular claim, and can be
regarded as a seventh principle augmenting the list of principles above that
delineate the view Rachels is calling cultural relativism. This principle 7
entails that for the cultural relativist it is not just an error to judge that moral
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progress has occurred or that the customs of other societies are inferior to
one's own, but it is literally senseless.
This is the point at which cultural relativism (as Rachels interprets it) is
revealed as a somewhat extremist sect within moral relativism. The moral
relativist can accept that it makes sense to moral universalists to use what are,
according to the relativist, context-dependent moral principles as if they were
non-context-dependent by making moral evaluations of the actions that occur
in other cultures. Given that it does seem to be at least intelligible to make
such evaluations about the customs of other societies, so long as it is
understood that any such judgement is relative to one's own moral standards,
the moral relativist does not have to deny that it is possible to understand the
sentences that people utter when they make such evaluations. For the cultural
relativist, as Rachels characterises the position, such evaluations would be on
a par with judgements about the colours of numbers, or some other literally
senseless utterances.
There are two major insights to be gained from the discussion of Rachels'
arguments against cultural relativism. Firstly, cultural relativism (as Rachels
interprets it) is a species of moral relativism that requires a commitment to the
semantic claim principle 7 above (as well as the normative claim principle 6).
Not all versions of moral relativism need to be committed to these principles.
Secondly, an appeal to Conviction U must be carefully handled by the
universalist. Asking a crowd of Athenians whether it is Athenians or Spartans
who do what is right is not the way to argue for moral universalism. some
more legitimate way of accommodating Conviction U must be found.
Pojman's unprincipled individualistic moral relativist and Rachels'
cultural relativist both contain glaring weaknesses that make them easy to
criticise. It would perhaps not be entirely fair to call the unprincipled
individualistic moral relativist and the cultural relativist straw men, as Pojman
and Rachels may indeed have come across the sort of opinions that these two
positions represent. However, there are far more rigorous and interesting
versions of moral relativism available and any moral universalist who ignores
48
these theories would be doing themselves and their position a disservice. In
the remainder of this chapter I will critically examine three serious versions of
moral relativism, presented by Gilbert Harman, David wong, and Robert
Arrington.
2.5 Ilarman's moral relativism
2.5.1 Moraldiversity
Harman is perhaps the classic example of a moral relativist who is impressed
with Conviction R. His basic position is that moral relativism is: "a reasonable
inference from the most plausible explanation of moral diversity". (1996, p g)
He gives many examples of moral diversity: across different cultures we find
different moral attitudes towards cannibalism, marriage, the treatment of
women, slavery, caste systems, theft and infanticide. within contemporary
Western society we find different moral attitudes towards the treatment of
animals, abortion, euthanasia, the value of artifacts as compared with human
life, how much help one ought to give another, whether kitling is worse than
letting die and the relative importance of liberty versus equality. (1996, p g-
I l)
In Harman's view the most plausible explanation for all this heterogeneity
is the operation of a wide variety of different moral frameworks. From this he
believes we can reasonably infer that moral relativism is the case. While he is
aware that moral diversity in itself does not entail moral relativism, Harman
tries to show that it is more reasonable to infer that moral relativism is the
case than that anything else is the case.
2.5.2 Harman's criticism of universalism.
Harman brings up and dismisses one possible universalist explanation of
moral diversity. This is the notion that some people or cultures are rather
poorly placed epistemologically. According to this universalist account, such
individuals or groups may have the same relevant experiences as those who
are following the universally correct moral system but their false beliefs about
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nonmoral matters lead them to misinterpret this experience and so they end up
adopting moral arrangements that are not correct. (1996, p 12)
Harman does not think that this is a plausible explanation and believes that
this kind of account of moral diversity is the result of simple bias in favour of
one's own moral framework: "The system of moral coordinates that is
determined by a personos own values can be so salient that it can seem to that
person to have a special status" (1996, p l3). A commitment to moral
universalism in itself provides no guarantee that the moral universalist's own
moral framework is actually the universally correct moral framework. The
claim that there is but one correct set of moral principles leaves open the
possibility that the universalist themselves is mistaken about what this set
contains, or even the possibility that nobody at all is in a position to say what
this set contains. Needless to say, moral universalism will not guarantee
access to the truth about relevant nonmoral matters either. Imputing false
beliefs about nonmoral matters to others as an explanation of moral diversity
cuts both ways; these others may be just as inclined to pay the erstwhile
imputer back in her own coin. If the nonmoral matters in question are
themselves controversial ones, with no readily apparent procedure available
for deciding them, such as for example, the question of whether the fetus is or
is not conscious, then little will have been achieved if each side declares that
the other side has false beliefs about this. Harman's point is that at the very
least the moral universalist must do more than merely impute false beliefs to
others in order to give a convincing explanation of moral diversity.
2.5.3 Inner judgements.
There are two main parts to Harman's attempt to give what he considers the
most plausible account of moral relativism. l) There is the logical thesis that
moral relativism applies only to those moral judgements he calls 'inner
judgements'. 2) There is the claim that agents are motivated to act morally as
a result of an agreement in intentions that arise due to what he calls 'implicit
bargaining'. I will look at each of these in turn.
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For Harman, an inner judgement is a judgement we can make about a
person, "only if we suppose that he is capable of being motivated by the
relevant moral considerations." (1982, p 190) Examples of inner judgements
include a judgement that someone ought or ought not to have done something
and a judgement that it was right or wrong of someone to have done
something.
Harman draws a logical distinction between four different senses of the
word "ought". These are what he calls the expectational sense, the rational
sense, the normative sense and the moral sense (1982,p 192), For example,
the sentence: "She ought not to have an abortion," may be interpreted in at
least four different ways, employing each of the above four senses
respectively. The sentence may mean that one would not expect her to have an
abortion, or that it would not be in her own best interests to have an abortion,
or that it would be a bad thing for her to have an abortion, or that she would
be morally wrong to have an abortion. According to Harman, it is only the
very last of these interpretations of this sentence that makes it an inner
judgement, and it is this kind of judgement that Harman's theory of moral
relativism solely applies to.
The distinction between the third and the fourth sense of "ought" is a fine
one, but important for Harman. He explains it thus:
The normative "ought to be" is used to assess a situation; the moral
"ought to do" is used to describe a relation between an agent and a
type of act that he rnight perform or has performed.
Harman also thinks that this is the case with the word '\vrong". For Harman it
is important to distinguish:
using the word o'wrong" to say that a particular situation or action is
wrong from using the word to say that it is wrong of someone to do
something. (1982, p 192, italics in original)
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The point of the distinction seems to be to allay the universalist's fear that
moral relativism can allow anything to be morally acceptable by giving
Harman the conceptual room to say that, for instance, the situation that
obtained in ancient Greece that allowed human slavery to be practiced was a
morally wrong situation, but that despite this it was not morally wrong for
individual ancient Greeks in that situation to enslave humans.
Harman singles out inner judgements as being susceptible to relativism
because they imply that the agent who is the subject of the inner judgement
has a reason (or reasons) to do or to refrain from an action and that the one
making the judgement approves of this reason (and that the intended audience
for the judgement also approves). so inner judgements may only legitimately
be made relative to a set of shared reasons for acting. I may not make a
genuine inner judgement (using the moral sense of 'ought') that someone
ought or ought not to do something unless I (and also my intended audience)
share the relevant motivational attitudes with the one about whom the
judgement is made. This is the logical foundation of Harman's moral
relativism. He analyses 'ought', when used in the moral sense, as a four-place
predicate, in the following manner: " "Ought (A, D, C, M)," which relates an
agent A, a type of act D, considerations C, and motivating attitudes M."
(1982, p l94) The inclusion of M ensures that reference to shared motivating
reasons for acting is built into the meaning of the moral sense of 'ought.'
Although in this analysis Harman does not mention the notion of the
framework that takes center stage in his later writings on relativism, a
framework may perhaps be supposed to be constituted by a set of shared
motivating reasons for acting.
Harman acknowledges that his analysis requires the following assumption:
"l assume that the possession of rationality is not sufficient to provide a
source for relevant reasons [for action], that certain desires, goals, or
intentions are also necessary" (1982, p l9a). However, even those who did not
accept this assumption about the role of rationality in motivating action would
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not need to reject Harman's analysis of inner judgements entirely, but woutd
only need to insist that the inclusion of a reference to motivating attitudes is a
redundant element, as speaker and audience will always necessarily share
motivating attitudes if they are all rational. Someone with this view might
want to insist that, strictly speaking, the word 'ought' when used in a moral
sense is a three-place predicate and not a four-place predicate as Harman
believes. Making this modification would allow Harman's analysis of moral
judgements to be detached from his moral relativism and they could each
stand alone as independent contributions to metaethics.
In any case, the metaethical issue conceming the role of rationality in
moral motivation is distinct from the metaethical issue between the
universalist and the relativist, and this is something I will discuss in more
depth in part 3. For the sake of specifically evaluating Harman's version of
rnoral relativism, I propose to accept the analysis of inner judgements given
above.
2.5.4 T acit bargaining.
Harman offers a hypothesis about the origins of the shared motivating
attitudes that allow us to make legitimate inner judgements. He says that they
arise as a result of implicit bargaining. (1982, p 196-8; 1996,p21-4)ln fact he
says it is "essential" (1982, p 197) to his version of moral relativism thatthey
be supposed to have originated in this way. A deal that is struck as the result
of a bargain, for instance an agreement that a house will be sold at a certain
price, is not considered to reflect any sort of universally correct reality about
the value of the house. It is a pragmatic arrangement that allows a self-
interested buyer and seller to do business and achieve their goals by reaching
a compromise that both of them can live with. The buyer and seller of a house
may use various argumentative strategies and appeal to various facts when
bargaining over the price of the house, but an appeal to the price of the house
will not be one of these, as the price of the house emerges only once the
bargain has been struck. Harman stresses that the most effective bargaining
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tool in such situations will often be a threat to withdraw from the bargaining
process; the seller will refuse to sell if the price is too low, the buyer will
refuse to buy if the price is too high.
According to Harman a similar sort of bargaining process is also how
moral frameworks arise. There is no universally correct fact of the matter
concerning what moral framework to follow prior to bargaining, and each of
the self-interested parties to the bargain can, if the bargain is not to their
f iking, "threaten to withhold full participation in a moral framework" (1996, p
22). The resulting bargains form a sort of social contract that it is in each
participant's self-interest to follow. Everyone agrees that there must be
restrictions on some kinds of behaviour, such as murder, because the benefits
to any self-interested individual in being able to commit murder at will are
outweighed by the costs of the constant possibility that one could be murdered
at will by anyone else.
Harman sees morality as "a compromise based on implicit bargaining."
(1982, p 197) He believes that this is the best way to explain why "most of us
assign greater [moralJ weight to the duty not to harm others than to the duty to
help others." (1982, p 196) His explanation is that because the implicit
bargaining underlying morality is between people of differing degrees of
power then, while all could agree to a moral principle forbidding harm ro
others because all would benefit from such a principle, only the poor and the
weak would support a moral principle requiring everyone to help others,
because only the poor and the weak would benefit from it. The rich and the
strong would not support such a principle, and so implicit bargaining would
result in a compromise whereby there was a robust moral principle requiring
agents not to harm others, and a considerably more fragile moral principle
requiring agents to help others.
This reflects Harman's conviction that morality has "a source in actual
bargains, reached among actual people who have different powers and
resources" (1996, p 63). This conviction suggests that Harman considers
himself to be giving a causal explanation of why we regard it as more wrong
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to harm others than not to help them. It is because our ancestors once struck a
bargain to that effect some time before the beginning of recorded history, and
since then social pressures along with other casual factors have entrenched
this aspect of our morality. Furthermore, Harman seems to envisage this as an
ongoing process. He says, "most people's values reflect conventions that are
maintained by continual tacit bargaining and adjustment" (1996, p 22). He
also believes that we may sometimes observe the process in action: "Recent
changes in conventional sexual morality seem clearly to have been affected by
moraf bargaining" (1996, p 30).
Harman gives an example of what he thinks tacit bargaining is. The
example is Hume's one of two rowers adjusting their rates of rowing to
achieve a compromise rate (1996, p 22). However, while this may be a good
example of unspoker bargaining, it is not clear that it is tacit bargaining. The
physical circumstances that the rowers are in does not require speech in order
for one rower to understand that the other rower is not matching their speed
and to react accordingly, but there is some kind of nonverbal communication
going on here. Other instances we might imagine that could be cases of
unspoken bargaining also seem to have this feature. So, for instance, when
people at a bus stop form a queue to get on the bus without having to speak a
word it could perhaps be said that they are bargaining with each other to
determine their place in the queue, but again this only seems to be possible
because body language and other non-verbal means take the place of speech.
Just because a situation is such that bargaining can take place without speech
does not necessarily make the bargaining tacit. Two people could bargain
without speaking to each other by writing messages on a blackboard, but this
would not be tacit bargaining. Some indication is needed ofjust how implicit
the bargaining would have to be before it would count as tacit bargaining.
Harman recognises that there are some clarifying questions faced by the
proponent of a theory like his and he himself lists five of them:
l) If we have agreed, when did we do it?
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2) Does anyone really remember having agreed?
3) How did we indicate our agreement?
4) How do those who do nor want to agree indicate that they do not
agree?
5) What are the consequences of their not agreein g? (1982,p 201)
Harman responds to these questions by stipulating that the sort of
agreement he has in mind is not supposed to be some sort of datable ritual but
rather an agreement in intentions: "there is an agreement in the relevant sense
when each of a number of people has an intention on the assumption that
others have the same intention." (1982, p 201). Harman says he is using the
word "intention" here in an extended sense to indicate a certain disposition or
habit, rather than a conscious intention. (1982, p 196). This takes care of
questions l-3. As it is an agreement in intentions it is not the kind of
agreement for which we can give a date for the commencement of the
agreement, or remember agreeing to, or indicate our agreement in any formal
way. We just habitually act in the way we think is morally right (as far as we
can) and assume that others will do likewise. This also answers the question
raised in the previous paragraph; no communication of any kind occurs
between the parties to the agreement. Participants in the bargaining process
will not be aware that they are undertaking such bargaining, but will simply
think that they are debating about what is morally right.
As for questions 4 and 5, Harman says: "Someone refuses to agree to the
extent that he or she does not share these intentions. Those who do not agree
are outside the agreement; in extreme cases they are outlaws or enemies."
(1982, p 201). The way such outlaws are dealt with will depend on the details
of the moral framework, although some sort of sanction will presumably be
likely.
However, it is significant that Harman continually talks of agreement
when he is answering these questions, and not bargaining, even though it is
the notion of tacit bargaining that his theory is built upon. There is an
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important difference between agreement and bargaining when it comes to
answering questions 4 and 5. Those who are unsatisfied with an agreement are
simply regarded as being outside it. Harman says: o'in extreme cases they are
outlaws or enemies.'(1982, p 201). In contrast, those who are unsatisfied with
a bargain, Harman says, "can threaten to withhold full participation in a moral
framework unless their disadvantage is lessened or removed." (1996, p 22).
With an agreement one is either a part of it, or outside of it, but in a
bargaining situation things are less straightforward as there is a third
possibility. One may either be a part of the bargain, outside of the bargain, or
be threatening to withdraw from the bargain unless certain demands are met.
A difficulty with Harman's theory is that it is crucial for participants to be
able to make a threat to withdraw from the bargaining process, but it is a
mystery as to how such a threat could be delivered tacitly. It seems that
explicit communication between the parties is a necessary element of any
bargaining situation. Recalling Harman's earlier example, it would seem to be
impossible for a buyer and seller to tacitly bargain over the price of a house.
Part of the nature of bargaining involves making offers and counteroffers and
it is difficult to see how anyone could do this tacitly, or tacitly threaten to
withdraw from the negotiations if they are not getting what they want.
To see the diffrculty, consider the following situation: Suppose I am a
member of a club. I intend to pay my club fees so long as I believe that the
others in the club also intend to pay their fees. Nothing to this effect has ever
explicitly been stated, and so the club members could be thought of as being
participants in a tacit agreement. So far, so good. Now suppose I become
aware that myself and a few other members of the club pay far higher club
fees than the rest of the members while receiving exactly the same benefits of
membership as they do. I am dissatisfied with this arangement and I (along
with the minority of other club members who also pay higher fees) would like
the agreement to be modified so that the amount we pay is in line with what
the rest of the club members pay. Presumably bargaining is called for, and if
necessary I and the others in the minority will threaten to not pay our fees at
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all or even to leave the club if our fees are not reduced. But it is difficult to see
how such a threat can be made in a tacit manner. Perhaps I should simply stop
paying my fees or pay a lesser amount than I am cumently paying and expect
that the rest of the club members will tacitly understand what my grievance is.
An appeal to intentions does not clarify matters. It seems that my intention has
changed, or at least become more refined: I now intend to pay my club fees so
long as I believe that the others in the club are charged fees comparable to
mine and intend to pay these fees.
This problem for Harman also effects the other examples of rowing and
queuing for a bus. Suppose one of the rowers decides she wants to rest for a
while and wishes to strike a bargain with the other rower about this. The
sensible thing to do would be to speak up and explicitly discuss a new
agreement. Someone who pushes their way from the back to the front of a bus
queue may have rejected the bargaining process, or they may only be tacitly
threatening to reject it because they think it was unfair that they were at the
back. It seems impossible to say which is the case without communicating
with them.
Harman's notion of tacit bargaining as the basis for morality faces the
difficulty that there does not seem to be any plausible way for bargaining to
proceed tacitly. If we do not communicate explicitly with others about the
bargain then we have no means of determining what aspects of morality they
intend to bargain about nor can we determine when or why they may be
threatening to withdraw from the bargain. Claiming that tacit bargaining is the
basis for morality leaves it unclear whether, for instance, a particular murderer
is an outlaw operating outside the bargaining process or whether they are
someone who is provisionally withdrawing their commitment to morality as a
part of the bargaining process. (ln a recent paper Barbara Fried has raised
related concerns about how the practical difficulties of exiting a social
contract type arrangement tend to be suppressed when such theories are
presented.)
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It seems to me that the notion of tacit bargaining is problematic in so far as
Harman does not explain how it is possible to conceive of bargaining
occuring without explicit communication between the parties to the bargain.
Yet Harman would not want to rely on the notion of explicit bargaining as the
basis for morality because no explicit bargaining about morality takes place, at
least so far as I can determine. For instance, the recent changes in sexual
morality that Harman mentions do not seem to have occurred because people
who were once thought to be immoral due to their sexual orientation
threatened to start lying and murdering if they were not more fairly treated.
Bargaining, either explicit or implicit, does not seem to play the role in
morality that Harman believes it does. This makes his version of moral
relativism, which is built on the notion of bargaining, less plausible.
2.5.5 Wong's criticisms of Harman.
Before moving on to examine the version of moral relativism offered by
David Wong, I will look briefly at the objections Wong makes to Harman's
brand of moral relativism. He has two lines of objection. Firstly, he proposes
that in a situation in which no bargain about morality was in force, we would
still have some moral obligations. Wong says: "Suppose that in the next Great
Depression, the fabric of society unravels into a Hobbesian war of all against
all. Many of us think we would still have the elementary duty not to kill others
for amusement, even if we know that others had no intention of
reciprocating." (Wong, p 24).According to Wong, Harman's theory is not
able to explain where this duty would come from.
Harman might reply that it is doubtful whether the kind of extreme
situation that Wong envisages, wherein every individual is set against every
other individual, could ever really arise. Even the most divisive of civil wars
will be between groups of people and not individuals, and any time people are
interacting with one another in groups there must be some sort of an implicit
agreement in force within the group, and that is all Harman needs for his
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moral relativism to get off the ground (assuming he is able to find some way
to account for the difficulties I raised in the previous section).
Wong could perhaps maintain that the situation he envisages is not
supposed to be one that could ever arise in practice but rather that it is a
logical possibility that society could completely fragment into warring
individuals and yet that even in such an extremity the moral duty not to kill
others for amusement would hold. This would perhaps be to imagine that
some sort of individualistic relativism (see section 2,3) has taken over. Wong
might think that it is this logical possibility that Harman's theory cannot
account for. Perhaps it could not, although it is unclear just how much of a
victory this would be for Wong to score. In setting up this extreme situation as
something that a theory of moral relativism must be able to explain in order to
be credible, Wong is in danger of defeat at the hands of the monster he
created, as I argue below that his own theory is not able to explain this
situation either (see section 2.6.2).1 think it is fair to say that this situation is
something that many moral theories would have difficulty explaining but that
this has a lot to do with the incredible nature of the scenario that Wong
creates. After giving the details of Wong's theory below I will ask whether it
fares any better than Harman's in explaining this scenario.
Wong's second objection is that Harman's view does not take into account
our propensity to criticise other groups for the agreements they make. This is
reminiscent of Rachels objection that moral relativism implies that we could
no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our
own (see section 2.4). ln fact, Harman takes some pains to distance his moral
relativism from such an implication: "I am not denying (nor am I asserting)
that some moralities are "objectively" better than others or that there are
objective standards for assessing moralities." (Harman 1982, p 190) In putting
forward this objection Wong seems not to recognise that Harman's moral
relativism is supposed to apply only to inner judgements. Harman's
distinction between the normative sense and the moral sense of words such as
'oought" (see section 2.5.3) is supposed to forestall the very objection Wong
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raises. Perhaps Wong could have tried to cast doubt on the plausibility of this
distinction of Harman's, but he does not appear to be aware that it has been
made. In summary, it seems to me that neither of the criticisms that Wong
puts forward against Harman's version of moral relativism are especially
successful. Now I will turn to the type of moral relativism that Wong
advocates.
2.6 Wong's moral relativism
2.6.1 Six claims.
David Wong, in his book Moral Relativity, advances a theory that he says
"gives us the best explanation of moral experience." (p l) It is "a theory built
around the claim that there is no single true morality." (p l) Like many others,
Wong characterises the metaethical dispute about this claim in terms of
conflicting views about whether morality is "objective" or 'osubjective". For
my discussion of Wong I will recast what he says in the terminology I have
already introduced in section 1.5, for the reasons that I give there. When I do
use Wong's terminology t will place it in quotation marks to indicate that it is
his.
Wong lists six claims on the first page of his book. How many of these
claims one is willing to accept indicates the degree to which one is an
"objectivist" or a "subjectivist" about morality. The claims are:
l. Moral statements have truth values;
2. There are good and bad arguments for the moral positions people
take;
3. Nonmoral facts (states of affairs that obtain in the world and that
can be described without use of moral terms such as 'ought,' 'good,'
and 'right') are relevant to the assessment of the truth value of moral
statements:
4. There are moral facts (that may or may not be claimed to be
reducible in some way to nonmoral facts);
5. When two moral statements conflict as recommendations to
action, only one statement can be true;
6. There is a single true morality.(p l)
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Wong rejects Claim 6, correctly identifying it as being the real issue that
separates moral universalists from moral relativists. He recognises that a
moral relativist may accept at least claims l-4, while it would be possible for a
moral universalist to deny them. Claim 5 seems to be the odd one out in this
list as whether or not it was accepted or denied would seem to depend greatly
on just how the two moral statements are supposed to be conflicting as
recommendations for action. Wong appears to think that the two moral
statements must contradict one another. The example he gives of two
conflicting moral statements is: "You ought not to act coldly" and "You ought
to act coldly" (p 2-3). Less implacably opposed pairs of conflicting moral
statements seem to be possible however, such as the sort of situation that
might be described as a moral dilemma, perhaps a case in which someone has
made a promise that requires them to tell a lie, in which moral
recommendations to action may conflict without strictly speaking
contradicting each other. The acceptance or rejection of Claim 5 depends on
the details, and will not necessarily separate the moral universalist from the
moral relativist.
Wong commits himself to accepting Claims l-4: that moral statements
have truth values, that there are good and bad arguments for the moral
positions people take, that nonmoral facts are relevant to assessing the truth
values of moral statements, and that there are moral facts. But he rejects
Claims 5-6: he believes that two moral statements recommending conflicting
courses of action can both be true and that there is no single true morality. (p
7) Wong categorises himself as a moral relativist, but at the same time he
wants to take on board some of what he thinks are the more plausible of the
claims that moral universalists might make. Wong wishes to achieve a
compromise between moral relativism and moral universalism by conceding
some claims that are often central to an universalist account of morality while
at the same time insisting that the nature of morality is ultimately relativistic.
The strategy is to give the moral universalist almost all they could reasonably
ask for but still in the end maintain a theorv that would deserve to be called a
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form of moral relativism. This seems to me a sound strategy and my attempt
in this thesis to present a coherentist approach that makes room for both
Conviction U and Conviction R shares some similarities with what Wong is
trying to do, although the details of our two approaches differ markedly.
Wong, like Harman, is impressed with Conviction R and like Harman he
critically examines some common universalist strategies for explaining moral
diversity and disagreement. The universalist might say that in a moral
disagreement one side or the other is mistaken about some fact or facts, that
one side or the other has made errors in reasoning, or that the disagreement is
beyond the powers of human reason to solve (Wong, p l5l-3). Wong thinks
that the universalist is not able to satisfactorily say just what the facts are that
one side or the other is mistaken about. Nor does he believe that universalists
are able to say just what errors in reasoning have taken place, or why exactly
the disagreement is beyond human power to solve. o'The general failing of the
[universalist] methods is not meeting the principle of the best explanation. We
are left with gaping holes in our theory of the speakers of moral language."
(Wong, p 153) Wong here exploits Conviction R in very much the same way
as Harman, by alleging that universalists are not able to give an acceptable
explanation of why moral diversity occurs.
2.6.2Wong's analysis of morality.
A central part of Wong's reconciliation project between the "objectivist" and
the "subjectivist" is to make use of the developments in philosophy of
language pioneered by Tarski, Quine and Davidson (p 5-6). Once Wong
reveals just how he intends to do this it becomes obvious that his acceptance
of the notion that moral statements have truth values was not merely a
concession made to the "objectivist" in the spirit of reconciliation, but is in
fact essential to Wong's own project. He wants to "present a truth conditions
analysis of moral statements" (p l7) that will "show how'ought'and'good'
contribute to the truth conditions of [moral] statements." (p l9). The moral
statements he concentrates on are statements of the form: "A ought to do X,"
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and also: "X is a good Y". This sort of approach is of course only feasible if
we assume from the outset that moral claims are the sorts of things that can
have truth conditions, and this will only be the case if they have truth values.
This makes Wong a good example of an explicitly cognitivist moral relativist.
To support his theory Wong produces a causal account of the origin and
nature of moral statements. I will briefly set out what he says about this and
offer some criticism. Wong gives a schematic explanation of how morality
arose:
My thesis is that rules [without explicitly moral terms] were the first
means by which people began to formulate and to recommend to each
other actions or policies of action. At first they may have used rules of
the simplest form 'oA is to do X." As they became more sophisticated
and reflective about the use oftheir rules, they noted conditions under
which this or that policy of action was to be carried out, and they used
rules of the form "lf C, A is to do X." They went on to develop general
rules of the form "lf C, everyone is to do X," from which more specific
rules about particular agents could be derived. It was useful to develop a
language for talking about which rule applied to agents given certain
conditions, or which rule applied to agents given certain rules applying
to all agents. An "A ougltt to do X" statement may be interpreted as
telling us (in part) that by not doing X, A would be breaking a rule
under certain conditions that obtain. (p 37-8)
Wong goes on to say that as they mature groups or societies will develop
different sets of rules that have different functions. Morality arises from "the
set [of rules] for resolving internal conflicts of requirements (stemming from
an individual's different needs, desires and goals) that affect others and for
resolving interpersonal conflicts of interest in general." (Wong, p 38) It is
disappointing that Wong does not include a few examples here to explain the
transition from normative rules with no moral content to moral systems. This
transition is discussed at a level of generality that seems to eschew providing
concrete instances. Wong does not give us any particular reason to share his
confidence that: "An "A ought to do X" statement may be interpreted as
telling us (in part) that under certain conditions that obtain, A would be
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breaking a rule belonging to that set of rules for resolving internal and
interpersonal conflicts." (Wong, p 38)
Wong continues by considering how morality is to be distinguished from
other nonmoral sets of rules, such as legal statutes, that are also at least in part
devoted to resolving conflict. Out of all the possible systems of rules that are
concerned with conflict resolution, Wong tries to narrow the field to those that
could be said to be moral by specifying that: 'otrue moral 'A ought to do X'
statements are founded on moral systems that are adequate with respect to
some ideal of morality." (p 39) He then introduces what will be for him a
fundamental notion, that of an adequate moral system. Its adequacy resides in
its meeting the standards for moral systems. Wong recognises that this
reliance on standards for moral systems may possibly be viciously circular but
he escapes this by stipulating that the standards for adequate moral systems do
not contain the word 'ought' and are merely descriptions of the characteristics
of adequate moral systems. "A complete list of such standards specify the
ideal of morality" (Wong, p 40).
With this structure in place, Wong can present his analysis of moral 'A
ought to do X' claims:
By not doing X under actual conditions C, A will be breaking a rule
of an adequate moral system applying to him or her. (p 40)
Wong's analysis of 'X is a good Y' statements is:
Under actual conditions C, X' satisfies those standards for Y's
contained in adequate moral systems applying to X. (p 69)
These formulae allow Wong to present the claim that is the cornerstone of his
book: "The extension of oadequate moral system' could vary, as the term is
used in different groups and societies." (p 44) Because different societies may
use different standards to measure the adequacy of moral systems there will be
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in these different societies varying extensions of the phrase 'adequate moral
system'. For Wong this is the source of moral relativism; the extension of the
phrase 'adequate moral system' will be relative to the sociery in which the
phrase is being used.
Wong discusses some contemporary theories of reference in order to
decide which of them would be most appropriate to determining the reference
of the phrase 'adequate moral system' and also account for how the extension
of this phrase could vary across different groups. He elects to follow a
descriptive-causal theory of reference. Wong summarises the theory in this
way: "certain descriptions associated with 'adequate moral system' fix the
referent of the term, and the referent, once fixed, plays an appropriate role in a
causal explanation of speaker's beliefs about it. In the end, we have a theory
with causal and descriptive elements in it." (p 6l) The descriptions that fix
reference are weighted, in that some count more in the reference-fixing
process than others, because they are more finnly associated with the phrase
(p 60). wong does not think that the process of reference-fixing takes place
only at an initial stage, but rather he: "allow[s] for the reference to change at
any time ... when the moral beliefs that embody reference-fixing descriptions
(standards for the adequacy of moral systems) change." (p 63)
I propose not to question the plausibility of the descriptive-causal theory
as a theory of reference. It would take me too far from the topic of my thesis
to delve into the issues in philosophy of language that would arise in a
complete discussion of what Wong says in support of his prefered theory of
reference. Howevern there is one issue that I think is significant enough to be
mentioned. There is an apparently unresolved tension between two different
approaches to philosophy of language that Wong attempts to combine under
the banner of his moral relativism. I will briefly indicate where I think the
tension lies. wong explicitly says he is following the Tarski-Quine-Davidson
approach to language (wong p 17-22) in looking to give a truth conditions
analysis of moral statements, and yet this approach seems to conflict with his
use of the descriptive-causal theory of reference to make decisions about the
66
extension of a single phrase. one of the central features of the truth
conditional approach of Quine and Davidson is that the smallest semantic unit
is the sentence, as it is sentences that are true or false and thus have truth
conditions, and in their view it is fruitless to attempt to do the sort of semantic
work with sub-sentential phrases that Wong is trying to do. (See for instance
Quine (p 26-79) and Davids on (p 215-225 , p 227 -241 .))
It is characteristic of the Tarski-Quine-Davidson approach to philosophy
of language that a candidate for the extension of a sub-sentential phrase will
emerge only gradually as a theory of interpretation is built up for a whole
language by looking to assign possible truth conditions to utterances of
sentences of that language, in the process Davidson calls radical
interpretation. Even when this has been done, on such an approach there is no
such thing as the extension of a word or phrase, because assigned extensions
only represent the best guesses of the interpreter in an attempt to present the
overall best theory of interpretation for the language as a whole. (Davidson, p
125-139) On this view we cannot in principle give the extension of a sub-
sentential phrase. This is especially the case with an extremely abstract phrase
such as 'adequate moral system', because the truth conditions of sentences in
which it appears will not be apparent from observing the circumstances in
which they are uttered. Quine and especially Davidson are eliminativists about
the semantic relation of reference and it is difficult to see why Wong thinks he
can graft the very non-eliminativist descriptive-causal theory of reference onto
their truth-conditional approach to aruive at a theory of moral relativism. It
seems that if Wong really was a foilower of Quine and Davidson then he
would see little point in the claim that the extension of the phrase 'adequate
moral system' is relative to different societies because, strictly speaking, there
is nothing there to be relative.
It might be replied that this is a misconception of the results of the truth
conditional approach. Because on this approach the extension assigned to any
given phrase in a language will always be relative to a theory of interpretation
for that language and because such theories of interpretation may quite
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evidently be relative to societies or groups, there is no difficulty with Wong's
claim that the extension of the phrase 'adequate moral system' is relative to
societies or groups. This may be true, but it will do nothing to assist the case
that Wong is trying to make for moral relativism. If any given phrase in a
language is relative to a theory of interpretation, and not just the phrase
'adequate moral system', then there is nothing special about this phrase from
the point of view of the truth conditional approach to philosophy of language.
But for Wong there is something special about this phrase. The extension of
'adequate moral system' is supposed to be relative to societies or groups in a
way that the extensions of other phrases are not. That is what makes his theory
of moral relativism discriminating relativism and not indiscriminate relativism
(see section 1.3). Perhaps it would be possible for Wong to find a way to
defuse this apparent tension between the different elements within his theory,
but as things stand the apparent tension between Wong's desire to employ a
certain kind of truth-conditional analysis of moral statements and his desire to
make claims about the extension of a particular phrase is problematic.
Now that the details of Wong's theory are present it may be asked whether it
can explain the situation that he thought was essential for Harman's theory to
be able to explain. This was the scenario Wong created of the utterly
fragmented population of warring individuals that never the less still have the
moral duty not to kill one another for amusement (see section 2.5.5). It seems
that Wong's theory faces difficulty explaining this situation. A population of
warring individuals would apparently have no need for rules to resolve
interpersonal conflict. As every individual is pitted against every other
individual in a struggle for survival, interpersonal conflict will be the order of
the day and resolution of it will be through use of force. Maybe there is some
internal conflict that may only be resolved by a moral duty not to kill other
individuals for amusement, but this would need to be spelled out by Wong.
Another option for Wong would be to say that the moral duty in question
derives from the rules of conflict resolution that were present in the society
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prior to its fragmentation into warring individuals. So the explanation of this
duty would involve tracing its origin to an earlier pre-fragmentation epoch in
which it was essential. A sort of intellectual inertia has allowed it to survive
beyond the conditions for which it was appropriate. Of course, if Wong gives
this sort of explanation then it would be open to Harman to do so as well.
Harman could claim that a situation in which warring individuals somehow
retain the moral duty not to kill one another for amusement, may be explained
by tracing this duty back to an implicit bargain that was in force in an earlier
epoch.
It may be wondered how good either of these explanations are but Wong's
theory does not seem to be on any stronger ground than Harman's with
respect to explaining this particular situation. In any case, the very extremity
of the situation does not make it a very credible candidate for being a sort of
test case that a moral theory must be able to explain. There is a strong
inclination to say that in a "Hobbesian war of all against all" morality would
have collapsed and the warring individuals would owe no moral duties to one
another. Wong himself makes a remark that seems to indicate that he would
also agree with this assessment: "A society in which each person is a moral
community unto him- or herself does not have a viable morality" 0 6a).
Perhaps the reason why the scenario Wong invents is so difficult to explain is
that it is quite far-fetched, even to its creator.
2.6.3 Moral relativism and tolerance.
It is worth considering in a bit more detail a claim Wong makes towards the
end of his book. This is a claim that he recognises is a controversial (even
"disreputable'" (p 177)) one for a moral relativist to espouse. He says that he
wants to advocate a version of moral relativism that is combined with a
principle he calls the 'Justification principle", and that this version of moral
relativism leads to tolerance of other groups that operate with differing
extensions of 'adequate moral system' from one's own. The justification
principle is a moral statement that Wong derives from Kant and it says: "one
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should not interfere with the ends of others unless one can justify the
interference to be acceptable to them were they fully rational and informed of
all relevant circumstances." (p |8l)
A critic might ask under what circumstances the justification that gives
this principle its name could ever occur. After all, Wong has earlier criticised
the universalist view that serious moral disagreement with other groups could
be due to ignorance of facts or error in reasoning. (See above, section 2.6) It
might seem that according to Wong's moral relativism, a serious moral
disagreement that occurs because different groups subscribe to different
extensions of the phrase 'adequate moral system', is not a matter of ignorance
or error on the part of one or the other of them, and that such disagreement
may proceed even when both groups are reasoning correctly and fully aware
of all the facts. Neither side will be able to justify to the other any interference
with their ends and so the justification principle is misleading as Wong has
stated it. It would be more accurate for the principle to simply read: One
should not interfere with the ends of others. (Perhaps with an explanatory note
to the effect that 'others' means those in other groups that subscribe to a
different extension of the phrase'adequate moral system', because of course
the justification principle is not concerned with possible interference with the
ends of other individuals within one's own group.)
However, Wong might be able to reply to this line of criticism by
appealing to his belief that morality arose as a set of rules for resolving
intemal and interpersonal conflicts. One may be able to justiff interference
with the ends of those in another group if one can show that there are some
facts about conflict resolution that this other group is unaware of and that
under the extension of the phrase 'adequate moral system' that this group
cleaves to, the ends they are pursuing will increase internal and interpersonal
conflict rather than resolving it. The other possibility is that one could show
that there is some failure of reasoning on the part of this group that leaves
them unable to recognise that the ends they are pursuing do not resolve
conflict but rather increase it.
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Wong admits that there is nothing about moral relativism or the
justification principle in themselves that is likely to make a moral relativist
particularly inclined to accept the justification principle. He has two major
lines of argument to try to convince a moral relativist to accept it. One is that
sympathy and compassion, in conjunction with the desire to be a part of a
group in which there is mutual refraining from interference with the ends of
others, may lead the relativist to adopt the justification principle. (p 185) This
reply ignores the fact that the justification principle is supposed to regulate
conduct towards other groups, of which one is not a part. As these other
groups adhere to moral codes with which one disagrees, it is not at all clear
what feelings may be held towards members of these other groups, and
whether they would be sufficient to motivate accepting the justification
principle rather than some other principle for dealing with other groups.
Wong's other reply is that it is no contradiction for a moral relativist to
subscribe to the justification principle: "the justification principle is
interpretable in such a way that the content of what it prescribes is
independent of any proposition entailing the falsity of moral relativism" (p
185). It may be true that it is logically possible to combine moral relativism
with the justification principle but a form of moral relativism that is merely
logically possible seems to be a weaker goal than that which Wong is aiming
for. There are many kinds of moral relativism that are logically possible and
Wong himself thinks that something stronger is required in a plausible version
of moral relativism.
This emerges in his response to the universalist's Conviction U, the worry
that moral relativism may imply that any moral systemn no matter how
seemingly evil or repugnant, is as acceptable as any other. Wong's reply to
this is to say, "let me point out that it is only in the logical sense of possibility
that a group can conduct so arbitrary a determination of adequate moral
systems" (p 74). He appears to be claiming here that a version of moral
relativism that is merely logically possible may be overlooked or disregarded
as not being a serious version, and yet when he discusses the justification
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principle he thinks it is a point in his favour that it is logically possible to
combine his version of moral relativism with the justification principle.
Perhaps he is only making the modest observation that his version of moral
relativism is able to be combined with the justification principle without
contradiction, and that this is more than some versions of moral relativism
might manage. However, Wong does look to be guilty of applying double
standards with respect to the credibility of holding positions that are merely
logically possible.
2.7 Arrington's criticisms of Harman and Wong
Although I have identified what I think are problems with some of the details
of the theories of moral relativism advanced by Harman and Wong, it might
be thought that suitably revised versions of their theories could still stand as
credible opposition against universalism. In this section and the next I will
examine two general lines of criticism against the approach they take. The
first comes from Robert Arrington, who during the course of developing his
own theory of moral relativism (a theory that I will examine more fully in
section 2.9), criticises the versions presented by Harman and Wong-
Arrington argues that the positions of Harman and Wong slide into either
what he calls, "objectivism" or "subjectivism". First I will look at what he
says regarding objectivism and then subjectivism. Anington divides
objectivism into two distinct varieties. These are metaphysical objectivism,
the view that: "true moral judgements describe a subject matter that is
independent of the thoughts and feelings of finite sentient beings," and
epistemological objectivism, the view that: "at least some moral judgements
can be supported by evidence that any knowledgeable and rational individual
would have to accept." He goes on to say that moral relativists 'hsually deny
one or both of these objectivist theses." (Anington, p 193)
The difficulty he sees for the theories of Harman and Wong is that: "both
theories offer explanations of how the rules of a social group come into being,
and these explanations make the rules susceptible of an objectivist
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interpretation" (p 248). This is because for both Harman and Wong the
relativity of morality is seen as being the result of different social groups
allegedly following diffbrent moral principles due to their different social,
geographical and other circumstances. Harman and Wong see moral principles
as having non-moral goals. In their view the metaethical justification for a
moral principle is that it fulfils a non-moral role, in Harman's case creating a
stable society through tacit bargaining, in Wong's case resolution of conflict.
This is thought by them to lead to moral relativism, because different groups
in different situations will require different sets of moralprinciples to fulfil the
same non-moral role. I will have more to say about this approach in section
2.9 below, when I give my own criticisrn of it. Arrington has his own avenue
of criticism.
Harman's claim that moral principles arise through tacit bargaining and
Wong's claim that moral principles arise in order to resolve conflict leads to
the problem, as Arrington sees it, that: "these rule-generating activities are
constrained by standards either of truth or of rationality" (p 248). Under the
conception offered by Harman, there will be some moral principles that it is
more or less rational to bargain towards, while under Wong's there will be
some moral principles that undeniably do or do not effectively resolve
conflict. To reject some of the moral principles arrived at through tacit
bargaining or determined to be effective conflict resolution devices is to make
manifest some sort of irrationality or enor. Both Harman's and Wong's
theories thus appear to be unwittingly supporting epistemological objectivism.
Arrington believes that this is problematic for Harman and Wong.
For example, suppose that the members of a social group have anived,
through a process of tacit bargaining such as Harman envisages (assuming for
the sake of argument that such bargaining is possible), at a moral rule stating
that it is wrong to wear green. Given that this moral rule is the result of such
bargaining, it seems to Arrington to be irational for any moral agent within
that social group to reject this rule. After all, any moral agent who wished to
wear green without thereby doing anything morally wrong could have tacitly
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bargained against such a rule. So, as tacit bargaining is supposed to provide
both an explanation and a metaethical justification of the moral rule stating
that it is wrong to wear green, Harman seems to Arrington to be endorsing
epistemological objectivism. A moral agent may not reject the moral rule
against wearing green without this rejection entailing that they are making an
effor or manifesting some sort of irrationality. Arrington says: "if moral
bargaining produces a result that can be evaded only by being irrational, do
we not have a basis for morality that is independent of custom and opinion 
-
moreover a basis that is likely to yield the same set of principles, or largely
overlapping sets, for most people?" (p 213)
But then, if Harman is an epistemological objectivist, it seems to
Arrington to be implausible for Harman to simultaneously claim to be a moral
relativist. He thinks that Harman is in effect trying to maintain tlat there is no
one set of true moral judgements while also maintaining that it is inational to
reject a certain set of moral judgements. Analogous reasoning leads Arrington
to the same critical result regarding Wong's theory. But now the strain of
maintaining a metaethical theory that is supposedly morally relativist but also
simultaneously epistemologically objectivist seems to Arrington to be too
much for Harman's and Wong's positions to bear. He thinks it is the morally
relative part of their theories that must give way. He says: "Both Harman and
Wong then, picture rules in such a fashion as to convert what purport to be
relativist theories into at least quasi-absolutist ones. If this is relativism,
absolutists have little to fear" @2a\.
Possibly Arrington has tripped himself up with his own complex
terminology in stating this conclusion (his terminology I explain more fully in
section 2.9). The thrust of his criticism was advertised as being directed
against what he perceives as Harman's and Wong's epistemological
objectivism, rather than their "quasi-absolutism", a term that he does not
explain. Furthermore, as detailed in section 2.9, Arrington himself explicitly
accepts what he calls moral absolutism (p 195) while rejecting what he calls
epistemological absolutism. If moral absolutists have little to fear from the
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theories of Harman and Wong then it seems they have little to fear from
Arrington's theory either.
However, putting this aside, Arrington's criticism of Harman and Wong is
not as damaging as he thinks it is. As explained in section L5 above, the
opposition between objectivists and subjectivists is quite distinct from the
opposition between relativists and universalists. So a moral relativist may, for
example, quite consistently be an epistemological objectivist. Moral relativists
may usually deny objectivist theses as Anington claims, or they may not, but
they are by no means compelled on pain of inconsistency to reject either
metaphysical objectivism or epistemological objectivism. Moral judgements
may be independent of the thoughts and feelings of finite sentient beings and
supported by evidence that any knowledgeable and rational individual would
have to accept and yet for all that also be context-dependent. The friction that
Arrington believes he has identified between the objectivism and the moral
relativism in Harman's and Wong's theories seems to be illusory.
The other side of Arrington's criticism of Harman and Wong is that if they
do not take an epistemological objectivist line then they must find themselves
committed to some sort of subjectivism. If standards of truth or of rationality
do not constrain moral agents in their tacit bargaining or their attempts to
resolve conflict, then it seems that Harman's and Wong's versions of moral
relativism will collapse straight into subjectivism. Tacit bargaining could lead
to practically anything being adopted as a moral rule if the parties involved
are free to strike irrational bargains, while conflict resolution will be
impossible to aim for if it is irrelevant whether it is true that a given rule either
does or does not serve to resolve conflict. The difficulty here would be similar
to the one identified by Pojman in his criticism of unprincipled individualistic
moral relativism. Agents would be unable to be corrected no matter what
moral principles they feel like adopting, or how inconsistent they might be.
However, Harman and Wong need have no concern about their theories
collapsing into subjectivism, as Arrington has provided nothing that would
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force them to abandon the idea of moral principles that are (metaphysically
and epistemologically) objective and also relative.
2.8 The naturalist strategy in metaethics
2.8.1 The genetic fallacy
At this point I would like to present what seems to me to be a more credible
general objection that attempts to cast doubt on the overall metaethical
strategy followed by both Harman and Wong. The objection is that they are
committing the genetic fallacy (see section 2.2),lf this objection is correctly
handled it is one of the most effective weapons of argument that the
universalist has available, although it can be something of a double-edged
sword. This is because the genetic fallacy is not confined to relativists alone.
In this section I will examine how the genetic fallacy and its parent the
naturalistic fallacy impact on the debate between relativists and universalists. I
return briefly to the universalism of Rachels to show how a universalist may
commit the genetic fallacy, before turning back to Harman and Wong to
evaluate how damaging this line of criticism is to their theories.
Recall that in section 2.4 Rachels argues: "that there are some moral rules that
all societies will have in common, because those rules are necessary for
society to exist." (Rachels, p a%) He gives three examples of these rules, and
argues that each of them are required in any sort of complex human society.
The examples are: a general rule requiring that infants be cared for, a general
rule prohibiting lying, and a general rule prohibiting murder. In each case he
argues that society would fall apart or would not be possible if these rules
were not generally adhered to. Rachels' arguments are, firstly, that a society
that did not care for infants would not last, as the young would not survive to
replace the elder members of the society as they died. Secondly, in a society in
which people constantly lied to each other, "[c]ommunication would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible,"() 493) making any complex society
out of the question. Thirdly, if rnurder were not prohibited then, "[e]veryone
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would have to be constantly on guard. People who wanted to survive would
have to avoid other people as much as possible," with the result that,
"[s]ociety on any large scale would collapse."(p 493)
Now even if it were to be conceded that these three rules are, for the
reasons that Rachels gives, instances of rules that all societies must follow if
they are to continue to exist, establishing this would not support the
conclusion that Rachels wishes to argue for. This is because his argument
attempts to leap the factlvalue gap in what seems to be an illegitimate manner.
Rachels would not have demonstrated the metaethical conclusion that there
are universal moral rules, even if it were accepted that it is a fact that all
societies that survive have exactly the same moral rules. Whether or not a
society survives or falls apart (or would survive or fall apart) due to the moral
rules it follows is an empirical question, and deciding it does not decide the
metaethical issue between the relativist and the universalist. Moral rules may
still be context-dependent, even if certain moral rules are always followed by
successful societies. If Rachels is correct about his empirical claim, then a
society that does not follow the three rules he mentions will eventually fall
apart, but this in itself would not show that such a society's rules were not
moral rules or that moral principles are not context-dependent. Such a society
would perhaps be unfortunate, but not necessarily immoral (or amoral).
It may be that some normative lesson can be extracted from the
considerations Rachels advances, but if so his three rules would be universal
prudential rules rather than universal moral rules. To achieve his goal of
supporting moral universalism Rachels must mount a separate argument
showing that it is morally wrong (rather than imprudent) for members of a
society to act in such a way that the society is unlikely to endure. A society
that did not care for infants would quite possibly die out, but this fact by itself
does not show that it is morally wrong (rather than imprudent) not to care for
infants. Similarly, it may indeed be difficult for anyone to feel secure in a
society in which murder was not prohibited, but again this seems to say more
about the prudential desirability of such a general rule, and does nothing to
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establish that it is the universal moral rule that Rachels wants to say that it is.
In the same vein, people who constantly asserted what was not the case would
be incomprehensible to each other perhaps, but it is not clear from this alone
that they would be immoral. Lying might seem on the face of it to be morally
questionable because it involves deception rather than because it may result in
a failure of communication. A disabled person who may have great difficulty
communicating with others is not held to be morally wrong because of their
difficulty in communicating.
The upshot of this is that it does not seem to be too much of a stretch to
charge Rachels with committing something close to the mirror image of the
fallacy he accused the cultural relativist of in section 2.4. He has failed to
distinguish facts about the likely causal origin of the three rules he mentions
from arguments that establish thenr as universal moral rules. This could be
considered the moral universalist's version of the genetic fallacy; the causal
genesis of a rule is mistakenly taken to provide a metaethical justification for
it. It would be an open question to ask: 'This rule is necessary for society to
exist, but is it a moral rule?' The genetic fallacy is certainly an error to be
avoided. Rachels' argument is a good example of how the genetic fallacy is
not restricted to relativists but sometimes finds its way into the reasoning of
universalists as well. I now return to the discussion of Harman and Wong, to
see whether they have committed the genetic fallacy as well.
2.8.2 Locatin g moral ity.
Both Harrnan and Wong see metaethics as something like a branch of or
adjunct to science; it is the science of morality. A metaethical theory like
moral relativism is something akin to a scientific hypothesis. Whether moral
relativism is the case or not may be cunently undecided, but a careful
examination of the observable evidence will allow us to draw a reasonable
inductive inference that will best explain the available data. The most
plausible explanation of this data is likely to be that moral relativism is the
case. According to this approach, any acceptable metaethical explanation must
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take a naturalistic form that finds a place for moral principles and other
features of morality within the causal chains of the world of non-moral facts.
Harman spells this out explicitly in his paper: "ls There A Single True
Morality?" where he makes what is for him a significant distinction between
"two different ways to do moral philosophy" characterised by "a difference in
attitude toward science." (1984, p 29) His favoured approach is naturalism.
The naturalist is a theorist who, "takes it to be of overriding importance in
doing moral philosophy actually to attempt to locate moral properties." A
naturalist explanation that succeeds will, o'be able to locate value, justice,
right, wrong, and so forth in the world in the way that tables, colors, genes,
temperatures, and so on can be located in the world." (1984, p 33) Now it may
be the case that a version of moral relativism could be constructed that was
inspired by the details of Harman's theory and that did not require this sort of
naturalistic explanation, but Harmarr himself thinks that being able to locate
moral properties in the world in the way described above is the primary task
of the metaethicist. He also believes that the naturalist approach provides
significant support for his version of moral relativism. Conviction R, with its
emphasis on explanation of moral diversity, would find a likely ally in
naturalism.
The opposing approach, one that Harman calls 'oautonomous ethics", does
not consider the main goal of metaethics to be this task of naturalistic location.
Instead, according to the follower of autonomous ethics, "[w]e begin with our
initial moral beliefs and search for general principles... an important aspect
of the appeal of such principles will be the way in which they account for
what we already accept." (1984, p 3l) It is easy to see how someone
impressed by Conviction U might be drawn to autonomous ethics. The "initial
moral beliefs" would include those non-negotiable elements of morality that
the universalist accuses the relativist of threatening. During the course of his
paper, Harman sets the two metaethical strategies of naturalism and
autonomous ethics against each other, noting how and where they disagree,
and trying to fairly present the attractive features of each position, while in the
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end declaring that he finds naturalism to be ultimately the more plausible of
the two. Harman is not interested in the coherentist notion of trying to make
two seemingly opposing strategies fit together in a way that does not privilege
either of them.
Harman is aware of the sensitivity of the issue of reduction in metaethics.
According to him, naturalism need not involve a o'serious" reductive definition
of moral terms in non-moral terms. However, the naturalist's metaethical
project of the locating of moral properties will undoubtedly have to involve
specifying irr some way those non-moral properties of the world that
constitute the moral properties, or with which the moral properties are
identical. The naturalist metaethicist trying to locate moral properties in the
world is always going to find it tempting to reduce them to non-moral
properties. Harman himself acknowledges and gives in to this temptation. In
discussing moral beliefs he says: "our having the moral beliefs we have can be
explained entirely in terms of our upbringing and our psychology, without any
appeal to an independent realm of values and obligations" (1984, p 32).
Although he does not try to offer a strict definition of the former in terms of
the latter, he accepts that this sort of explanation involves "naturalistic
reduction" and that he is reducing moral beliefs to facts about upbringing and
psychology (1984, p 33).For Hannan's naturalist, moral properties such as
values and obligations drop out of rnetaethical explanations as unnecessary,
because they do not have an obvious naturalistic location. Harman does not
try to give an entire explanation of a sample moral belief in terms of
upbringing and psychology. The naturalist's point is that an entire explanation
in terms of upbringing and psychology could always in principle be given, and
this sort of explanation would satisfy the requirement that Harman considers
so important in metaethics of naturalistically speciffing location.
2.8.3 A naturalist argument for moral relativism.
Harman believes that the naturalist approach supports his moral relativism and
he gives a two premise argument to this effect. The first premise he states
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thus: "lf [a] person does not intend to do something and that is not because he
or she has failed in some... empirically discoverable way to reason to a
decision to do that thing, then, according to the naturalist, that person cannot
have a sufficient reason to do that thing." (1984, p 36)
Harman couples this premise with the further premise that for any moral
principle that might be alleged to be universal, there will be some people who
will not intend to follow this rnoral principle and this is not because such
people have failed in some empirically discoverable way to reason to a
decision to follow the principle. As an example of such people and such a
principle, Harman cites, "certain professional criminals, who do not act in
accordance with the alleged requirement not to harm or injure others." (1984,
p 36)
The conclusion of the argument is that these professional criminals do not
have a sufficient reason not to harm others. If they do not have a sufficient
reason not to harm others then they cannot be said to have a sufficient moral
reason to follow an allegedly universal moral principle. The upshot is that if
we take a naturalistic approaclr to metaethics then moral universalism is not
the case with respect to this principle. Harman believes that a similar
argument could be run for any other principle the universalist might try to put
forward as a candidate for a universal moral principle.
Harman provides some brief discussion of the two premises of this
argument, in which he says that the follower of autonomous ethics is able to
reject one or both of the premises by appealing to grounds other than scientific
ones (in particular, assumptions about the nature of ethics), but that the
naturalist appeals to scientific grounds only, and so is not willing to relinquish
either premise. The resulting situation is presented as a stand ofl in which
each side seems to the other as if it were begging the question.
For the purposes of that particular paper this may be all that Harman is
prepared to say, but the naturalist argument he gives for moral relativism
would have to be more extensively defended if one's intention was to use it to
decide the issue between the moral relativist and the moral universalist. For
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instance, his first premise is a reflection of the earlier mentioned assumption
about reasons for action that Harman takes as the starting point for his
metaethics: 'ol assume that the possession of rationality is not sufficient to
provide a source for relevant reasons [for action], that certain desires, goals, or
intentions are also necessary" (1982, p l9a) (see section 2.5.3). Demonstrating
that this assumption is warranted would be part of a suitable defence of the
naturalist argument for moral relativism. Furthermore, the second premise
would be on shaky ground unless it could be convincingly argued that it was
not possible to be a naturalist moral universalist. It could be considered to be a
live question as to whether the universalist could present empirically
discoverable moral principles grounded in universal facts about, for instance,
the evolution of human nature, such that these principles would provide a
naturalistically acceptable sufficient reason for any (human) moral agent to
follow these principles.
However, I do not propose to discuss in depth the minutiae of this
particular argument that Harman presents because it seems to me that the
argument is just an instance of a more general style of argument for moral
relativism that follows from taking the naturalist approach to metaethics.
According to the naturalist approach, a naturalistic explanation must be given
as to why we have the moral principles that we do, and this explanation must
locate the moral principles in the world. In the case of Harman and Wong, this
naturalistic explanation consists of presenting a more or less abstract causal
explanation detailing the origin of moral principles. Harman has a story about
the process of tacit bargaining that leads to morality and Wong has a story
about the emergence of morality from a set of rules that had no normative
content. A feature of this sort of naturalistic explanation is that it attributes to
our moral principles some useful nonmoral function, so that the adequate
fulfillment of this function will be the way to naturalistically locate moral
principles in the world. This approach to metaethics I will characterise as
functional role natural ism.
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2.8.4 Functional role naturalism.
Functional role naturalism could be thought of as being the metaethical
counterpart to the position in philosophy of mind known as functionalism.
Roughly speaking, according to functionalism a mental state is distinguished
in terms of the fulfillment of causal roles. For instance, a pain state might be
said to be caused by tissue damage and the cause of avoidance behaviour,
There is a distinction here between role functionalism and occupant
functionalism (Papineau, p 807). According to role functionalism, a pain state
is whatever fulfils the causal role given above. It might be the firing of a
certain set of neurons or it might be electricity moving down a wire, the
important thing is whether it fulfitls the causal role, not what it happens to be.
According to occupant functionalism, a pain state is the physical state that
actually realises the causal role. To the occupant functionalist pain states are
first-order properties, while to the role functionalist they are second-order
properties. As the name that I have given it indicates, it seems to me that
functional role naturalism is a species of role functionalism. Thought of in this
way, functional role naturalism can provide theoretical backing for moral
relativism.
According to functional role naturalism, moral principles receive their
metaethical justification, their reason for being, by fulfilling a certain
nonmoral function that is given in naturalistic terms. For Harman the function
of moral principles is to provide sufficient reason to motivate action in
accordance with them, for Wong the function of moral principles is to resolve
conflict and achieve dispute resolution within a group. Following role
functionalism, the set of principles that fulfills the requisite nonmoral function
for a group will be the moral principles of that group, whatever those
principles happen to be. It just so happens that the general rules going under
the label of 'morality' that we at present follow in our society fulfil the
function of moral principles fbr us, although different general rules could
fulfil this function just as well for other groups. Functional role naturalism
thus leads to moral relativism in circumstances where it is the case that
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differing sets of principles fulfil the same nonmoral function for different
groups. Fulfillment of a nonmoral function is the means of naturalistically
locating moral principles in the world, so that whatever fulfills the function
counts as a moralprinciple.
An analogy here would be relativism with regard to nutritional principles.
The functional role approach works very plausibly here. Nutritional principles
are justified by fulfilling the function of promoting health in the person who
follows them. Because the physical makeup of some people's bodies is
different, the nutritional principles that will fulfil the function of promoting
health will be different for some people. For instance, for those who are
diabetic, the nutritional principles that fultil the function of promoting health
will be different than for those who are not diabetic, and so nutritional
relativism follows.
Taking Wong as an example to show how this would work in the
metaethical field, if moral principles receive their metaethicaljustification by
fulfilling the function of conflict resolution, then because the situation or
composition of some groups or societies are different, the moral principles
that will fulfil the function of resolving conflict will differ across these
groups. For instance, the principle, 'Lying is morally wrong,' may be a
principle that, for one reason or another, resolves conflict in one society but
not in another society. According to functional role naturalism, 'Lying is
morally wrong,' would fulfill the function of moral principles and thus be a
moral principle in the first society, but would not fulfill the function of moral
principles and thus would not be a moral principle in the second society.
Hence, it would be morally wrong to tell a lie in the first society but not in the
second society, and moral relativism has apparently been demonstrated.
The functional role naturalist's argument here would be a more general
version of Harman's two premise argument mentioned in the previous section:
Nl) Something is a moral principle only in so far as it fulfils a
certain nonmoral function.
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N2) For any allegedly universal moral principle, there will be some
group or groups for whom the principle does not fulfil the function,
but some other principle fulfils this function.
Conclusion) There are no universal moral principles.
Premise Nl is just the statement of functional role naturalism. Premise N2 is
an empirical claim about moral diversity, The nonmoral functional role that
moral principles are supposed to fulfil will vary from theorist to theorist.
Although Harman and Wong make different claims about what this function
is, they both try to give the nonmoral functional role of moral principles by
providing a speculative causal explanation of how moral principles arose.
2.8.5 The naturalistic fallacy.
An objection to the above argument is that premise Nl is false. The use of
functional role naturalism by moral relativists to support their moral relativism
commits the naturalistic fallacy. It appears that it would be an open question
to ask: 'Such-and-such a principle fulfils a certain function, but is it a moral
principle?' (Or the opposite question: 'Such-and-such a principle does not
fulfil a certain function, but is it a moral principle?') Because the functional
role of a moral principle is determined (at least by Harman and Wong) by
providing a speculative causal explanation of how moral principles arose, the
version of the naturalistic fallacy being committed here is the genetic fallacy.
Functional role naturalism (as Harman and Wong apply i0 adopts a
reductionist approach that conflates the distinction between causal explanation
and metaethicaljustification. The moral principles we follow obviously arose
due to some cause or causes and of course empirical investigation into just
what these are will be an interesting and worthwhile exercise and may even
have implications for metaethics. However, according to this objection, even
if accurate causal explanations were available it would be going too far to
seek to use them to extract a functional role that will in turn serve to provide
metaethical j ustifi cation.
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A recent example by G. A. Cohen brings out what does seem to be a real
distinction between being caused to accept a moral principle and being
justified in accepting a moral principle. Take the moral principle, 'Abortion is
morally wrong.' Someone may be caused to accept this principle only by
having the particular experience of finding that she cannot bring herself to
have an abortion. But even if she had not had this experience she rnight still
have been justified in accepting the principle (Cohen , p 232).
The genetic fallacy is prominent because of Harman's and Wong's
emphasis on causal explanation, but the more general concern is that
functional role naturalism commits the naturalistic fallacy. It is of course the
case that sometimes empirical discoveries will make us revise our moral
behaviour and that facts have an effect on our values. The discovery that an
activity previously thought to be benign, for instance smoking in an enclosed
space, is in fact dangerous to others, may lead to a revision in moral standards
or values concerning smoking. But the objection being considered is that
functional role naturalism has a far more serious implication than that. If
fulfilling a functional role is what makes a principle a moral principle, then
any principle that is found to fail to fulfil this role is thus not a moral
principle. The result is that in following such a discredited principle we are
mistakenly treating something as a moral principle that is in fact not a moral
principle at all. Functional role naturalism leaves open the possibility that it
could 'turn out to be the case' that, for instance, lying is not wrong, as it
turned out to be the case that the earth is not flat. The functional role
naturalist's strategy of tying the justification of moral principles to the
function they fulfil leaves our current moral principles hostage to fortune.
It is merely contingent that a principle such as 'Lying is morally wrong,'
fulfits the function that theorists like Harman and Wong speculate that it does.
Furthermore, just because this principle appears to currently fulfill a certain
nonmoral function in our society, this is no guarantee that it will continue to
do so. Taking Wong as an example again, it is possible that new empirical
research by sociologists or psychologists or the like could demonstrate that in
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fact an apparent moral principle such as 'Lying is morally wrong,' no longer
fulfils the function of resolving conflict. New research may show that lying as
a matter of fact resolves conflict far more effectively than does tetling the
truth. According to functional role naturalism such a discovery would show
not only that we must now be suspicious of the principle 'Lying is morally
wrong,' if we want to act morally, but furthermore that we are at present
mistaken if we continue to believe that this principle is a moral principle at all,
and that we may have been mistaken all along in treating it as a moral
principle.
This emerges when we look at how the functional role approach works in
the field of nutrition. There are no qualms here in allowing that if new
empirical research shows that an apparently sound nutritional principle in fact
does not fulfil the function of promoting health in the person who follows it,
then we should not only abandon that principle, but accept that we were
regrettably mistaken all along in following it. The chance of wholesale error
about nutritional principles is an unfortunate but accepted possibility that is a
part of putting forward such principles. The nutritional principles we follow
are acknowledged to be correct only so far as we currently know. This would
also be the situation with moral principles under functional role naturalism.
Our moral principles will always have an air of uncertainty about them. They
must always be thought of as 'our current moral principles so far as we know',
because it will always be a contingent matter that they as a matter of fact fulfil
the function that justifies them as being moral principles.
Under this regime moral discussion would take on a completely different
character. Our moral principles must continually be reexamined as conditions
change. A question such as: 'ls 'Lying is morally wrong' still a moral
principle or not?' will have to be asked in the same spirit as a question about
the current exchange rate, with the expectation that today the answer may not
be the same as it was last week. Those who follow out of date moralprinciples
are not just being old-fashioned, they are morally wrong, so there will be a
high premium on having access to the very latest empirical research about
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matters surrounding the nonmoral function that moral principles fulfil. The
functional role naturalist might say that this would actually be a superior way
to conduct moral discussion, and any uneasiness about it just exposes a
commitment to what Harman labeled autonomous ethics.
There is a parallel between this criticism of functional role naturalism and
the sort of criticism of consequentialism that proposes a situation in which
certain consequences, such as maximising pleasure for example, are achieved
and yet it still seems that something morally wrong is occurring. We might be
asked by the critic of consequentialism to imagine a society that contains a
racial minority that is so despised by the majority of the population that the
pleasure that large numbers of them would gain from mistreating this minority
would outweigh the displeasure suffered by this minority as a result of the
mistreatment. The consequentialist may simply bite the bullet here and say
that despite what our intuitions may tell us, to mistreat the minority is actually
not wrong in this situation. Likewise, the functional role naturalist may bite
the bullet and insist that the moral principles we are currently committed to
could turn out to be in error (although I am not suggesting that the functional
role naturalist has anything else in common with this sort of consequentialist).
To me it seems more plausible to say that empirical discoveries about
conflict resolution or any other non-moral function that might be alleged to
justif, morality are not the sort of reasons that would force us to reject a
principle like, 'Lying is morally wrong.n The moral principles we follow may
or may not resolve conflict more effectively than anything else, but this is
irrelevant to the question of their metaethical justification. So, while these
considerations may not be conclusive, I believe they raise difficulties for the
plausibility of the naturalist strategy followed by Harman and Wong. In the
next section I will look at a version of moral relativism that does not take
naturalism as its starting point.
2.9 Arrington's conceptual relativism
2.9.I Introduction.
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Robert Arrington develops a version of moral relativism that is very different
from the versions of Harman and Wong. He calls it conceptual relativism. In a
nutshell, this is the view that moral principles are relative to a concept of
morality. Arrington's conceptual relativism is something of a hybrid in that it
accommodates universalism to the extent that he believes that there is one and
only one universally correct set of moral principles. He calls these "rules of
moral grammar" Gt 269). An example of a rule of moral grammar is: 'Lying is
morally wrong.' According to Anington, although the rules of moral grammar
are universal, they may not necessarily be subscribed to by everyone, and a
lack of subscription to these rules does not indicate any sort of irrationality or
any error about factual matters. I will explain the notion of a rule of moral
grammar more fully below, after first explaining some of the terminology
Anington uses in situating his conceptual relativism.
Arrington employs a series of complex distinctions to create a theoretical
space within which he positions his theory and from which he opposes other
metaethical theories, including other sorts of moral relativism. He
distinguishes different varieties of absolutism from different varieties of
objectivism, and further distinguishes all of these from different varieties of
subjectivism (p 193-199). I will not rehearse all the details of these divisions,
but merely present the ones that are most relevant to my discussion.
The most important term that Arrington introduces is "nonobjectivism" (p
193), as his conceptual relativism is presented as a variety of nonobjectivism.
The nonobjectivist is distinguished by what he rejects, and that is both moral
objectivism and moral subjectivism. I have already shown above how
Arrington's preferred line of criticism against other moral relativists such as
Harman and Wong is to argue that their positions slide into either objectivism
or subjectivism (see section 2.7). Despite their less than compelling nature,
Anington believes his criticisms of Harman and Wong are sufficient for him
to reject the entire foundation that their versions of moral relativism are built
upon. For Arrington, the approach taken by Harman and Wong is too close to
epistemological objectivism for a moral relativist to credibly hold, and
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Anington is determined to come up with a theory of moral relativism that is
nonobjectivist.
When characterising the opponent of the moral relativist Arrington does
not at first glance seem to recognise that a distinction can be drawn between
moral absolutism and what I have called moral universalism. Instead he lumps
together a commitment to "absolute moral truths" with a commitment to
"universal standards of moral value true for all human beings," (Anington, p
193) and calls that moral absolutism. It is only the second sort of cornmitment,
a commitment to what I have called moral universalism, that necessarily
makes one an opponent of the moral relativist. As I noted in section 1.5, it
would not be inconsistent to hold that moral truths were absolute by virtue of
being unable to be overridden, while also at the same time being relative, or
context-dependant.
However, Arrington is perhaps aware of this possibility as he later
distinguishes between three forms of absolutism. These are moral absolutism,
epistemological absolutism and metaphysical absolutism (p l9 ). The crucial
distinction for Arrington is between moral absolutism and epistemological
absolutism. What Arrington calls moral absolutism is close to what I have
called moral universalism, that is, the commitment to the idea that there is one
and only one universal set of moral principles, whereas what he calls
epistemological absolutism concems the question of whether these moral
principles could be rejected without error or irrationality. This is a vital
distinction for Anington to make as his position is to accept what he calls
moral absolutism while at the same time rejecting what he calls
epistemological absolutism (p I 95).
He thinks that different groups or individuals may be completely aware of
all the relevant nonmoral empirical information and be completely rational,
but be using a mistaken concept of morality that can lead them to reject the
universally correct set of moral principles (the rules of moral grammar).
Clearly Arrington must be committed to a reasonably sharp distinction
between nonmoral factual inforrnation and what might be called moral
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information (for instance, what the one correct concept of morality is) for him
to be able to claim that a person or group could be in possession of all the
relevant information of the first kind, and yet not be in possession of
information of the second kind.
The role/occupant distinction made above in section 2.8.4 is useful in
bringing out the significant difference between Arrington on the one hand, and
Harman and Wong on the other. One way to put it is to say that while Harman
and Wong focus on the functional role played by moral principles, believing
that the occupant of this role may vary, Arringlon focuses on the occupant of
this role, believing that it may not vary. For example, according to Arrington
the ancient Greeks were morally wrong to keep human slaves, although they
were not making any factual errors or being irrational when they practiced
human slavery. There was a concept that occupied the role in ancient Greek
society that the concept of morality occupies in our society today, but the
ancient Greek's concept was not the concept of morality. They may have
reasoned impeccably about human slavery, but because for them a concept
other than morality occupied the role of the concept of morality, they
inevitably came to the incorrect conclusion about the moral status of human
slavery. @ 252) I say more about this example below.
Looking at another example, one of the two opposed sides of the abortion
debate is morally wrong, although this side is not thereby making any factual
mistakes or being irrational. As each side has a different concept occupying
the role of the concept of morality, they come to different conclusions about
the moral status of abortion. However, only one side (or perhaps neither side)
actually has the concept of morality occupying the relevant role, so at most
one side draws the correct conclusion about abortion (although Aninglon
himself is circumspect about which side he thinks this is (p 290).
2.9.2Moral principles have moral goals.
One of the most distinctive features of Arrington's conceptual relativism is his
insistence that the point of moral principles is not to resolve conflict or create
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a stable society or any other sort of non-moral goal, but rather it is simply to
encourage actions that are morally right and discourage actions that are
morally wrong. As he puts it: "moral rules have moral ends, and whether in
fact they promote still other ends is irrelevant to their justification" (p 250).
He asks a number of rhetorical questions designed to build up the credibility
of this assertion: "Do not moral rules have their own intrinsic end 
- 
namely,
the promotion of morally correct behaviour? Many societies have rules
prohibiting cruelty, but is this because cruelty is seen as promoting conflict
and instability or because it is seen as an immoral way for one person to treat
another? Is injustice denounced simply because it upsets a balance of interests
or rather because it is unfair and wrong?" (p 250).
This is a major tenet of Arrington's conceptual relativism, the doctrine that
moral principles have moral goals. The key claim here is that moral principles
do not stand in need ofjustification in terms of some other non-moral goal in
order for them to achieve their purpose as moral principles. Now there are at
least two different ways that such a conception of moral principles could be
understood. One could say that it is not necessary for moral principles to
receive a non-moral justification in order to achieve their purpose as moral
principles, or one could go further and say that it is not possible for moral
principles to receive a non-moral justification. Arringlon's commitment to
develop a nonobjectivist version of moral relativism leads him to adopt the
second, far stronger and more stringent interpretation of the formula that
moral principles have moral goals. As it was the spectre of objectivism
through the rational justification of moral principles that he believed was so
awkward for Harman and Wong when critiquing their versions of moral
relativism, Arrington asserts that moral principles must be "relative to
something for which a rational justification is not possible" (p 250). If it is not
possible to give a rational justification of moral principles then there is no
danger of fatling into objectivism and Arrington's goal of producing a
nonobjectivist version of moral relativism will not be jeopardised. The
implications of the claim that it is not possible (as opposed to not necessary)
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to justify moral principles resonate throughout Arrington's theory and create
what I consider to be some strongly counterintuitive implications. These will
be addressed below
First I must fill in some further details of Arrington's notion of rules of
moral grammar. Arrington paints a picture of the nature of moral discourse
that derives from broadly Wittgensteinian notions about language that
Arrington relocates to the field of metaethics. The most nokble of these is
Arrington's claim that the moral principles that jointly define our concept of
morality are "rules of moral grammar" (p 269). He also characterises them as
"rules for talking and thinking about morality" @275), and says: "The rules
of moral grammar are universal, a priori, and necessary, not contingent,
debatable generalizations that are matters of mere belief'(p 291). Because of
the significance of this idea for Arrington, I will go into some detail in
explaining it.
2.9.3 Rules of moral grammar
When Arrington talks about moral principles being rules of moral grammar he
takes these rules to be defining assumptions forming the linguistic background
that makes moral discourse possible. A rule of moral grammar such as: 'Lying
is morally wrong,' is not something the truth or falsity of which can be argued
about using moral language, as rules of moral grammar provide the very
grounds for moral discussion. "The rules of moral grammar ... function as an
element of the presupposed background of moral discourse and not, for the
most part, as ingredients in its content" (p282).
This is not to deny that it may be possible for a moral dispute to arise over
whether an agent is permitted to lie in a particular situation. This might occur
because the two sides in such a dispute may disagree over just what factors are
most important when applying the moral principle in this situation, whether or
not the principle may properly be overridden or ourweighed by countervailing
considerations, and so forth. What they are not disagreeing over, however, is
the general applicability of the moral principle dictating that it is wrong to lie.
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(p 271). It is a commitment by both sides to the rule of moral grammar
embodied in this principle that is what allows the dispute to even proceed;
common agreement on the moral principle forms the background without
which the disagreement could not meaningfully arise.
There is no difficulty with imagining a case in which it was arguably the
morally correct thing to do to tell a lie, perhaps because some other moral rule
is judged to take precedence on this occasion. However, making such a
decision in a case like this would not amount to a rejection of the general
moral principle: 'Lying is morally wrong.' lt would instead be a reluctant
recognition that "unfortunately, we had to tell a lie on these occasions, that is,
we were forced to do something that remains morally dubious" @ 272).
Arrington notes that while moral disagreement may arise over a wide variety
of topics, we never disagree over whether it is in general morally wrong to lie,
or to break promises or commit murder (f,273).
According to this conception of moral discourse, we cannot reject the rules
of moral grammar within the context of a moral discussion because these rules
are the presuppositions that enable us to use moral language. One could not
participate in the practice of moral discourse while at the same time rejecting
the indispensable background assumptions that make this discourse possible.
Someone who rejected the moral principle that says that it is wrong to lie
would not be making a move within the moral disagreement described above,
they would instead be showing by this rejection that they are, as far as
Arrington is concerned, operating with a concept other than morality. The
rules of moral grammar must be accepted as presuppositions by those who
wish to engage in moral discourse, and a rejection of these rules amounts to a
refusal to engage in moral discourse. Any such rejection does not threaten the
appropriateness of the rules themselves as the foundation of moral discourse,
but rather places the one who rejects them outside the domain of moral
discourse. This would not prevent them from participating in other sorts of
normative discussion such as prudential discussion, but participation in moral
discourse would not be open to them.
94
Arrington's analogy between moral principles and grammatical rules
could do with some clarification. Presumably the idea is that when it comes to
a grammatical rule such as where to place the possessive apostrophe, there is
no real answer to the question: 'Why is the apostrophe placed where it is in
this case?' The answer is simply: 'Because that is what the rule dictates.'
There is nothing further that needs to be said, or that can be said. No
justification of the placement of the possessive apostrophe is necessary, and
nor is it possible. Someone who does not place the apostrophe where the
grammatical rules dictate is simply being ungrammatical. This sort of
situation with respect to morality is what Arrington is trying to create with his
idea that moral principles are rules of moral grammar.
When it comes to articulating what the rules of moral grammar are that
constitute morality, Anington says the following: "Morality has to do with
personal autonomy and integrity, respect for persons, avoidance of harm to
persons, and similar notions" (p 252). He is ready to acknowledge that there is
some vagueness around the edges, and backs off from an extensive analysis of
our concept of morality, but he does give some examples of what he considers
some of the most important rules of moral grammar. These are: "It is wrong to
tell a lie.", "One ought to keep One'S promises.", "One Ought not to harm other
people.", "lt is wrong to treat others disrespeCtfully.", and "Ons must not take
the life of an innocent person." (p 302)'
Arrington also distinguishes between rules of moral grammar and what he
calls "substantive moral principles" (p276). These latter are'omoral principles
and rules concerning which there can be legitimate moral disagreement" (p
276). Examples of these are: "Premarital sex is wfoll$'", "One ought to be
patriotic.", "Mercy killing is wrong.", "One ought to lead a simple and frugal
life.", and "one ought to give a quarter of one's income to charity." 0 302).
The moral discussions that take place when we disagree about substantive
moral principles require the rules of moral grammar as background
assumptions. (Substantive moral principles should not be confused with moral
principles, the term that I introduced in section 1.4. The latter is a general term
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that covers both Arrington's rules of moral grammar and his substantive moral
principles.)
Furthermore, it is sometimes the case that people will take rules of moral
grammar as substantive moral principles. Arrington gives as examples: "One
ought never to tell a lie.", "One ought always to keep one's promises.", and
"One should never kill another human being, in war, peace, or self-defense."
0 302-3). The difference between a rule of moral grammar such as "It is
wrong to tell a lie." and a substantive moral principle like "One ought never to
tell a lie." is that the former may not be disputed by those who wish to engage
in moral discourse, whereas the latter certainly may be. The former identifies
a morally relevant dimension of life that must always be taken into account
whenever moral discussion occurs, but that does not preclude the possibility
that sometimes we may be morally required to lie. The latter is the contingent
product of moral discussion and debate, and its rejection need not mean the
rejection of morality. Arrington puts it thus: "The glammatical rule is
unexceptionable, but the substantive rule requires considerable defense" (p
278).
According to Arrington, understanding the rules of moral grammar is not
only necessary to being able to participate in moral discourse, but is also
necessary to even understanding what morality is. According to his conceptual
relativism there is no logically prior grasp of morality that precedes a
comprehension of the rules of moral gfammar. "One does not understand
morality by grasping a general definition of it; one understands it by knowing
that we are morally obligated to tell the truth and keep our promises, as well
as avoiding harming others and to respect them" G) 283,Italics in original).
Morality is what he calls a determinable notion, defined through its
determinants (p 284). Arrington draws an analogy with the concept of colour.
The following two paragraphs are worth quoting in full as an account of
Arrington's notion of rules of moral grammar:
[Rules of moral grammar] can fruitfully be compared to grammatical
rules like "Red is a color." The latter defines 'red' by saying that it
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designates a color. But equally it partially defines 'color'. ...[W]e have
no general concept of color allowing us to discover that red is a color.
Color is a determinable property and one that is defined through its
determinants 
- 
color is red, yellow, green, blue, and so on. These
definitions jointly define color and thereby introduce us to the color
dimension of experience.
Likewise, "One ought to keep one's promises" and "It is wrong to tell
a lie" simultaneously serve to define, on the one hand, 'Keeping one's
promises' and 'lying' and, on the other hand, the moral notions of
obligation and wrongdoing. "Morally what we ought to do" and "what it
is right for us to do" 
- 
as well as "what we ought not to do" and "what it
is wrong to do" 
- 
are determinable notions. They have no identifiable
content in addition to such notions as keeping one's promises, telling
the truth, breaking promises, lying, and so on. (p 283)
The rules of moral grammar embodied in the tradition Anington appeals
to together constitute the concept of morality. According to Arringlon, this is
the only concept that deserves the name omorality', and other sets of principles
do not and indeed could not count as alternative moralities. Other sets of
principles would not have anything at all to do with morality, because the
meaning of that term is exhausted by the list of moral principles that make up
the concept of morality. Due to the nature of the concept, the single correct
morality has no rivals and can have no rivals. "Our moral system constitutes
morality: nothing else does." (p 254) While we may have normative
discussions other than moral ones, and even consider that the results of these
discussions are more compelling when it comes to deciding on our actions, the
rules of moral grammar can have no other challengers within the field of
morality.
Fufthermore, as noted in section 2.9.2, it is a crucial claim for Arrington
that it is impossible to justiff the rules of moral grammar. For the
nonobjectivist such as Arrington no rationaljustification is possible and to try
to look for it is to misunderstand the nonobjectivist nature of the concept of
morality. According to Arrington, our concept of morality "has no ground in
truth and reason. lt is beyond proof and beyond refutation" @257).
To the conceptual relativist, those who do not subscribe to the rules of
moral grammar are employing a different concept of morality to us, or to be
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more accurate, because he believes that, "the notion that there could be
alternative moralities basically makes no sense," (p 287) those who do not
subscribe to the rules of moral grammar are using a concept other than
morality when they make certain normative judgements. He thinks that while
moral condemnation of all those who do not subscribe to the rules of moral
grammar is the proper and suitable response, this condemnation does not
mean that it is possible for the rules of moral grammar to be in any way
rationally justified to those who do not follow them. Nor does it mean that
those who do not follow or who reject the rules of moral grammar are guilty
of any sort of irrationality or error. Arrington's concepfual relativism, as an
explicitly nonobjectivist theory, does not allow for the rational justification of
the rules of moral grammar, so those who follow these rules are not doing so
because they have been rationally persuaded to.
As noted earlier, the conceptual relativist believes that the Ancient Greeks,
for instance, ffiay have been acting immorally by keeping slaves but they were
not acting irrationally or making any sort of logical or factual mistakes, and it
would be impossible for us to reason with them about the moral status of
human slavery. In Arrington's view those who do not follow the moral rules
have not made any errors; "they are simply different, and their lives revolve
around a different concept of morality" (p 256), although as I have noted
above, it seems that Arrington should be saying here: "their lives revolve
around a concept other than morality." Groups with different forms of life to
ours may operate with concepts other than morality and there is no rational
way of conducting any sort of dialogue with them about this. This strong
commitment to nonobjectivism makes Arringlon's conceptual relativism a
most distinctive form of moral relativism.
Although there is no way that we can rationally justify the rules of moral
grammar to those who do not subscribe to them, the conceptual relativist is by
no means tolerant of such others. Anington says: "we are not in logical
disagreement with them, for we do not share the same logical or conceptual
space. Our practice is pragmatically incompatible with theirs 
- 
ours commits
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us to actions that physically cannot take place if the actions required by their
practice are to occur" (p 261). He is blunt about the possible outcome of any
disagreements we may encounter with those who do not subscribe to the rules
of moral grammar: "To make our way of life possible, it may be the case that
theirs must go. The result would be open conflict, perhaps war." Cr260). It
may be possible for the conceptual relativist to ignore those who are mistaken
about morality so long as there is no possibility of interaction between them
and us, for example our society and that of the ancient Greeks. But if there are
disputes within our own society between those who subscribe to the rules of
moral grammar and those who do not then there is no possibility of any sort of
compromise.
Furthermore, under conceptual relativism there are severe restrictions on
what forms of amoralism are possible. According to the conceptual relativist
there could not be an amoralist who regarded morality as some kind of error
or illusion while still having an intellectual understanding of what was
involved when one lied, broke a promise, and so forth, because to understand
these notions is to realise that they are morally wrong. It is not just that
Arrington's conceptual relativist would disagree with such a form of
amoralism, but that he thinks such a position could not even be possible. So an
error theorist such as Mackie would be attempting to adopt a position that
according to the conceptual relativist it is impossible to adopt. The only sort of
amoralism possible would be a kind of individualistic amoralism according to
which one placed oneself outside morality (presumably by rejecting the rules
of moral grammar) while at the same time accepting that actions such as lying
and so on were indeed still morally wrong for everyone else who had not
rejected the rules of moral grammar.
2.9.4 Criticism of Arrington
I think that Arringlon has achieved some genuine insight into the nature of
moral discourse with his notion that the rules of moral grammar are
presuppositions that must be accepted as a condition of participating in the
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practice of morality. I employ this idea of presuppositions myself with the
notion of basic moral principles that I introduce below in section 3.3.2.
However, I disagree with much of the detail of Anington's theory. In this
section I will point out what I think are two of the most serious flaws in his
conceptual relativism, which in my view remove it from contention as a
plausible way of dealing with the conflict between moral relativism and moral
universalism.
Criticism l) Conceptual relativism is inconsistent.
The claims about morality being a determinable notion that were made in the
two full paragraphs quoted in section 2.9.3 seem to indicate that there is no
room for the facVvalue distinction within conceptual relativism. For example,
someone who might seem to understand a factual description of lying - that it
is knowingly deceiving another 
- 
but who does not believe that lying is
moratly wrong, apparently does not really understand what it is to lie. Those
who operate with a concept other than moraliry do not have what might be
called 'a different perspective' on lying, murder, and so on - it aPpears they
literally do not understand what these activities are.
This is inconsistent with the epistemological nonobjectivism that is such a
vital part of conceptual relativism. Epistemological nonobjectivism entails
that the rules of moral grammar may be rejected without eror or inationality'
But for morality to be a determinable notion implies that for someone to
believe that lying, for instance, was not morally wrong or was morally neutral
would mean that they were not only making an error about the contents of the
concept of lying, but were also making an elror if they believed that they
understood what lying was.
Criticism 2) An implausible stance towards others.
Arrington's moral relativism is far from a conventional version of the view.
Some of the claims that the conceptual relativist is committed to are claims
that a traditional moral relativist would probably be honified to hear. These
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include the claims that those other groups who do not accept our rules of
moral grammar are acting immorally whenever they breach these rules no
matter what they may think about the rules, or even whether they are aware of
them at all. What is more, as such groups cannot be morally reasoned with, it
may be that the only appropriate response we can make when encountering
such groups is to attempt their extinction. This is a far cry from the moral
relativist as traditionally thought of, someone who advocates tolerance of
groups that follow different moral rules to ours, because 'our moral rules are
correct for uso and their moral rules are correct for them'. Of course, just
because Arrington's conceptual relativism develops in a non-traditional
direction need not necessarily make it suspect. In his defence Anington could
point to the difficulties that a moral relativist such as Wong has in trying to
incorporate a serious commitment to tolerance into his theory of moral
relativism.
Still, there is far more than just tradition that a critic of Arrington might
appeal to in expressing their alarm at the implications that his view has for our
treatment of those groups that may reject or not be aware of the rules of moral
grammar. The major problem is not that Anington classifies the so-called
moral practices of such groups as not really being moral, but rather that it
seems we cannot even have an understanding of what it is that these other
groups are doing when they follow such practices. The diffrculty lies in how
we are supposed to be able to recognise or identifu any practice as being what
we might, until we encountered conceptual relativism, naively have wanted to
call an altemate morality.
Consider the normative concerns of the ancient Greeks and the question of
whether these can be identified as constituting a moral practice. The
conceptual relativist seems to have no easy way of talking about what up until
now seemed to be merely the exercise of a morality that differed from our
own. Arrington says, "We can grant a metaethical statement to the effect that
other people like the Greeks mean sornething else by 'morality' than we do"
G)252, his italics). But this is a rather dubious claim. Obviously the ancient
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Greeks did not mean anything by the English word 'morality', because they
did not use this word. Translations into English of ancient Greek texts such as
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics will contain English moral vocabulary, and
while it may be true that something is irrevocably lost in translation when this
occurs, Arrington's claim is far stronger. In his view it would be a mistake to
use ourconcepts of morality, rightand wrong, and so on, in such fanslations,
because according to his conceptual relativism the Greeks could not possess
these concepts.
Given the lack of legitimate moral disagreement within our society about
the principle, "Human slavery is morally wrong," it seems that such a
principle would be considered by the conceptual relativist to be a rule of
moral grammar rather than a substantive moral principle. Following
conceptual relativism, subscribing to a rule of moral grammar such as,
"Human slavery is morally wrong," is necessary to understanding what our
conception of morality (and according to conceptual relativism, the only
conception of morality) is. When we are faced with apparent evidence that the
ancient Greeks did not subscribe to this rule of moral grammar, it seems that
the conceptual relativist is required to admit that the ancient Greeks did not
understand what morality is.
While Arrington does concede that "[the ancient Greek's] normative
concerns, though not identical to ours, nevertheless do overlap with our own'n
G) 252\, he insists that these concerns "must be identified as a distinct
concept" (p 252). But this leaves him with no way to say, using our language,
what it was the ancient Greeks thought they were doing when they apparently
argued about right and wrong. Arrington could not say that they were doing
the same sort of thing that we do when we have a moral argument, because the
rules of moral grammar that constitute the concept of morality and that
provide the necessary background for engaging in moral argument were not in
place for the ancient Greeks.
However, to even raise the question of the normative concerns of the
ancient Greeks seems to be some kind of concession that they had some word
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or phrase that can be interpreted (even if only very roughly) by using the
English word 'morality'. It might seem on the face of it to be a reasonable
claim to say that if a word or phrase plays the same sort of semantic role in the
language of the ancient Greeks as it plays in our language, then the word or
phrase means the same sort of thing (although it would be a matter of
controversy within philosophy of language as to just how a vague idea like
this should be cashed out). Although emphases may differ across the two
cultures, Arrington seems to be drawing a very long bow indeed to insist that
the concept employed by the ancient Greeks did not and could not contain
anything resembling the concept of morality employed by us today. I suggest
it would be hard to find in the works of the ancient Greek philosophers any
hint that actions such as murder, lying or breaking promises were considered
by them to be anything other than morally wrong and to be condemned by all
right-thinking people.
Arrington does mention "value-neutral descriptive conditions (e.g., formal
or functional ones)" (p 252) that would assist us in trying to adiculate what
the ancient Greeks were doing, but it is not clear how helpful this is going to
be to him. He does not say what either the formal or functional descriptive
conditions might be, and it seems his position does not allow any real room
for such descriptive conditions. These conditions could not identiff the
ancient Greek's concept in terms of the similar role it plays in their language
and lives to the role our concept plays in our language and lives, as this
renders implausible the claim that the concepts are not the same. Furthermore,
description of the ancient Greek concept in terms of non-moral goals such as
conflict resolution and suchlike would run the risk of leading Anington
towards objectivism or subjectivism, which is exactly the problem he saw in
the theories of Harman and Wong. Arrington's claim that the ancient Greeks
had a different concept in place instead of our concept of morality depends for
its plausibility on being able to identify some aspects of ancient Greek life as
having a recognisably moral dimension. However, this very identification
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removes credibility from the claim that the ancient Greeks had no concept of
morality.
Furthermore, according to conceptual relativism, subscribing to a rule of
moral grammar such as, "Human slavery is morally wrong," is not only
necessary to understanding what morality is, but is also necessary to
understanding what human slavery is. So, not only did the ancient Greeks not
understand what morality is, they did not even understand what human slavery
is. Despite the fact that they were far more closely acquainted with it than we
are, they did not understand what human slavery is, but we do. This seems to
be an outrageously parochial stance for the conceptual relativist to take. It
does not appear to be something that is entirely out of the question to imagine
a representative from our society debating the morality of human slavery with
a representative of ancient Greek society.
We might wonder why Arrington does not at any stage consider the
possibility that morality may be conceived of as a Wittgensteinian family-
resemblance concept. This lack is curious for someone who draws on
Wittgenstein as a major source of inspiration. One might have expected
Arrington to say something to forestall the objection that while we may
identify the ancient Greek's normative concerns as a distinct concept from our
own morality if it suits our purposes, it is not at all clear that we rnusl do so.
A metaphor popular with wittgenstein was that of the game; and
Arrington perhaps ought to have considered the possibility that the concept of
morality may be thought to be closer to the concept of game than to the
concept of colour. Wittgenstein compares different games with each other,
saying: "For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to
all,but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that." ($ 66' p
32). The differences between activities such as chess and tennis do not prevent
us calling both of them 'games'. A similar thing might be said by a
Wittgensteinian to happen when we compare the ancient Greek's normative
concerns with our own morality - we find many differences, but also many
similarities, and there is nothing to prevent us calling them both 'morality''
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Merely pointing out a difference between our normative concerns and the
ancient Greek's normative concerns does not seem to be sufficient to justify
Arrington's claim that we must call only ours 'morality'. Wittgenstein himself
even says, in the only mention he makes of ethical matters in Philosophical
Investigations, that the word 'good', "must have a family of meanings". ($ 77,
p 36)
Of course one does not have to be a Wittgensteinian or to buy into the
notion of family resemblance concepts to think that Arrington has not made a
convincing enough case for saying that the ancient Greeks did not possess the
concept of morality or the concept of human slavery. One might take a view
that there are similarities underlying both our normative concerns and those of
the ancient Greeks that make it possible for us to identiS with the ancient
Greeks to an extent that Arrington does not seem to be willing to admit. I
think it is not so far-fetched to accept that the ancient Greeks possessed the
concept of morality even if they did keep hurnan slaves, and the suggestion
that they did not possess or did not understand the concept of human slavery
simply beggars betief. In section 4.2.3 below I present my own
recommendations for thinking about the issue of human slavery as a part of
my attempt to achieve a compromise between the positions of the moral
relativist and the moral universalist'
2.10 General afterword on moral relativism
This concludes my excursion into the three most prominent theories of moral
relativism currently on offer, those of Harman, Wong and Anington. Each of
these theorists presents a way to accommodate Conviction R, and to answer
e3 with various versions of the claim that different groups are committed to
different moral principles because moral principles are context-dependent' For
Harman this is because tacit bargaining in the context of differing social
circumstances has led different groups to be motivated to make different
moral inner judgements. For Wong it is because, also in the context of
differing social circumstances, different groups are led to operate with
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differing extensions of the phrase 'adequate moral system'. For Arrington it is
because, in the context of a oommitment by some groups to principles other
than the rules of moral grammar, these groups operate with concepts other
than morality. I have presented criticisms of each of these varieties of moral
relativism, both in the detail of how the theories are worked out and in the
general assumptions behind each theory. I do not think that any of these three
versions of moral relativism convincingly makes the case for unqualifiedly
answering 'Yes' to Q3, and completely ruling out Conviction U. I now turn to
examine moral universalism.
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Part Three
Moral Universalism
3.1 Introduction
It is unfortunate that the confusion noted above in section 1.5, regarding just
which metaethical position is opposed to the moral relativist, extends even to
those who do take themselves to be opposed to moral relativism. For instance,
in the recent book on this topic in the Great Debates in Philosopfty series,
Harman contributes an essay on moral relativism (from which I have quoted
extensively in describing his position), and Judith Jarvis Thomson contributes
an essay that according to the format of the book is supposed to be a counter
to Harman's position. However, in her contribution Thomson argues at length
for her "Thesis of Moral Objectivity: It is possible to find out about some
moral sentences that they are true," (p 63) when this is a thesis Harman does
not deny. In his response to Thomson, Harman explicitly notes that he is quite
able to accept moral objectivity (p 158). It seems that Thomson erroneously
believes that to establish her cognitivist thesis is to damage the credibility of
Harman's moral relativism. However, she does not actually argue against
moral relativism, but only against something she calls "Moral Scepticism",
which is simply the negation of the above thesis of moral objectivity.
Harman points out that there is no reason why a moral relativist such as
himself would need to be committed to the moral scepticism that Thomson
criticises. On the contrary, the moral relativist would want to oppose such a
view. The moral relativist certainly thinks that it is possible to find out about
moral sentences that they are true (relative to some context of course), by
consulting our (as the relativist sees them) context-dependent moral
principles. Context-dependence is not at all the same as unknowability, nor
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does the former imply the latter. To the moral relativist it would be an absurd
idea that we somehow might not know what our own local moral standards
are, or that we might not be able to find out whether moral sentences were true
for us in our own local context. If anything, the relativist might say, it would
be easier to find this out than to find out whether moral sentences are true in a
universal sense.
The battle that Thomson wants to fight over whether moral objectivity or
moral scepticism is the case only bears very indirectly, if at all, on the issue
between the moral universalist and the moral relativist. I will not go over
Thomson's arguments against moral scepticism here as moral relativism is a
different position from moral scepticism. It is unfortunate that, despite the
essay-and-response format of the book in which Harman has most lately
presented his version of moral relativism, he does not receive the critical
attention of a genuine moral universalist.
3.2 Universalism and rationalism
3.2.1 Two separate questions.
One way that a moral universatist might defend Conviction U is to try to
show that it is the conclusion of a valid argument with all true premises. The
goal would be to demonstrate that there is some rationally compelling
argument supporting Conviction U that would allow the universalist to label
as irrational anyone who did not accept it. This rationalist route to
universalism will be explored throughout this section.
When examining rationalist arguments for universalism, it is important to
keep separate two distinct metaethical questions. There is a significant
difference between the question of whether rational argument will lead us to
one and only one set of universal moral principles and the question of
whether being rational necessarily motivates us to follow moral principles. It
is only the former question that the moral universalist is concemed to pursue.
This is because it is unnecessary to give any argument forcing a moral
relativist to be motivated to act morally. The moral relativist is already
108
motivated to follow moral principles, although of course these are context-
dependent moral principles rather than universal moral principles. See, for
instance, Harman (1982, p 190).
I have argued in section 1.6 that moral relativism is a distinct metaethical
position from moral scepticism or nihilism. Unlike proponents of these latter
trvo positions, the moral relativist is firmly committed to doing the right
thing. This is imporlant to note because it seems that a great deal of the
rationalist effort in metaethics is devoted to showing that the rational agent
must be motivated to be moral, and further devoted to deciding just what
rational argument or arguments can succeed in showing this. But the moral
relativist and the moral universalist do not differ in their motivation to be
moral. This is something that they both share. The moral universalist who
looks to rational argument for assistance faces only the task of showing that
rational argument leads to one and only one set of universal moral principles,
and is not required to show that rational agents are necessarily motivated to
be moral.
However, it might be thought that the argument or arguments that
rationally compel agents to be motivated to act morally also at the same time
show that there is one and only one universal set of moral principles that
agents are rationally cornpelled to be motivated to follow. A rationalist might
attempt to simultaneor"rsly answer the two metaethical questions distinguished
in the previous paragraph. But the out-and-out rationalist (this label I give to
the rationalist who tries to answer both questions at once) will face extra
difficulties that the moral universalist will not. The following subsection will
illustrate one of these difficulties.
3.2.2 A difficulty for rationalism.
Consider the sort of things a rationalist might say to someone who claims to
'reject' the following moral principle:
(l) Murder is morally wrong.
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Pointing out the reaction of fear or disgust we are likely to have towards
someone who blatantly rejects (l) would not necessarily show that it is the
rejecter who is irrational. Reactions of fear or disgust are not themselves
always entirely rational. More promisingly, (l) may be said by the rationalist
to follow necessarily from other principles that the person who rejects (I)
holds, so that it is inconsistent of them to reject (l) while retaining these other
principles. However, this still leaves it open as to whether it is (l) or one or
more of the other principles that the person must relinquish if they are to
remain consistent. A stronger rationalist line would be to try to prove that (I)
follows with certainty by deduction from self-evident premises, or something
in a similar vein, so that anyone who can follow an argument is compelled to
accept (l). The burden of proof is here obviously being accepted by the
rationalist, and the plausibility of their claim will depend entirely on just what
arguments of the kind mentioned above they are able to produce.
Alternatively, the rationalist may try a more direct stipulative approach,
and state that 'murder' means 'wrongful killing'. Surely it may not be
intelligibly denied that wrongful killing is morally wrong. If (I) is true by
definition, then the person who rejects (l) is simply ignorant of the meaning
of the word 'murder'. But the rationalist is likely to want to say something
more than this. To claim that 'murder' and 'wrongful killing' are
synonymous just seems to be another way to state the conviction that (l) is
the case.
An apparent difficulty for the rationalist is exposed with the idea that
there is a ready counterexample to the claim that there is a failure of
reasoning going on when someone rejects (l). It seems we have apparently
good evidence that there are at least some individuals who reject the claim
that murder is morally wrong and who do not appear to be inational at all.
The coldly calculating murderer who carefully plans and executes their
murder, weighing various probabilities and taking various contingencies into
account, always preferring A over C whenever they prefer A over B and B
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over C, and so on (perhaps in the end never being caught for the murder they
commit) seerns on the face of it to be quite rational. An example of a
calculating murderer could be Harman's invention of the successful criminal
who is employed by the gang Murder, Incorporated (Harman 1982, p l9l;
1984, p 39-40). I look at the implications of Harman's example of the
successful criminal below in section 3.2.4.
A first response that the rationalist might make to this alleged
counterexample is to say that the term 'rational' has more than one sense.
The calculating murderer is 'rational' in one sense, but not in another,
specifically moral, sense. However, this sort of reply looks like it is begging
the question unless there is some independent reason to think there is a
specifically moral sense of the term 'rational'. It is safer to proceed on the
assumption that 'rational' is used in the same sense by the metaethicist as it is
used by the logician or the economist.
More promisingly, the rationalist might say that in actuality the
calculating murderer only appears to be rational. In every instance of
calculated murder there is some hidden inconsistency or other error present in
the reasoning of the murderer. This is not supposed to be an empirical claim
that has to be established on a case by case basis, but rather a general
theoretical claim. Nagel is one rationalist who takes this general line and
gives the fotlowing argument for where the inconsistency is located. He talks
about harm in general instead of murder, although if his argument works it
will apply to the calculating murderer as well as to other cases:
This is a matter of simple consistency. Once you admit that another
person would lrave a reason not to harm you in similar circumstances,
lnd once you adrnit that the reason he would have is very general and
doesn't apply only to you, or to him, then to be consistent you have to
admit that the same reason applies to you now. (Nagel' p 66)
The calculating murderer is invited to concede that in a comparable
situation someone else would have a reason not to harm them (the rnurderer),
and that furthermore this reason is a very general one so that the murderer in
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their turn has a reason not to harm their victim. The problem for this
rationalist line of argument lies in the idea that the calculating murderer
would make these two concessions. They may be willing to acknowledge that
if another person has a reason not to harm the murderer, then this reason is a
very general one, but it may be less plausible to say that the calculating
mufderer must admit that another person has a reason not to harm the
murderer. Indeed, once they become aware of the inconsistency, they may, in
order to remain consistent, explicitly reject the idea that another person has a
reason not to harm them. They may agree that they could have no moral
complaint against someone else who made a plan to murder them and then
carried it out before they themselves were able to commit the murder they
were planning.
Naget maintains that there is something like self-evidence attaching to the
principle that others have a reason not to harm us, that this is a principle that
"most people, unless they're crazy" would agree to. But taking this line may
not be so convincing. Of course it is true that most non-crazy people are not
calculating murderers, but this does not mean that all calculating murderers
are necessarily crazy. Nagel would presumably not want to claim that 'crazy'
in this context is simply supposed to mean 'irrational', as the irrationality of
rejecting this principle is just what he is trying to show'
The rationalist may have other responses to make to the calculating
murderer counterexample, but I will not pursue them. The point I would like
to make with this example is that there is an ambiguity between two different
ways that it is possible to 'reject' (l). Someone (perhaps the calculating
murderer) may accept that (t) is required by morality but reject the principle
because they are not motivated to act morally' or someone may be motivated
to act morally but reject (l) because they do not think that morality requires it
of them. An out-and-out rationalist like Nagel is arguing against the first sort
of person as well as the second sort of person, whereas the universalist is
troubled only by the second sort of person. This is why the calculating
murderer counterexample would not pose a problem for the universalist.
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While the out-and-out rationalist rvho is trying to show that all rational agents
are necessarily motivated to act morally may have difficulty in dealing with
counterexamples like the calculating murderer, the universalist is not trying
to show this.
In the background here looms a significant metaethical controversy that
threatens to become overly prominent. This is the opposition between
internalism and externalism. Intemalism is the view that for any rational
agent there is an internal connection between the recognition that an action is
morally required (or lbrbidden) and the motivation to perform (or to avoid)
that action. Externalisrn is the denial of this, holding instead that something
extemal, such as a desire to do what is morally right, is required before a
rational agent must be motivated to act in accordance with morality.
Obviously the out-and-out rationalist is an int€rnalist, but the universalist
may be an internalist or an externalist. Subscribing to the notion that there is
one single universal set of moral principles does not in itself commit the
universalist to a particular view about what a rational agent's relationship to
these moral principles must be.
This means that the universalist is able to accept with equanimity the
notion that the calculating murderer is simply someone who has abandoned
morality. Such an individual fails to act according to the universal moral
principle (I) because they refuse to be moral. It is not the case (as Nagel
seems to suggest) that they are trying to act in the morally right way but they
are somehow making a mistake about what acting in the morally right way
entails. The calculating murderer is someone who has rejected (I) in the first
sense described above, the sense of declining to be bound by the normative
system of which (l) is a part. They are not motivated to follow (I), but this in
itself does not entail that they do not believe that (t) is a universal moral
principle.
For the universalist the usetul result of recognising this distinction is that
the counterexample of the calculating murderer (or indeed any other
counterexample of an agent who is apparently not motivated to act morally)
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does not threaten their position that there is one and only one set of universal
moral principles, because the universalist is able to say that there is a sense in
which even the calculatirtg murderer can accept that murder is morally
wrong. The universalist would perceive no problem in terms of the internal
consistency of the position of the calculating murderer who believes that
murder is morally wfong and that this is a universal principle, if the
calculating murderer has no concern themselves about avoiding doing what is
morally wrong. The amorality of the calculating murderer that is being
envisaged here could be summed up with the phrase: 'Yes, I know that what I
am doing is morally wrong, and indeed morally wrong for everyone, but I
don't care about avoiding what is morally wrong.' Of course, an out-and-out
rationalist such as Nagel is not going to be able to accept that such a thing
can coherently be said, but the universalist need not be troubled by a
statement such as this, because it is not an expression of moral relativism.
The upshot of these considerations is that the moral universalist does not
have to concern themselves with trying to argue that all rational agents must
necessarily be motivated to follow moral principles. lnstead they may
concentrate on arguing that there is one and only one set of universal moral
principles that may rationally be accepted. To say that even a calculating
murderer would not deny that murder is morally wrong buttresses Conviction
U, the notion that there are son'le things that are simply unacceptable, morally
speaking.
The point could also be put in terms of Humean moral psychology' The
moral universalist is concerned only to argue that our beliefs will converge on a
single set of moral principles, and is not required to argue that certain beliefs
about moral principles will necessarily create the desire to follow them. The
out-and-out rationalist rvill take it upon themselves to argue for both of these
conclusions, trying to slrow that there is one universal set of moral principles
and also that these principles are such that all rational agents are motivated to
adhere to them, but the question of motivation is not an issue that exercises the
moral universalist.
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Things would be different if the calculating murderer were to say
something like: 'Murder may be morally wrong for you, but it is not morally
wrong for me.' This would be an expression of moral relativism rather than
amoralism and the universalist must attempt to refute it. They may take a
rationalist path here by trying to show that rational argument leads us to one
and only one set of universal moral principles, and that (l) is one of these
principles, so that if tlre calculating murderer were to make the above claim
then they would be irrational.
3.2.3 Ajumble of issues.
The prospects for rational arguments in support of universalism are
unfortunately not easy to determine when universalism is only addressed as a
part of an out-and-out rationalist program. The claims of the out-and-out
rationalist in metaethics have been much contested, with numerous different
attempts to provide the argument or arguments required, and also opposing
efforts to refute these attempts. For instance, Anington and Wong between
them devote many pages to criticism of the endeavors of a number of different
out-and-out rationalist philosophers. Arrington presents a detailed attack on the
theories of Bernard Gert and Alan Gewirth (Anington,p77-ll6), while Wong
offers less comprehensive but more wide-ranging criticisms of the theories of
Gewirth (again), Nagel, Kantians in general, McDowell, Foot, Moore, and
platts (Wong, p80-104). Unfortunately, in this barrage of criticism neither the
distinction between moral universalism, moral absolutism and moral
objectivism made in section 1.5, nor the distinction between the two separate
metaethicat questions nrade in section 4.2.1, are recognised. Many issues are
conflated and that is why this arena is one in which it seems to me the debate
has a great potential for becoming bogged down in what are, from the
perspective of my project, side issues. Many of the metaethical questions that
are raised by the out-and-out rationalist arguments considered by Anington and
Wong are not relevant to the issue that I am investigating. I have chosen not to
enter into the details of these controversies as it seems to me that this would
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merely contribute to the impasse I see in the dispute between the moral
relativist and the moral r"rniversalist.
3.2.4 Smith's rationalism.
Despite the reservations noted in the previous section, it would be remiss not to
include at least one example of how an out-and-out rationalist might argue
against moral relativism. The theorist I will examine is Michael Smith, whose
version of out-and-out rationalism is more recent and arguably more plausible
than those versions considered and dismissed by Anington and Wong.
Smith takes a distinctive approach to metaethics with his view that it is
dominated (and metaethicists are divided) by what he calls 'the moral
problem". This problem is the difficulty of accepting two ideas that seem to
pull in opposite directions. The first is the idea that moraljudgements express
our beliefs about matters of fact, and the second is the idea that moral
judgements express our desires by being intimately connected with our
motivation to act. It seems to be too much to expect moraljudgements to fulfill
both of these expectations, with the result that: "nothing could be everything a
moral judgement purports to be" (Smith, p I l).
Smith's solution to the problem is to say that the concept of a reason for
action is ambiguous. He makes a distinction between motivating reasons for
action and normative reasons for action (p 95). Motivating reasons for action
explain an agent taking a certain action and are psychological states that are
reasons from the perspective of the agent themselves. In contrast to this,
normative reasons lor action justify an agent taking a certain action and are
reasons from the perspective of a fully informed rational outside observer. For
instance, an agent nray have a motivating reason to turn left at the next
intersection because he believes that turning left will get him to his destination
most quickly, but the agent would only have a normative reason to turn left if a
fully informed observer would agree. lf, from the privileged perspective of a
fully informed observer, turning right would actually get the agent to his
destination most quickly, then the agent would have a motivating reason to turn
l16
left but a normative reason to turn right. We could explain his turning left but
we could not justify it.
Smith then drarvs out the implications of this distinction, noting that
teleological/causal explanations of actions that cite motivating reasons will rely
on claims about what an agent desires (p l3l), while rational justifications of
actions that cite normative reasons will rely on some other kind of attitude.
Smith characterises this attitude as valuing, or what it is desirable to do (p 132).
I will not give the details of Smith's discussion of the difference between what
we desire to do and what is desirable for us to do (what we value), but Smith
eventually says: "what it is desirable for us to do is what we would desire that
we do if we were fully rational" (p l5l).
This formula provides Smith with a mechanism to solve the problem he has
set himself. He analyses the concept of moral rightness as, 'othe concept of what
we would desire ourselves to do if we were fully rational" (p 185)' Using this
concept, our moral judgements about what is right can be seen as both
expressing our beliefs about facts, that is, facts about what we have normative
reason to do, and also as connected with our motivation to act. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to evaluate whether Smith's arguments in support of this
mechanism are successfirl, but I would like to focus on the use he makes of this
mechanism to criticise moral relativism.
He asks the question: "whether, if we were well-informed, cool, calm and
collected, we woulcl tend to converge in the desires we have" (1993' p 408,
Italics in original). Srnith thinks that we would. He thinks that moral discussion
under ideatised conditions of full information and perfect rationality would
result in a massive convergence of desires, and furthermore that this
convergence is not corrtingent but is due to the "privileged rational status" (p
408) of these desires. Srnith does not give an argument for this claim that the
desires of fully-inforrned rational agents would necessarily converge but he
simply thinks it is nrore plausible to say that they would than to say that they
would not. Such colvergence of desires would be problematic for the apparent
counter-example to oLrt-and-out rationalism that arose earlier, the notion of the
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calculating murderer. Srlith is concerned to debunk this notion and he directs
particular criticism against Harman's example of the successful criminal.
As we saw earlier. I-larman created the example of a successful criminal
empfoyed by the gang Murder, Incorporated (Harman 1982, p l9l; 1984' p 39-
40) in order to help rnake moral relativism seem more plausible. This criminal
does not mind in the least harming or killing anybody who is not a fellow
member of their gang, and Harman takes such an example to support moral
relativism. In the context of the criminal morality of the gang, moral principles
are followed that are different from those moral principles followed by
ordinary citizens. (See section 4.2.4 where I give my own account of what I
think is really going on with this example) After describing the example,
Harman says, "sonreone can be completely rational without feeling concern
and respect for outsiclers" (1984, p 40). Smith's response, however, is to reject
this utterty: "[Consider] the claim that fully rational creatures would want that,
if they find themselves in the circumstances of the successful criminal, then
they gain wealth no matter what the cost to others. And the successful
criminal's opinion notwithstanding, it seems quite evident that we have no
reason to believe that this is true. Fully rational creatures would want no such
thing." (Smith, p 195) It is interesting and significantthat Smith and Harman
have exactly opposite views about this. Smith goes on' "[the successful
criminall sticks rvith this opinion despite the fact that virtually everyone
disagrees with him." Srnith's belief is that there is (or would be) a massive
convergence of opinion about this but that some perversity on the part of the
criminal keeps them liom partaking in this convergence.
However, it seenrs to me inaccurate to represent this as a situation in which
the opinion of a clinrinal is pitted against the opinion of "virhrally everyone",
when really the only opinions present are the opinions of Smith and of Harman.
I must confess I fincl it difficult myself to arrive at an opinion about whether a
fully rational creature r.vho was in the shoes of a successful criminal would
want to gain wealth rro matter what the cost to others. Harman is absolutely
convinced that they rvould, whereas Smith is absolutely convinced that they
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would not. Smith nright say that Harman is not fully appreciating the
requirement that tlie successful criminal is supposed to be imagined as a fully
rational creature, u,hile Harman might counter that Smith is ignoring the
constraint that the tirlly rational creature is supposed to be in the circumstances
of a successful member of a criminal gang, and not in the circumstances of,
say, an ordinary metnber of society. Harman could make the point that while
there may indeed be a massive convergence of opinion that fully rational
creatures in the circumstances of ordinary members of society would want that
successful criminals not pursue wealth no matter what the cost to others, this is
not what is under consideration.
Rather than massive convergence, it seems that Smith's approach to this
issue potentially opens the door to massive disagreement instead. It faces the
difficulty that nobody has ever been in the position of a fully informed,
perfectly rational agent. Inevitably any metaethicist who takes this approach
must speculate on u,hat such an agent would desire, based on abstractions from
those situations in rvlrich rational argument or becoming more fully informed
resulted in the mocliflcation of desires. Speculation creates the potential for
disagreement. The spcculative nature of this enterprise is compounded in this
case by the further abstraction required in placing the fully rational agent in
circumstances which are unlikely to much resemble the circumstances of many
metaethicist's lives (being a member of a successful criminal gang)' I think it is
fairto say we really have very little understanding of whatthe desires of such
an agent might be. We could certainly guess, but it would be no more than a
guess. As we see, l-larman's guess is very different from Smith's guess' It
seems likely that a moral relativist impressed by Conviction R would agree
with Harman about rvlrat fully rational creatures in the shoes of a successful
criminal would desire. ',vhile a moral universalist impressed with Conviction U
would agree with Srlith, so the situation seems to be once more at a stalemate.
It appears that Smitlr's version of out-and-out rationalism has not taken us any
further than the clash of convictions with which we began.
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3.3 Coherentism
3.3.1 Distinct types of moral principle.
The coherentist project of defusing this clash of convictions begins with the
claim that there are distinct types of moral principles. The dispute between
moral relativists and moral universalists rests upon a key underlying
assumption made by both parties. This is the assumption that all moral
principles have the same sort of use within the practice of morality. Different
moral principles look alike on the surface, and so they are taken by both the
universalist and the relativist to be alike. I wish to argue that not all moral
principles are of the same type. I believe that there are at least two distinct
types of moral principle that are distinguished by being used in two
importantly different ways within the practice of morality and that a
conflation of these disparate uses leads to the conflict between relativists and
universalists.
In Part One I argued that the main point of contention between the moral
relativist and the moral universalist could be articulated as the following
question:
Q3: Are moral principles context-dependent?
A context-dependent moral principle is one that ineluctably requires reference,
either explicitly or implicitlY, to a context. A context is, roughly speaking, the
situation in which a principle is being used to arrive at a moral judgement
about what to do. The moral relativist answers 'Yes' to Q3, although, as we
have seen, different moral relativists have differing views on exactly how to
characterise the context. The moral universalist answers 'No' to Q3, taking
the position that all moral principles apply universally, so that a reference to
context is not required. The answer to Q3 that I propose is: 'There are two
types of moral principles, those that are context-dependent and those that are
not.' Explanation and elucidation of this answer will comprise the bulk of the
remainder of my thesis.
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Despite their opposing viewpoints, the moral universalist and the moral
relativist both have a similar goal and this goal is to say something general
about moral principles considered as an overall group. Moral principles are
seen through the lens of relativism or universalism as belonging to a
homogenous class in which every member of that class has a similar status
with regard to its context-dependence, that is, they are all either context-
dependant or they are not. In pursuit of a general theory of the status of moral
principles there seems to be little recognition of what could be called the
different facets of the use of moral principles. The moral universalist tends to
focus on just one of these facets and the moral relativist on another and then
each of them generalises from their favourite kind of case to moral principles
as a whole. Both the moral universalist and the moral relativist are able to
give a not implausible account of things with respect to their favoured type of
moral principle, and this further entrenches them into their own respective
positions. I think it is often overlooked that the type of moral principles that
the universalist favours as examples have a different use from the type of
moral principles that the relativist favours as examples. It seems to me that
carefully distinguishing between some of the different uses for moral
principles within the practice of morality will go a long way towards
achieving a coherent fitting together of Conviction U and Conviction R in a
way that shows how the core convictions of universalism and relativism may
be regarded as compatible. This is what I will attempt in what follows.
In order to investigate these different facets of the practice of morality, I
will for the sake of simplicity restrict myself to constructions made with the
predicate, '_ is morally wrong.' When it has as its subject a general class of
actions this predicate can be used to make a large number of general moral
principles. This predicate has the convenient feature that it is able to express
either that a type of action is morally forbidden, or that a type of action is
morally required, the latter by using the locution: 'Failing to do action of type
such-and-such is morally wrong'.
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The universalist will tend to point to moral principles such as 'Murder is
morally wrong' and 'Lying is morally wrong' to support their view that
moral principles are not context-dependant. The relativist will tend to point to
principles such as 'Human slavery is morally wrong' and 'Abortion is
morally wrong' to support their view that moral principles are context-
dependant. Each of these principles has the same form and seems to make use
of the same predicate, but the form of a particular moral principle is not
necessarily going to be a reliable guide to its use. I will distinguish some
significant differences in the way that moral principles are used and argue
that an observation of these distinctions is a way to achieve the coherentist
goal I have set myself. This will also go some way towards redirecting the
discussion between relativists and universalists into more fruitful areas.
3.3.2 Basic moral principles.
With this overall coherentist goal in mind, I continue the examination of
universalism by taking another look at the universalist's complaint against
the relativist, a complaint that is encapsulated within the notion of Conviction
U. The universalist maintains that it is a given of normative moral discourse
that there are some elements that are, so to speak, not negotiable. The
universalist's contention is that there would be something more than peculiar
about the stance of someone who was trying to participate in normative moral
discourse without acknowledging that there are some topics, such as whether
or not someone has committed murder, that are always of relevance in a
moral discussion. The universalist would question whether such an odd
participant had any real understanding of how to take part in a moral
discussion at all.
The view of the universalist is that no matter what the context or
circumstances, an act such as murder is always of moral import and our
morat discussions and our moral judgements must reflect this. It is important
to note that while the universalist says that murder is always of relevance,
this does not force the universalist's hand about the particular moral
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judgements they may make about particular instances of murder (so long as
the universalist is not also an absolutist). There are some situations in which
mitigating factors may (although of course they also may not) excuse murder.
For example, consider the decision to deliberately target civilians during
wartime as part of a policy of weakening the infrastructure of an enemy
country and thus damaging their ability to wage war, with the overall aim of
ending the war more quickly than might otherwise have been the case. Before
a decision like this is made, moral discussion is called for, and various
arguments might be considered. It might be argued that while the killing of
civilians in this manner is murder, in some circumstances acts of murder may
be excused, even if they may not be justified (See section I .7). Altematively,
it might be argued that mitigating factors influence what counts as murder, so
that in some circumstances the killing of civilians does not count as murder.
Deciding whether the circumstances in question in this particular case are the
sort of circumstances these arguments mention would require much more
discussion before any moratjudgements about the case could be arrived at. I
do not mean to undertake such discussion here, but merely to point out that
on the universalist conception, murder (even murder that can be excused) is a
matter that is always of relevance when moral judgements are being made.
The moral universalist emphasises that this is very different from the
situation that seems to be possible under moral relativism, whereby in a
certain context it could be possible for it to be completely morally inelevant
that something is an act of murder. The moral relativist apPears to the
universalist to be willing to allow context to overshadow absolutely
everything else. So in the above example an examination of any possible
mitigating factors that might or might not excuse the murder of civilians may
be unnecessary under moral retativism. The context may be such that the
murder of the civilians, while it is acknowledged as being murder, does not
even need to be excused because in this context murder does not matter
morally.
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The moral universalist (at least, the moral universalist who is not also an
absolutist) is able to take context into account, as I have indicated above.
However, they believe that there is a significant difference between saying:
'ln this context, murder may be excused,' or: oln this context, these acts are
not acts of murder,' and saying: 'ln this context, it is morally irrelevant that
these acts are acts of murder.' In the first two cases the moral principle,
'Murder is morally wrong,' is accepted as being prior to the context in
importance, so that the moral principle must be acknowledged even if it is
outweighed, while in the latter case the context has usurped the priority of the
moral principle. To the universalist this latter situation seems to be an
unacceptable implication of moral relativism, and this is seen by the
universalist to count strongly against the possibility of moral principles being
context-dependent, and in favour of the view that moral principles are
universally applicable. To the universalist, context merely determines how
moral principles are to be applied, while for the relativist context determines
the moral principles themselves.
There is some helpful terminology that captures the notion the moral
universalist is interested in when making this point against the moral
relativist. The universalist who is not also an absolutist sees moral principles
as pro tanto principles. A pro tanto moral principle exPresses a consideration
that is always of concern to us and that must always be given some genuine
weight when engaging in normative moral discourse. Although it is possible
for mitigating factors to outweigh the concerns raised by the pro tanto moral
principle, this does not mean that suoh concerns are negated, they have
merely been outweighed in this instance. For example, that an act is an act of
murder is always something that is of moral concem to us, even in those
circumstances where it is possible to excuse the act.
A pro tanto moral principle may be contrasted with a prima facie moral
principle. The tatter is a moral principle that appears to have genuine weight,
but that may on further examination prove to actually have no weight at all' It
is possible that the concerns that are raised by the prima facie moral principle
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are not relevant and may be ignored. (This terminology was first used in this
way by Shelly Kagan in 1989. For his similar account of o'pro tanto" and the
distinction between this term and "prima facie", see Kagan p 17) We could
say that the moral universalist fears that moral relativism tums pro tanto
moral principles such as, 'Murder is morally wrong,' into prima facie moral
principles.
The moral absolutist, of course, does not believe in pro tanto moral
principles (although the absolutist may believe in prima facie moral
principles), so the universalist who also happens to be an absolutist will not
use this term. However, as I have already noted in section 1.5, a commitment
to absolutism is not something that necessarily distinguishes the universalist
from the relativist, so there is nothing about universalism in itself that
prevents moral principles from being pro tanto moral principles.
My suggestion is that in making the point of the last but one paragraph
against the moral relativist, the moral universalist is partially, but only
partially, correct. Some, but not all, moral principles are pro tanto principles
that apply universally. These universal moral principles I will call basic
morol principles. It is by means of the notion of basic moral principles that
Conviction U is accommodated. In the following three sections I will explain
what basic moral principles are before turning to the question of what degree
ofjustification it is appropriate to ask for them.
Basic moral principles are pro tanto principles. They indicate the
fundamental concerns of any moral discussion and hence the sort of things
that must be taken into consideration whenever moral discussion occurs-
However, the basic moral principles do not dictate what the results of any
given moral discussion must be nor do they dictate what moral judgements
we will arrive at. An example of this has already been given above. 'Murder
is morally wrong,' is a basic moral principle, and this means that murder is
always a relevant concern when undertaking moral discussion, but this does
not mean that murder may not sometimes be morally excusable.
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As a part of deciding what we should do in various situations, we
undertake many different sorts of normative discussion, both moral
discussion and normative discussion of other kinds. It is not the case that just
any kind of normative discussion counts as a moral discussion. Prudential
discussion is an example of normative discussion that does not count as
moral discussion. There must be some way to separate moral discussion from
other sorts of normative discussion such as prudential discussion. The way
we achieve this separation is by recognising that there are different
fundamental concerns that shape the nature of each of the practices that these
discussions are part of. Understanding what these fundamental concerns are
is just the ability to appropriately engage in the relevant kind of discussion-
The concerns in question must be universal to the practice because they are
what makes the practice the practice that it is rather than some other practice.
The basic moral principles establish the sort of features of a situation that
are of moral consern to us. These are the features that we must take into
account when we make a moral judgement as opposed to some other kind of
judgment. They are presupposed whenever a discussion that Gounts as a
moral discussion is taking place. If a discussion is taking place in which the
basic moral principles are not acknowledged by the participants, then
whatever kind of discussion it may be, it is not a moral discussion' An
acknowledgement of the basic moral principles is a necessary (although not
sufficient) condition for participation in moral discussion. That is why the
basic moral principles must be universally present in all moral discussion'
Despite their importance, basic morat principles do not often have to be
bought up as a part of a moral discussion. This is because they work as
presuppositions that allow a moral discussion to occur. The participants in a
moral discussion must already be well aware of the basic moral principles
and furthermore be committed to them as one of the conditions of their
effective participation in the discussion. It is this that explains the universalist
reaction described above. All effective participants in normative moral
t26
discussion will understand that the basic moral principles are not something
that can be questioned from within the precincts of such discussion.
Although they will not figure as a part of the content of a moral
discussion, basic moral principles may sometimes be voiced as a reminder to
participants that the current discussion is a moral discussion and not some
other kind of normative discussion. It could be that a participant is perhaps
allowing prudential considerations to overshadow moral ones and is thus
straying from moral discussion into prudential discussion. For example,
someone may need to be reminded that speculation on the financial benefits
that may accrue to oneself from the killing of a wealthy elderly relative
would be out of place in a moral discussion about whether it was right to do
so, although it would be appropriate as a part of a discussion about whether it
was prudent to do so.
3.3.3 Principle H.
According to my account, the sorts of things that are of fundamental moral
concern are already recognised by anyone who understands how to
participate in moral discussion, so the basic moral principles will not be
anything novel or unexpected but should rather come as no surprise. 'Murder
is morally wrong,' is merely the most obvious one. Other basic moral
principles may be articulated differently by different commentators but the
thrust behind different articulations will be consistently similar concerns.
Despite other flaws in his approach, it seems to me that Arrington has
expressed these moral concerns as well as anyone has in the examples he
gives of rules of moral grammar. Using the predicate I recommended above,
'_ is morally wrong,' Arrington's list is:
'Lying is morally wrong,'
'Breaking a promise is morally wrong,'
'Harming other people is morally wrorg,'
'Treating others disrespectfully is morally wrong,'
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'Taking the life of an innocent person is morally wrong.' (p 302)
Comparable lists are given by other universalist commentators, such as
Pojman, who also adds to the above list:
'Rape is morally wrong,'
'Depriving another person of their freedom is morally wrong,'
'Failing to treat equals equally and unequals unequally is morally wrong,'
'Failing to help other people is morally wrong,'
'Failing to obey just laws is morally wrong.' (p 514)
Arrington's and Pojman's lists could possibly have other principles added to
them that also deserve to be considered as basic moral principles, but rather
than do that I would prefer to try to get at an important notion that seems to
lie behind the basic moral principles. This is the notion of harm to others. The
question of whether harm would be or has been done to others is always
something that is of relevance in a moral discussion. Some immediate
clarification of what it is to do harm to others will be offered here, but more
important claims about this notion will be made in Part Four.
Harm may be straightforwardly, if somewhat vaguely, analysed as
making someone worse off than they would otherwise have been. Such an
analysis does not make it clear whether not helping should also be considered
as harming, when not helping leaves someone worse off than they would
otherwise have been. I will not try to say here whether not helping is to be
considered as harming or the moral equivalent of harming.
It might be argued that if harming is making someone worse off than they
would otherwise have been, then the concept of harm is not sufficient to
capture the full extent to which it is possible to do to others what is morally
wrong. For instance, in a recent article Rahul Kumar discusses a particular
case that he thinks illustrates this. He believes it is possible that parents may
have done something morally wrong to their child if the child is bom in
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circumstances that severely restrict it's quality of life, when these restrictions
could have been avoided by the parents using contraception and preventing
the birth of the child. [t seems that the parent's failure to do this has not made
the child worse off than it would otherwise have been because the child
would not otherwise have existed. So it is arguable that the child has not been
harmed by the parents but the parents have done something morally wrong to
the child. Kumar's solution is to propose the notion of wronging as replacing
the notion of harming. To wrong someone is to have o'violated certain
legitimate expectations" (p I07) of the wronged party. I will not try to
evaluate Kumar's contention here, but I raise it in order to recognise that to
some harm may not be an adequate characterisation of what underlies basic
moral principles. However, harm can still be a universal value even if
Kumarns counterexample means that it has nalrower scope than initially
thought. So, the more general universalist position is not threatened by
arguments such as Kumar's that would replace one universal notion
(harming) with another (wronging). A different kind of criticism of the
adequacy of the notion of harm, a criticism advanced by the pluralist, will be
examined in the next section.
To clarify what is meant by 'others' it is necessary to make the distinction
between moral agents and moral patients. (The latter term was first used by
N. Fotion in 1968. For a fuller account of the history of the use of the term
'moral patient'see Hajdin, p 180) This distinction, in particularthe concept
of the moral patient, will become quite important in Part Four when the moral
relativist's Conviction R is looked at more closely.
Moral agents are those to whom moral judgements are addressed - those
who can meaningfully be said to be in a position to do or to avoid doing what
is morally wrong and who, because of this, may be said to have moral
obligations or duties and to have followed or contravened their moral
obligations. Moral patients are those who are supposed to be protected by the
judgements of morality 
- 
those who can meaningfully be said to have been
harmed (or wronged) if a moral obligation is contravened. Moral patients are
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those entities that are morally considerable. The moral agent could be
considered the subject of a moral judgement, while the moral patient could be
considered the object of a moral judgement. This distinction does not
necessarily preclude cases in which the moral agent and moral patient happen
to be the same individual, so it is conceivable that one may have moral
obligations or duties to oneself. For instance, the moral judgement may
arguably be made that one has a moral obligation to oneself not to take one's
own life. However, even if we accept such cases, the two roles remain
logically distinct.
The distinction between moral agents and moral patients allows me to put
forward a technical principle that I contend is a very general basic moral
principle. I will call it Principle H:
Principle H) To harm a moral patient is pro tanto morally wrong.
This principle identifies a universal moral concern. A discussion in which
there is no acknowledgement that to harm a moral patient is pro tanto morally
wrong could not be a moral discussion, no matter what the context in which
this discussion occurred.
It is notable that we can derive many of the other less general basic moral
principles from Principle H, including 'Murder is morally wrong', 'Lying is
morally wtong' and others on Arrington's and Pojman's lists- Some basic
moral principles could be presented as the conclusion of an argument with
'To harm a moral patient is pro tanto morally wrong' as one of its premises'
For example:
Ml) To harm a moral patient is pro tanto morally wrong'
M2) An act of murder always harms a moral patient'
Conclusion) Murder is morally wrong.
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It might seem to be tempting to assert that Principle H is the most basic moral
principle, and that all the other principles on Anington's and Pojman's lists
could be extrapolated or constructed from this one, using arguments such as
the one given above. This issue must be dealt with before continuing so in the
following two sections I will investigate this claim.
3.3.4 Monism and pluralism.
The assertion that Principle H is the most basic moral principle touches upon
the issue of monism versus pluralism. The monist believes that there is one
single most general moral principle, perhaps something like Principle H, and
that all of our other moral principles may ultimately be reduced to this one.
The pluralist believes that there are a number of incommensurable general
moral principles underlying morality, and these are not reducible to one
single most general moral principle. The assertion considered above, that
Principle H is the most basic moral principle, would be a monist assertion.
The pluralist might argue against this that not all of the basic moral
principles on the lists above may be derived from 'To harm a moral patient is
morally wrong.' It may be objected that while the murder or rape of a moral
patient will always involve harm to the moral patient, there are other basic
moral principles, such as, ol.ying is morally wrong,' and, 'Breaking a promise
is morally wrong,' that do not fit this ideal. The pluralist may argue that it is
not always the case that lying to a moral patient or breaking a promise made
to a moral patient harms them. It might happen that being told the truth would
in some cases harm a moral patient more than being told a lie. The pluralist
could say the same about breaking promises. Breaking a promise made to a
moral patient might not always harm the moral patient, and keeping a
promise to a moral patient might in some cases hium them more than
breaking the promise would do.
According to this pluralist line we could not come up with a sound
argument about lying that paralleled the one given above about murder, thus:
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Ll) To harm a moral patient is morally wrong.
L2) An act of lying always harms a moral patient.
Conclusion) Lying is morally wrong.
This argument is unsound, the pluralist would urge, because the second
premise is false; an act of lying does not always harm a moral patient. The
same problem would arise again in giving such an argument about breaking
promises, and some of the other basic moral principles may create similar
difficulties. However, even if the pluralist is correct, this does not affect the
moral universalist's position. So long as either the single most basic moral
principle (if monism is the case) or at least one of the plurality of basic moral
principles (if pluralism is the case) are acknowledged as universal, then the
question of monism versus pluralism is not of direct concern to the moral
universalist.
The important point for the universalist is that Principle H at least is a
universal moral principle. In every possible context in which a moral
discussion ocsurs, it is always relevant to consider whether the action under
discussion would harm any moral patient, and furthermore, harm to moral
patients always weighs morally in the salne way, that is, against the action
being discussed. It may be that the pluralist is correct and that not all of the
basic moral principles in Anington's and Pojman's lists are able to be
derived from Principle H. Perhaps another very general moral principle,
something such as: 'Failing to respect a moral patient is morally wrong,'
would be required in order to derive basic moral principles about things such
as lying and breaking promises, but in so far as my account of moral
universalism is concerned, to accept that at least one moral principle,
Principle H, is universal is sufficient.
3.3.5 Basic moral principles and rules of grammar.
There is some resemblance between my basic moral principles and
Arrington's rules of moral grammar, especially in the idea that the basic
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moral principles rnust be presupposed by participants in the practice of
morality. However, although it seems to me that Anington's notion is flawed,
as I have indicated in section 2.9, nevertheless I think that the grammatical
rules of a language can provide a convenient analogy that elucidates the way
that the basic moral principles work. Despite this, basic moral principles are
not literally grammatical rules. Explaining why will help to clariff the notion
of basic moral principles.
The general rules of grammar provide us with a linguistic background or
set of common presuppositions by means of which we can express ourselves
through language and communicate with one another. Basic moral principles
play roughly the same role in relation to moral language use that general
grammatical rules play in relation to general language use. Basic moral
principles provide us with a set of common presuppositions by means of
which we are able to express our views on moral matters through moral
discussion and communicate these views to others. We are also able to seek
moral advice from others on matters about which we may be undecided, and
also at times we may change our moral judgements as a result of moral
discussion. These things are only possible against the background provided
by the basic moral principles.
Taking the analogy one step further, basic moral principles have an
instructional aspect, as do grammatical rules. A basic moral principle such as
'Murder is morally wrong' may be employed when teaching children about
what it is to be moral, as a pedagogical aid to help them form an idea about
what it is to do something morally wrong. Exposure to basic moral principles
may serve as an introduction into the practice of moral discussion by marking
out the limits within which moral discussion takes place.
Despite these similarities, the analogy between basic moral principles and
grammatical rules has its limitations. There is a strong sense in which
speaking in a grammatically correct manner has some optionality about it,
whereas acting morally does not. Verbal language use very frequently
violates the rules of grammar and yet people are able to communicate quite
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satisfactorily despite this. Condemnation of ungrammatical language use is
only a feature of certain formal situations or special circumstances in which
something important is depending upon precise grammatical accuracy. But in
ordinary speech someone may deliberately choose to ignore the rules of
grammatically correct English and still have little or no difficulty in
communicating effectively with others.
However, violation of basic moral principles, or the rejection of these
principles altogether, is regarded as a much more serious matter. Moral
condemnation is considered to be a matter of far more gravity than
condemnation for ungrammatical speech. A deliberate rejection of the basic
moral principles may even be thought by some (such as the out'and-out
rationalist considered in section 3.2) to be an indication of irrationality,
whereas deliberate ungrammaticality may be viewed as no more than
laziness. Furthermore, when children are taught the basic moral principles a
very important part of this instruction is that the moral dimension of life is
one that they are expected to become a part of. Acting morally is not merely a
convenient way to get along with others, but something far more important,
whereas speaking grammatically does not have the same degree of magnitude
attached to it.
It may be objected that this is all just a matter of degree. It might be said
that someone who completely disregarded grammatical rules to the extent
that they were constantly speaking nonsense would be quite likely to be
regarded by many as irrational, and such complete lack of grammaticality
may be considered to be more serious that the occasional lie or breaking of a
promise. While this may be true, we need to compare like cases with like to
get an accurate picture. The less serious moral transglessions such as lying
should be compared to the less serious grammatical transgressions such as
uttering an incomplete sentence, something that is an extremely common
grammatical lapse. I suggest that the individual who lied as frequently as they
uttered incomplete sentences would be a target of moral condemnation long
before they were a target of grammatical condemnation. It is also difficult to
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think of an act of ungrammaticality that would be comparable in seriousness
to an act such as murder. When like cases are compared, I think it is evident
that the breaking of moral rules is regarded as more serious than the breaking
of grammatical rules.
Furthermore, linguistic rules of grammar are not pro tanto principles.
Rules of grammar are not sometimes judged to have been outweighed by
other rules of grammar. We may sometimes face moral dilemmas in which
moral principles are weighed against one another, but we never face
grammatical dilemmas in which rules of glammar must be weighed against
one another. Of course, this point does not apply if one is an absolutist. To
the absolutist, moral principles are far more like rules of grammar in this
respect.
So while the grammar analogy may be a useful tool to help to clariS the
role that basic moral principles play in moral language, it must be borne in
mind that it is disanalogous to the extent that it does not fully capture the
significance and importance to us of following the basic moral principles and
acting morally, nor does it reflect the way in which moral principles (if one is
not an absolutist) must sometimes be weighed against one another.
3.4 Anti-universalist objections
3.4. I Cultural construction.
The role played within the practice of morality by the basic moral principles
can be seen as being what is behind the universalist's Conviction U. This
claim is the first part of my coherentist project of showing how Conviction U
and Conviction R can fit together within the same theory. However, before
proceeding with this project I will look at two significant lines of objection to
the very idea of universal basic moral principles-
The first line of objection is that it is not possible to identiff any so-called
central concerns of morality, such as harm to moral patients, as being
somehow 'given' in a way that is free from cultural variation. The objection
maintains that so-called central concerns are differently constructed by
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different cultures or different groups within cultures. (The objection is cited
in Nussbaum p 40-2) Furthermore, it would be possible to imagine a form of
life that did not contain these central concerns at all, in any form.
My response to this line of objection is straightforward. I would question
the extent to which central concerns of the practice of morality could be
diflerently constructed across different cultures. Nussbaum is suspicious of
how far such difference extends, saying: "Relativists tend ... to underestimate
the amount of attunement, recognition, and overlap that actually obtains
across cultures ... Despite the evident differences in the specific cultural
shaping of [people's experience], we do recognise the experiences of people
in other cultures as similar to our own." (p 46) An example of
underestimation of similarity is the view expressed to Nussbaum by an
anthropologist that the British eradication of smallpox in India may have
been morally suspect because it resulted in the collapse of the cult of the
deity thought to control the disease. For Nussbaum, this sort of extreme
sensitivity to cultural variation overlooks the obvious point that preventing
Indians suffering from smallpox is morally commendable, and that: "we are
all subject to certain physical constraints and liabilities, whatever our
historical and social location" (This example is given in Antony, p 8-$.
Nussbaum also emphasises the way in which it is possible for us to relate to
works of art from cultures very different to our own, suggesting that cultural
variation only goes so far.
A variant of this criticism from cultural construction would be to say that
what counts as a moral discussion is itself culturally constructed, so that in
the context of a culture other than our own, what counts as a moral discussion
could be something different from what it is in our culture. In our culture we
have moral discussions in which the central concern (or one of them, if
pluralism is the case) is the avoidance of harm to moral patients, but there
could be a culture where moral discussions occur in which this is not a
concern at all.
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This suggestion is similar to the conceptual relativism advanced by
Arrington, in which different cultures have different concepts of morality,
and it faces the same sort of difficulty that he faces. Whatever evidence might
be given for claiming that in another culture certain discussions occur in
which there is no concern about harm to moral patients, is just as much
evidence for the claim that these discussions are not moral discussions at all.
Conversely, any evidence that could be advanced in favour of the view that
what is occurring in some other culture is indeed moral discussion would be
evidence that the central concern (or one of the central concerns) of such
discussion is the avoidance of harm to moral patients.
Of course, it would be possible to take from another culture a kind of
discussion that was utterly different from moral discussion and insist on
giving it the label, omoral discussion', but this would merely be empty
terminological manipulation. To simply stipulate that in another culture
something such as a discussion about the effect of weather on agriculture, for
example, is actually a moral discussion seems to be taking a path towards
moral nihilism. To say that practically anything could be a moral discussion
is not far from saying there is no such thing as distinctively moral discussion.
Moreover, the moral universalist is not claiming that everywhere that
humans interact then the basic moral principles will be found, or that
following the basic moral principles is in any way essential to the human
species, or anything of that nature. The moral universalist (according to my
interpretation of universalism) claims only that the basic moral principles are
universal to the practice of morality. It is quite compatible with this claim
that there be a culture or form of life where the practice of morality is not
followed or recognised. Naturally, such a form of life would be different
from the one we are familiar with.
Finally, while it may be possible to imagine a form of life that did not
embrace any of the concerns central to morality, this does not mean that it is
possible to imagine the practice of morality occurring within such a form of
life. The critic might ask: 'lsn't this admitting that the basic moral principles
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are merely contingent on the fact that we are beings of a certain kind?' It is,
but I suggest that there is nothing untoward about this. There is undeniably a
sense in which the basic moral principles are contingent on some of the
characteristics of the beings that use them, and that these characteristics
might have been different. For instance, if the resurrection of the dead was
commonplace and involved no inconveniences then perhaps, 'Murder is
morally wrongo' would not be a basic moral principle. If it was possible to
telepathically read the minds of others then perhaps, 'Lying is morally
wrong,' would not be a basic moral principle. The basic moral principles we
have are contingent in so far as it is logically possible that things may have
been very different from the way they in fact are and such difference would
effect, among other things, the practice of morality-
Once again, terminological sleight of hand is fruitless here. Someone
might imagine beings that engaged in an alien practice and stipulate that the
practice is to be called 'morality', but this would achieve little. No matter
what word we decide to use as a label for it, the practice that we actually
engage in that we happen to call by the narne 'morality' has some central
concems that are universal to the practice, and while these concerns may not
be relevant to some kinds of beings, this is not the same as saying that they
could be irrelevant to us.
In accordance with my coherentist standpoint I think that the most
reasonable stance to take towards this line of criticism is to advance a theory
that allows room for the recognition of variation and differences of emphasis
between cultures as well as recognition of some similarity beween cultures
(at least, between cultures in which the practice of morality occurs). The
notion of basic moral principles is supposed to accommodate Conviction U,
which is behind the recognition of similarity. I will introduce mechanisms in
Part Four that I believe sufficiently altow for Conviction R, which is behind
the recognition of cultural variation.
3.4.2 Moral scepticism.
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A second line of objection is the challenge of scepticism. The sceptic may
allege that before the notion of basic moral principles can be accepted some
argument is needed to show that it is the principles that appear in lists such as
Arringlon's and Pojman's quoted earlier, and not some other principles, that
are the basic moral principles. The question may be asked: 'Why are those
principles rather than other principles the basic moral principles?' This
question may be asked as an empirical question that demands a causal
explanation, but I take it that a causal explanation is not what is being sought
here, and not just because a causal explanation would be in danger of leading
towards the naturalistic fallacy (see section 2.8.5). Instead the demand is for
some kind of argument that demonstrates why the basic moral principles are
the principles that I have identified, and not some other principles.
As we saw in section 3.3.3, there is a limited sense in which we may be
able to justify some of the basic moral principles from within the borders of a
moral discussion, by pointing out that while they are all general principles,
basic moral principles differ in the degree of generality that they have' I have
put forward Principle H as a very general basic moral principle' Because a
principle such as 'Murder is morally wrong' is tess general than Principle H,
it might be said that the former principle may be justified by appeal to the
latter. This means that we can give a reason within a moral discussion as to
why murder is morally wrong. It is wrong because murder harms a moral
patient and it is (pro tanto) morally wrong to harm a moral patient.
However, relying on this feature of the differing generalities of the basic
moral principles only pushes the question of justification back a step'
Justiffing a basic moral principle by appeal to a more general basic moral
principle will provide only a temporary reprieve. If it were asked: 'How does
one justify Principle H? Why is it morally wrong to harm a moral patient?'
then it seems we have to simply admit that something like Principle H is a
presupposition that must be made in order to participate in moral discussion'
We are able to engage in moral discussion to justify moral judgements, but
we cannot engage in moral discussion to justify a very general basic moral
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principle such as Principle H, as this principle is a presupposition that makes
moral discussion itself possible. A concern about whether or not harm is done
to moral patients is one of the characteristics that makes a moral discussion a
moral discussion and not some other kind of discussion. We could not have a
moral discussion with a person who does not accept the presuppositions of
moral discussion, and the person who refuses to be concerned about whether
harm is done to moral patients seems to be such a person. So, it is not
possible to justify the basic moral principles at the level of moral discussion
by doing anything more than pointing to Principle H, and this principle may
not itself be justified at the level of moral discussion.
A determined sceptic would still have room to object against the notion of
basic moral principles. Their objection would be that no argument has been
given that forces anyone to accept that Principle H is the most general of the
basic moral principles (or one of the most general, if pluralism is the case),
and so the question has been begged. The sceptic may say that I have merely
assumed that Principle H is a very general basic moral principle, and that
nothing so far has been said that is sufficient to answer a question such as,
.Why is it (pro tanto) morally wrong to harm a moral patient?' As I have
helped myself to an assumption about Principle H, a critic could do the same
by making their own assumption that there is a context in which moral
discussions occur without any concern at all for harming moral patients (or
for any of the other things identified by the other most general basic moral
principles, such as respect for moral patients, if pluralism is the case)' For
instance, it may be assumed by the critic that there is a context in which there
are moral discussions where the sole concern is the degree of financial profit
accruing from one's actions. However, I would maintain that an assumption
such as this would again appear to be mere empty stipulation resembling that
discussed in the response to the first objection in the section above, whereas
my assumption about Principle H I take to reflect something that is there to
be seen by all who care to examine what goes on in the practice of morality'
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Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that there is difficulty in
answering a question such as, 'Why is it pro tanto morally wrong to harm a
moral patient?' to the satisfaction of a determined sceptic, because any
possible answer will be subject to a further demand for justification. For
instance, it may be said that it is morally wrong to harm a moral patient
because this takes away from the dignity of a moral patient and it is wrong to
take away from the dignity of a moral patient. This answer may in turn
inspire a demand from the sceptic for the reason why it is wrong to take away
from the dignity of a moral patient, and so on. When presenting any
philosophical theory it seems there is some point where an assumption or two
must be made and it is here that the sceptic will direct their attack.
When the sceptic demands the premises that are supposed to support the
assumption that it is pro tanto morally wrong to harm a moral patient, I
concede that it may not be possible to produce any. In this case perhaps the
practice of morality could be accused of hanging unsupported in the air with
no solid foundation. Maybe such a lack of justification would even strike a
blow against the reasonableness of undertaking moral discourse rather than
some other kind of discourse when deciding on our actions' At this point the
universalist might turn to an out-and-out rationalist such as Smith to come to
the rescue wielding rational arguments that might defeat the sceptic, but the
possibility of such rescue would depend on accepting the details of the
argument presented by the out-and-out rationalist'
However, while the determined sceptic may be difficult to defeat I have
already explained in section 1.6 why I think the sceptical route is not a path
that the moral relativist would want to go down. It matters to the moral
relativist what is right and wrong and the casting into doubt of the practice of
morality as a legitimate enterprise is not a part of the relativist's agenda'
Scepticism is not the way to support Conviction R. The altemative that I offer
is a coherentist package that allows Conviction R to coexist with Conviction
U and it is to the details of this I will turn after summing up the thrust of this
chapter.
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3.5 Final remarks on universalism
It is important to reiterate that moral universalism is a distinct position from
moral objectivism and from moral absolutism. The moral universalist claims
only that the basic moral principles are universal to the practice of morality
and to all moral discourse. To say that the basic moral principles are
universal ones is not the s€une as saying that they are objective or absolute
ones, and because of this the moral universalist is not required to produce the
sort of arguments that a moral objectivist or a moral absolutist may need to
provide. This stance is what might be called 'pure' moral universalism. lt
may be that many who are moral universalists also happen to be moral
absolutists and/or moral objectivists. It would not be inconsistent to
simultaneously subscribe to all three of these metaethical views. In so far as
someone subscribes to one or both of the latter positions they may be
obligated to give further metaethical arguments. What these arguments are
would depend on the details of the moral absolutism or the moral objectivism
in question. The important point in so far as my investigation is concerned is
that Conviction U does not stand or fall on these issues' While the
universatist may believe that basic moral rules are objective and/or absolute
as well as believing that they are universal, the former beliefs are not a
necessary feature of universalism.
My goal in Part Three has been to present the notion of basic moral
principles as a way of thinking about morality that allows the taking on board
of the moral universalist's Conviction U. Basic moral principles are not
context-dependent, except for in the obvious but trivial sense in that they
occur within the context of the practice of morality. It does not matter in what
geographical location or period of history that a moral discussion occurs' or
between what segments of society, if it is to count as a moral discussion then
the presuppositions I have called basic moral principles must be in place'
This is the line of thought that I suggest makes the best sense of Conviction
U.
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However, the moral universalist can take this too far. Not every moral
principle is a basic moral principle. Even acknowledging the nature of basic
moral principles as presuppositions of moral discussion does not allow us to
privilege Conviction U by ruling out Conviction R because moral discussion
still contains the prospect of much disagreement indeed, and not just about
moral judgements. Legitimate participants in a moral discussion may refuse
to accepr some moral principles that other participants do accept and this is
an indication that at least some moral principles are not basic rnoral
principles. Here is where Conviction R must be given its due.
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Part Four
Moral Relativism Revisited
4.1 Introduction
While Conviction U may be accommodated without being overlooked by
using the mechanism of basic moral principles, this does not give it any
privileged status over Conviction R. The relativist's insistence that many
moral disagreements are real and cannot be just explained away as elrors or
mistakes may be accommodated by building on the notion that not all moral
principles are basic moral principles.
The first thing to acknowledge is that a proportion of what might seem to
be moral disagreements really are nothing more than arguments about the
facts. What is often in dispute in such arguments is whether or not it can be
said that certain sorts of actions do or do not cause harm to any moral
patients. For instance, an argument about whether to accept the principle,
'Pornography is morally wrong,' may really turn on the empirical question of
whetherharm to moral patients results from pornography. If this is indeed an
empirical question then the methods of empirical investigation rather than
moral discussion are appropriate to attempting to answer it. Observations
must be made, inductive inferences must be drawn from these observations,
and so forth. In cases where an argument really is about an empirical
question the ideal situation would be to end a moral discussion with an
agreement on just what empirical evidence would decide the issue, or to
provisionally end the moral discussion pending empirical evidence that
would allow it to meaningfully proceed. Then efforts could be put into
obtaining that empirical evidence, rather than mistaking speculation about
empirical matters for moral discussion'
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The moral relativist's case cannot rest on any seemingly moral
disagreements that turn out to be empirical questions in disguise. If there is
disagreement about an empirical question then this probably is due to a
mistake about the facts on the part of one or more of the parties to the
disagreement, or a lack of empirical evidence that leads to unwarranted
speculation about what the facts actually are. The moral relativist is not
interested in this sort of disagreement and Conviction R does not rest upon it,
so in what follows I will be assuming that the disagreements I discuss are
genuine moral disagreements and that any real empirical issues have been
agreed upon by the particiPants.
To help clarif what I think is behind the fundamental conviction of the
moral relativist, I would like to suppose for the sake of convenience of
exposition that monism is the case, and that Principle H could legitimately be
called the most basic moral principle, the one that all of the other basic moral
principles may be derived from (see section 3.3.4). Making this supposition
will allow me to more easily state which facets of moral discussion the moral
relativist is appealing to. To recapitulate, Principle H says the following:
Principle H) To harm a moral patient is pro tanto morally wrong.
Briefly, my claim is we can make Conviction U and Conviction R fit
together coherently by accepting that Principle H is universal to all moral
discussion, so acknowledging Conviction U, and at the same time also accept
that there is still much room for disagreement and diversity in the
interpretation of key elements of Principle H, so acknowledging Conviction
R. The elements of Principle H about which diversity may be entertained are:
l) There may be diversity with regard to who or what counts as a moral
patient. Different moral principles may be advanced representing different
views about which entities are tegitimate moral patients. Some of these moral
principles will be examined below in section 4'2'
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2) Many of the basic moral principles derived from principle H are about
different kinds of harm. There may be diversity about which of the many
different possible kinds of harm are more morally significant, and there may
also be different interpretations of the word 'harm' as it occurs in principle H'
Although the participants to a moral discussion must each accept the basic
moral principles, there may be disagreement about their order of priority. The
order of priority of basic moral principles is something that will be discussed
in greater detail below in section 4'3.
It is the possibility of these two separate dimensions of difference in
interpretation or understanding of Principle H that I believe Conviction R is a
response to.
4.2The bounds of the moral community
4.2.1 Limiting moral princiPles'
Many of the apparently context-dependent moral principles that the moral
relativist puts forward in support of Conviction R are not basic moral
principles but instead concern the difficult problem of trying to establish the
bounds of the moral community. This problem often takes center stage in
moral discussion, and even when moral discussion is not explicitly about this
matter it is frequently just beneath the surface. We establish the bounds of the
moral community when we say which entities have moral standing or moral
considerability. 'Moral patient' is the label given to those entities that have
moral standing (See section 3.3.3)
A crucial claim I want to make is that often in moral discussion a moral
principle is put forward that is actually an attempt to say who or what counts
as moral patients. I will call these limiting moral principles because they are
attempts to establish the limits of the moral community. Two examples of
limiting moral principles are: 'Abortion is morally wrong' (to be precise this
would have to say, 'Abortion of human fetuses is morally wrong" but for
convenience I will work with the abbreviated version) or 'Human slavery is
morally wrong.' These two principles have a different use in moral
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discussion from the use that basic moral principles have. Limiting moral
principles may not be readily distinguishable from basic moral principles by
their form alone, as they both may be expressed in exactly the same form' For
instance, 'Murder is morally wrong,' has the same form as 'Human slavery is
morally wrong,' but this obscures an important difference in use. The latter
principle is saying (in part) that it is human beings that have moral standing
and this is something essentially different from what the first principle is
saying.
ln arguing their case for relativism the moral relativist may be drawn to
giving limiting moral principles as examples. The many conflicts that occur
over questions of what has moral standing and the controversial nature of
some of the limiting moral principles, such as 'Abortion is morally wrong,'
makes them ideal illustrations of the relativist's point about moral diversity.
However if a moral relativist were to give a basic moral principle as an
example of a principle about which there may be moral diversity then this
would be a mistake.
In contrast to the basic moral principles' any of the limiting moral
principles may be argued about and challenged within the precincts of a
moral discussion. As a part of a moral discussion, disagreement and diversity
of opinion about which entities do and which do not have moral standing is
frequent and genuine. As I have noted above, such controversy seems to in
fact constitute a fair Proportion of moral discourse, and some of the most
controversial areas of moral debate will be about what are the correct limiting
moral principles. I suggest that this is the main reason why the moral
relativist is drawn to citing limiting moral principles or disputes about
lirniting moral principles as examptes when arguing for the context-
dependence of moral principles. It is not implausible to claim that in different
contexts different entities have moral standing'
Reviewing the list of examples of moral diversity given by Harman ( 1996
p 8-l l), it can be seen that many of them concern limiting moral principles'
This includes the examples of cannibalism, infanticide, caste systems, the
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treatment of women or of animals, as well as the two just mentioned
examples of abortion and human slavery. These are all moral issues at the
root of which is a question about who or what has moral standing. I will look
at the two latter examples in greater detail below.
Many different criteria have been advanced to determine which entities
have moral standing. These include membership in Homo sapiens, potential
personhood, rationality, sentience, being alive and being an ecosystem. It
would be possible to produce moral arguments for or against any of these
criteria, and such arguments could be criticised or defended while remaining
squarely within moral discourse. The possibility of such moral argument has
the important implication that while all parties to a moral discussion must be
committed to the basic moral principles in order to be having a moral
discussion at all, this commitment in itself does not entail any particular view
about who or what has moral standing. Disagreement about limiting moral
principles takes place against the background of agreement about the basic
moral principles. Failure to acknowledge this can lead the moral relativist to
overestimate the type and scale of the disagreement that is actually taking
place whenever there is a divergence of views about limiting moral
principles.
Many of the instances of moral diversity that a moral relativist may be
drawn to, in which two groups appear to have irreconcilable moral
differences, are disagreements about limiting moral principles' The parties to
a moral disagreement over what has moral standing may frame the limiting
moral principles that they are arguing about in the same form as the basic
moral principles that provide the presuppositions allowing the disagreement
to take place, and this similarity of form may lead to confusion'
A commitment to the basic moral principle, 'Murder is morally wrong,' is
not something that is up for debate within moral discourse, but whether the
killing of a particular kind of entity is the killing of an entity that has moral
standing, and so counts as murder, certainly may be a subject for debate
within moral discourse. This sort of observation is not new (see O'Neill, p
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536 for historical precedents; see also Hajdin, p 90-l)), but so far as I am
aware the impact of this distinction upon the metaethical issue of the dispute
between the moral universalist and the moral relativist has not on the whole
been noted. The moral universalist may be correct to say that anywhere and
at any time moral discussion occurs the basic moral principles must be
followed, but this in itself does not prevent the moral relativist from also
being correct in observing that there are a very wide range of views about
who or what is the proper recipient of moral consideration'
4.2.2Example one: 'Abortion is morally wrong'.
One of the clearest examples of disagreement about a limiting moral principle
is the debate concerning the moral status of abortion. This is one of Harman's
examples of moral diversity and he invokes it as an instance of coexisting but
radically different moral positions that require the adoption of some variety
of moral relativism to adequately explain. In the face of the deep and
apparently irreconcilable division within our society between those who
believe that abortion is morally wrong and those who believe that it is not
wrong, it may seem initially plausible to take this as evidence that within our
society there is no real agreement over basic moral principles. But the fact
that there can be genuine disagreement (perhaps even irresolvable
disagreement) about a moral principle such as 'Abortion is morally wrong'
does not mean that there could ever be genuine disagreement about the basic
moral principle 'Murder is morally wrong'.
The surface similarity of 'Abortion is morally wrong' and 'Murder is
morally wrong' does not disguise the rather obvious differences in the way
the two phrases are used by parties to the moral debate about abortion' The
latter is a basic moral principle that is used to provide the common
background for this moral debate, and it may not be challenged if the debate
is to remain a morat one; the former is used to state a significant result that
arises from within this moral debate. 'Murder is morally wrong' is quite
likety to be a premise in an argument that has 'Abortion is morally wrong' as
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a conclusion, but it is not considered necessary' within the confines of this
moral dispute, to give any argument with 'Murder is morally wrong' as the
conclusion. Sometimes the slogan 'Abortion is murder' may be used by those
who oppose abortion. This attempt to identify abortion with an act that is
acknowledged by all to be morally wrong only emphasises the comparatively
controversial nature of the claim that abortion is morally wrong.
The great differences between the positions of the two parties to this
dispute should not obscure the important respects in which they concur- Both
parties to the debate are likely to agree on a number of factual matters - that
abortion is the killing of a fetus, that a fetus is an entity with certain
biological properties and so on. For this to be a moral debate, they must also
agree on the basic moral principles and they do, the most relevant one here
being the principle, 'Murder is morally wrong.' The contentious issue is
whether the killing of a fetus is or is not an instance of murder and tftrs is a
question about the moral standing of a fetus.
There is a vast titerature on this topic, as we would expect with something
about which moral diversity is legitimate. I will look briefly at a
representative writer from either side of the controversy. ln arguments about
abortion it is a common move to distinguish between a merely biological or
descriptive category such as 'human', to which a fetus would on most views
belong and a moral category such as 'person' or 'moral patient', that is used
to identify those entities that have moral standing. The argument will then
tum on whether a fetus does or does not properly belong in the second
category. The issue becomes a question of whether a fetus has moral
standing.
For instance, Michael Tooley, a moral philosopher who argues that
abortion is not morally wrong, devotes some effort to his claim that a
necessary condition for moral standing is the possession of certain cognitive
capacities, namely: "the concept of a self as a continuing subject of
experiences and other mental states" and also a belief that oneself is such a
subject. (Tooley, p 44) lf this criterion is accepted then it will be a further
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matter to argue that a fetus does not meet Tooley's condition and so does not
have moral standing, but Tooley recognises that a significant argumentative
move is to establish acceptable criteria for moral standing'
Naturally enough Tooley's condition is not acceptable to those who argue
that abortion is morally wrong. So Don Marquis points out that Tooley, or
anyone who seeks to fix criteria for personhood on the basis of possession of
psychological characteristics, still has to show that the criterion being
advanced is morally significant. (Marquis, p 186) Marquis would prefer to do
away with the concept of personhood altogether and instead suggests that the
criterion for membership in the moral community is having a future "like
ours". (Marquis, p 190-l)
The point of these remarks is not to take a position myself on whether or
not the fetus has moral standing or on what is the most plausible criteria for
moral standing. Instead I want to emphasise here that the apparently
irresolvable nature of the dispute betrveen those who oppose abortion and
those who allow abortion does not threaten the universal status of a basic
moral principle like 'Murder is morally wrong'. Both parties to the debate are
committed to this rule. There is no grounds to claim that this dispute
exemplifies the clash of two incompatible approaches to morality, each
containing their own disparate basic moral principles. The disagreement
about abortion is a disagreement about the criteria for moral standing, and
this disagreement occurs within the bounds of moral discourse established by
universal basic moral principles.
4.2.3 Example two: oHuman slavery is morally wrong''
A popular example of moral diversity is the allegedly radical difference
between the moral stance taken in our society regarding human slavery and
that taken in ancient Greek society. This example is used by both moral
relativists such as Harman as yet another case of moral diversity, and also by
moral universalists who want to try to support the claim that other cultures
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can make errors about morality. We have already seen Pojman doing this in
section 2.3, and moral universalist Walter Stace is another, insisting:
If slavery is morally wicked today, it was morally wicked among the
ancient Athenians, notwithstanding that their greatest men accepted it as
a necessary condition of human society. Their opinion did not make
slavery a moral good for them. It only showed that they were, in spite of
their otherwise noble conceptions, ignorant of what is truly right and
good in this matter. (quoted in Solomon, p 5a6)
However, in this section I argue that the ancient Greeks were not so
radically different from us morally as either the moral relativist or the moral
universalist might want to suggest. Those ancient Greeks who were
concerned to be moral at all followed the same basic moral principles that we
follow and that anyone of any culture must follow if they are to be moral. It
cannot be the case, as the quotation from Stace above implies, that the ancient
Greeks rejected the moral principle 'To enslave a moral patient is morally
wrong.' If they were concerned to be moral then they accepted Principle H,
and if they accepted Principle H then they would have to have had some
peculiar beliefs about the condition of slavery not to recognise that it is a
great harm. Being closely acquainted with the reality of slavery as they were'
they clearly recognised the wretchedness of the condition and the harm
inflicted upon those subjected to slavery. The fact that they did not consider it
morally wrong to keep human slaves is simply an indication that they did not
consider all humans to have moral standing. To the ancient Greeks, not all
humans were moral patients and it was morally acceptable to enslave those
who were not.
There is a great difference between the two moral principles: 'To enslave
a moral patient is morally wrong,' and 'Human slavery is morally wrong''
The first may be considered a universally acceptable basic moral principle
that derives from Principle H, while in contrast the second puts forward the
claim that all humans (at least) are moral patients. The ancient Greeks could
subscribe to the first principle and have moral discussions about slavery
without necessarily having to accept the second principle, and I suggest that
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this is in fact just what they did. Among the ancient Greeks it was not
generally thought that all humans were moral patients and it was believed
that those humans that were not moral patients could rightfully be enslaved.
If I am right about this then we would expect to find some concem among
their moral thinkers when slavery was practiced on those humans who were
considered to be moral patients. This was indeed the case'
Ancient thought on slavery tended towards one of two views. There were
those who maintained that slavery was merely the unfortunate consequence
of fate - perhaps being captured in a war, or kidnapped by pirates, or evsn
being the child of slaves. Anyone, even the gleatest of kings, might through
ill luck become a slave and for this reason being a slave did not necessarily
mean one was inferior to one's master. (Garlan, p 120) The fact that someone
was a slave said nothing about the moral status of that individual. Perhaps it
was morally wrong that they were enslaved, perhaps not - their status as a
slave was nothing more than the result of arbitrary fortune. But such a
perspective was by no means the most prevalent.
The dominant view was the doctrine of the natural slave. According to
this doctrine there was a moral distinction between the natural slave and the
naturally free human. Those humans who were not Greek were naturally
inferior linguistically, intellectually, and culturally and were thus naturally
suited for slavery. There was a distinction drawn by nature itself between
those humans who were moral patients and those that were not, and there was
nothing morally wrong in treating the latter group as objects to be owned and
resources to be exploited, like horses or cattle. In fact, one common term for
a slave was andrapodon, a'being with human feet', an object on the same
moral level as tetrapodon, a 'being with four feet'. (Garlan, p 20)
While there were constraints on how a master might treat a slave, these
were not to protect the slave, but were intended to protect others in the moral
community from this master, who otherwise might develop into a tyrant'
(Wiedemann, p 23) There was condemnation of those who maliciously
injured their slaves but only because this was immoderate behaviour that
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would attract the wrath of the gods, not because human slaves had any moral
standing (Garlan, p 4l).
However, it was not impossible for once free Greek citizens to become
the slaves of other Greeks. Prisoners of war, for instance, legally became the
property of the victor, and could be reduced to slavery if the victor so wished.
An Athenian citizen visiting a foreign city that was besieged and captured
might become a slave and be later sold in Athens. Such a case would seem to
be a counter example to the doctrine of the natural slave. Hence a further
distinction was deemed necessary - among those who were actually slaves
there was the natural slave and the legal slave. The natural slave was the
slave for whom slavery was appropriate and morally unproblematic, whereas
the legal slave was the slave for whom slavery was not appropriate and was
morally problematic. Most forthright on this distinction is Aristotle' He says:
"For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or
slavery by convention as well as by nature ... no one would ever say that he
is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the
highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents
chanced to have been taken captive and sold." (Politics I .1255a) Others such
as Plato and Xenophon's Socrates also support this distinction. (Garlan' p 50)
The fact that the ancient Greeks felt the need to make this strained
distinction between the natural slave and the merely legal slave makes it clear
that for them human slavery was in general only morally acceptable when it
was practiced on those humans that were not moral patients' It was at the
least morally problematic to enslave a human who was a moral patient.
Furthermore, as it is possible for us to intelligibly disagree with the
ancient Greek view that not all humans were moral patients, it would seem to
be in principle possible for a representative of our society to have a moral
discussion about this with a representative of ancient Greek society' Any
such moral discussion would take place against the background of the
commonly accepted basic moral principles, principles that I suggest were
accepted no less by the ancient Greeks than by ourselves. So it seems that our
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moral perspective is not so radically different from that of the ancient Greeks
after all. Again, as in the example of abortion, the real differences in moral
view here concern the limiting moral principles, and the contents of the basic
moral principles are not put under threat by this difference.
4.2.4 Harman reconsidered.
Of all the three moral relativists I looked at in chapter 2, Harman comes
closest to recognising the important role played by the question of who or
what has moral standing. For instance, he says: "[People's values] differ with
respect to the extent of the moral community: some restrict it to family and
friends; others include all people of a certain race or caste or country; some
include all people of whatever race or class; others count animals and even
plants as part of the moral community to be protected by the moral rules."
(1996, p 17) Yet despite this acknowledgement he does not say what he
thinks the impact of this is on the case he is trying to make for moral
relativism. Using Harman's terminology, people's values about the extent of
the moral community are relative to their moral framework, but I have tried
to show how this relativity is compatible with the universality of the basic
moral principles.
Harman does at times seem to say something quite similar to my account:
"When moral prohibitions on harming and killing and lying exist, they are
sometimes supposed to apply only with respect to the local group and not
with respect to outsiders." (1996, p 9) In a footnote on the same page he even
says: "There will be universal truths about moralities perhaps all
moralities have some rules against killing, harm, and deception "' the
existence of universal features of morality is compatible with moral
relativism." However, this does not induce him to try to look for any sort of
compromise between his version of moral relativism and universal features of
morality. Instead he says: "Any universally accepted principle in this area
must verge on triviality, saying, for example, that one must not kill or harm
members of a certain group, namely the group of people one must not kill or
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harm" (1996, p 9). The principle Harman accuses of triviality here is very
similar to principle H, but if it seems trivial this is only because we are
already well acquainted with the moral dimension of life. To those not so
acquainted the principle will not be trivial, as it contains the significant
information that harming and killing are marked off from other activities in
that there are negative connotations attached to doing them to a certain group.
Of course the principle is not fully informative unless it is also known who
the members of this group are, to which Harman (and I) would reply: That is
relative to the context.
Views about who or what have moral standing look to be instances of
Harman's inner judgements. Consider the example I have looked at earlier,
the employee of Murder, Incorporated, who "was raised as a child to honor
and respect members of the "family" but to have nothing but contempt for the
rest of society." (lgl?,p l9l) Such an individual clearly considers that only
other members of Murder, Incorporated have moral standing, so that only
they are moral patients. This is consistent with the individual being
committed to the basic moral principles. They may uphold all of the basic
moral principles scrupulously in all of their dealings with the other members
of Murder, Incorporated. We can intelligibly disagree with this individual
about whether the set of moral patients is restricted to the members of
Murder, Incorporated, which means we share agreement with them on the
basic moral principles.
Harman's theory of inner judgements, shorn of his account of implicit
bargaining, is not incompatible with my account. Inner judgements about
whether "it is wron g of someone to do something" (1982, p 192, italics in
original) may perhaps legitimately vary according to that individual's views
about who or what is a moral patient. But the sense of the word 'wrong' here
is for Harman a different one from the sense of the word as it occurs in a
basic moral principle such as 'To harm a moral patient is morally wrong''
(See section2.5.2 for his fourfold distinction of the sense of this word) The
latter is for Harman a normative judgement about what "ought to be" rather
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than an inner judgement about what someone "ought to do." In so far as
Harman restricts his moral relativism to inner judgements, as he does in the
1975 paper'Moral Relativism Defended', then generally speaking it lends
itself well to the outlook I am proposing, as it does not question the
universality of basic moral principles. I would still disagree with some of the
details of that paper however, such as the notion of implicit bargaining, as I
have explained in section 2.5.
4.3 Limiting moral principles and context-dependence
4.3.1 Diversity of starting points.
It might be said that the view I have been presenting does not achieve a
genuine compromise between the moral relativist and the moral universalist,
as all I have done is to relocate the problem of the dispute between them from
one area to another. Now the dispute is about what entities are moral patients.
There may still be disagreement between the moral relativist and the moral
universalist about the context-dependence of any answer to this question. The
moral universalist may say that there is only one universally correct set of
moral patients, whereas the moral relativist may say that the set of moral
patients depends on the context. However, it is in the nature of a compromise
that both parties must give some ground to the other and I suggest that with
respect to this question it is the universalist who must give ground to the
relativist, just as it Part Three it was the relativist who had to give ground to
the universalist.
It appears that, unlike basic moral principles, limiting moral principles are
context-dependent. One reason to think that universalism about limiting
moral principles is not plausible is the controversy among universalists as to
which are the correct limiting moral principles. The considerations advanced
in section 3.3.2 for the universality of basic moral principles do not appear to
apply to limiting moral principles. Accepting that, for instance, all and only
human beings are moral patients is not an presupposition that must be made
before moral discussion can be undertaken, as moral discussion can occur
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about whether non-humans are moral patients. It is possible for people who
disagree about limiting moral principles to never the less engage in moral
discussion, and in fact moral discussion may occur about the very
acceptability of a limiting moral principle.
Furthermore, it cannot be said about limiting moral principles that they
are presuppositions, as can be said about basic moral principles, because
while the correct basic moral principles are already more or less known and
accepted, the correct limiting moral principles are not. Among universalists
there are numerous different competing views about which are the correct
limiting moral principles and choosing between them requires much
discussion and evaluation of alternatives. For instance, Marquis and Tooley
are both universalists when it comes to a limiting moral principle relating to
human fetuses, and yet both disagree about what this principle is' In order for
a universalist's position on a correct limiting moral principle to be credible,
they would first need to defeat by argument every other universalist position
that advocates a different limiting moral principle. It is in the very nature of
their positions that two moral universalists who offer different limiting moral
principles cannot both be correct. This is why I think that here is a plausible
location of (at least part of) the moral diversity underlying the relativist's
Conviction R.
This does not mean that there are no limits at all on the kinds of proposals
that may be made about who are moral patients. It would be difficult to argue
against the idea that, at a minimum, all moral agents are also moral patients'
Furthermore, any proposals about moral patienthood must meet basic
conditions of intelligibility, consistency, non-arbitrariness, and so forth that
are required for any proposals in any field of legitimate discussion' It is not
the case that some completely arbitrary collection of things could credibly be
put forward as the set of moral patients. There is no reason not to be
committed to the highest possible standards of argumentation when engaging
in moral discussion about a limiting moral principle'
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Conviction R, according to my interpretation, is a response to limiting
moral principles being context-dependent. In the context of different cultures
or groups the very best arguments and most careful moral discussion will
lead to different limiting moral principles. To clariff this I will introduce the
notion of a starting point. What I mean by a starting point is the complex of
fundamental beliefs and shaping attitudes concerning morality (over and
above the presuppositions that are the basic moral principles) that we bring to
any discussion of controversiat moral issues. A starting point will not
necessarily be clung to dogmatically and sometimes may be abandoned or
revised during the course of a moral discussion, but it will be given up
reluctantly and only under argumentative pressure. Some of the beliefs and
attitudes that comprise one's starting point may be widely held within one's
culture while some may be peculiar to smaller groups or even to individuals.
Some of the attitudes may not even be explicitly expressed but may be
revealed by one's reactions to thought experiments involving moral
situations.
My claim is that different starting points lead to a commitment to
different limiting moral principles, even when the route is via the most
impeccable argumentation. In saying that limiting moral principles are
context-dependent, the starting point is the context I have in mind' As an
illustration of this, I will look at another of the hotly contested questions
about moral patienthood, whether animals are moral patients' I will examine
the positions of two universalist moral philosophers, Paul Taylor and Peter
Carruthers, who oppose each other on this question, and show how their
different starting points lead them to adopt different timiting moral principles'
Although both Taylor and camrthers have internally self-consistent
positions, as moral universalists the conclusions they present exclude each
other. I hope to show that the limiting moral principles regarding animals that
each proposes depends on the context oftheir starting points.
4.3.2Taylor and the inherent worth of animals'
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Taylor has been influenced by the approach of Kant, who was of course also
a universalist with regard to membership in the moral community. Taylor
follows Kant in searching for "something whose existence has in itself an
absolute value, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of
determinate laws," (Kant, p 90) in order to make this the criterion for moral
patienthood. This "something" may more lately be known as inherent worth,
or intrinsic value. For Kant rationality was the only feasible criterion for
moral patienthood, as only rational beings could exist as ends in themselves
and not just as means to be used to further the plans of others, and so only
rational beings could have inherent worth.
In contrast to this Taylor argues for a "life-centred system of
environmental ethics", the crucial part of which is "the taking of a certain
ultimate moral attitude toward nature," (Taylor, p 98) a moral attitude that he
calls the attitude of respect for nature. He says that this parallels the Kantian
respect for persons as rational beings which are ends in themselves (Taylor, p
103), although Taylor of course is breaking with Kant in not accepting that
rationality alone is that which confers inherent worth' Kant himself is
unequivocal: o'Beings whose existence depends, not on our will, but on
nature, have none the less, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative
vafue as means and are consequently called things. Rational beings, on the
other hand, are called persons ". (Kant, p gGl,Italics in original) This is a
major point of difference between Taylor and his avowed influence, and as
they are both universalists, if Taylor is correct about the criteria for moral
patienthood then Kant must be incorrect. This aspect of universalism recurs
every time universalists disagree about limiting moral principles.
Taking Taylor's moral attitude of respect for nature involves accepting
that living beings are moral patients due to a "recognition of their inherent
worth." (Taylor, p 99) According to Taylor, inherent worth is the criteria for
moral patienthood and while it is apparently not the case that all living beings
have inherent worth, "wild organisms, species populations, and communities
of life in the Earth's natural ecosystems," (Taylor, p 100) do have inherent
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worth. For such living beings as these, there is something morally valuable in
the realisation of those states of affairs that allow them to flourish. As the
flourishing of these living beings may be assisted or retarded by the actions
of human moral agents, we are thus morally obliged to consider such possible
impacts when undertaking actions that may affect them. This amounts to an
insistence that the kinds of living beings specified in the quote above are to
be regarded as moral patients
For Taylor the recognition of the inherent worth of living beings follows
from the attitude of respect for nature already mentioned above. Providing
intellectual support for this attitude is a belief system he calls the biocentric
outlook on nature. Possessing this belief system makes the attitude of respect
for nature, "the only suitable or fitting attitude." The biocentric outlook on
nature is the argumentative heart of Taylor's position and it consists of four
main elements:
(1) Humans are thought of as members of the Earth's community of life,
holding that membership on the same terms as apply to all the
nonhuman members. (2) The Earth's natural ecosystems as a totality are
seen as a complex web of interconnected elements, with the sound
biological functioning of each being dependent on the sound biological
functioning of the others ... (3) Each individual organism is conceived
of as a teleologicat center of life, pursuing its own good in its own way.
(4) Whether we are concemed with standards of merit or with the
concept of inherent worth, the claim that humans by their very nature
are superior to other species is a groundless claim and, in the light of
elements (1), (2), and (3) above, must be rejected as nothing more than
an irrational bias in our own favor' (Taylor, p 103)
It is in his defense of the fourth notion that Taylor does what is, from my
perspective, his most interesting work. I will take the claim to human
superiority he mentions as being the claim that humans alone are moral
patients. Taylor has a number of arguments against this claim.
First, he argues that it is begging the question to assert that humans
deserve to be the only moral patients because humans possess abilities, such
as the capacity to do abstract reasoning, that nonhumans do not possesso and
that the possessors of such abilities have greater merit than those without
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them. Taylor points out that it is only according to some set standard that
judgements of merit can be made, and it would be an error to assume that
only the sorts of abilities that humans value can be judged to be of merit
when it comes to deciding moral patienthood. So while the capacity to do
abstract reasoning may be more meritorious according to human standards
than the ability to climb trees swiftly, this does not help to answer the
question of whether humans are more meritorious than monkeys, unless the
answer is going to be merely that humans are more meritorious according to
human standards, which begs the question. Merit as a criteria for moral
patienthood is only plausible in the presence of some clearly independent
standard of meritoriousness. Taylor believes that he has supplied such a
standard in the first three elements of the biocentric outlook on nature quoted
above, and according to this standard humans are no more meritorious than
many other living beings.
Taylor also identifies the conceptual confusion attendant on the notion
that only humans may be moral patients because only humans may be moral
agents. The idea here is supposed to be that because only humans may act
morally this makes humans morally superior to nonhumans, and such moral
superiority is a necessary condition for moral patienthood. But as Taylor
says, those that are not moral agents may not be morally evaluated at all, and
so it is not appropriate to claim a relationship of moral superiority over them'
It makes no sense to say that because moral agents may act morally, moral
agents are morally superior to those who are not moral agents, any more than
it makes sense to say that because moral agents may act immorally, moral
agents are morally inferior to those who are not moral agents. If the set of
moral patients is to collapse into the set of moral agents then some other
argument than this one that Taylor criticises must be given'
Another standpoint that Taylor assesses as faulty is one alleging that
humans have greater inherent worth than nonhumans and this is why humans
counts as moral patients whereas nonhumans do not. According to such an
account the criteria for moral patienthood would be the possession of a
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certain amount of inherent worth. Taylor is concerned that the notion of
differing degrees of inherent worth derives from non-egalitarian class-
structured societies in which humans were seen as having varying amounts of
inherent worth. He sees it as inconsistent and an expression of irrational
prejudice against nonhumans if such systems are rejected now as being an
unjust way of evaluating humans while at the same time being seen as an
acceptable way to evaluate nonhumans. The objectionable element seems to
be the arbitrary nature of assigning differing amounts of inherent worth. In
the absence of any means of measuring such an intangible quality it is left to
the accident of one's birth to determine this. Some more principled criteria
than this for moral patienthood is required.
Taylor's starting point is taking the attitude of respect for nature. Once
someone takes this attitude, they are inclined to recognise the inherent worth
of living beings and appreciate the biocentric outlook on nature and they may
be led quite painlessly by the arguments Taylor provides to the view that it is
a universally correct limiting moral principle that animals are moral patients.
There are no apparent flaws in the reasoning Taylor uses to reach this view
and each of the three arguments looks to make an eminently respectable
point: l) If moral patienthood depends on merit then some independent
standard for measuring such merit is required. 2) If moral patienthood
collapses into moral agenthood then some good reason for this must be given.
3) An arbitrary notion such as differing amounts of inherent value is not an
acceptable criteria for moral patienthood. If someone shares with Taylor the
attitude of respect for nature then their starting point will be very close to his.
Within the context of this starting point, they may accept the limiting moral
principle, 'To harm an animal is morally wrongo' perhaps also accepting
other limiting moral principles such as 'Eating meat is morally wrong''
Needless the say, Taylor's is not the only starting point on an issue such as
this.
4.3.3 Carruthers and the indirect moral significance of animals.
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Peter Carruthers is a universalist who has a very different starting point from
Taylor on the question of the moral patienthood of animals and not
surprisingly comes up with very different results. Carruthers proposes two
criteria that a moral theory must meet in order to be acceptable. Firstly it
must provide a conception of what moral knowledge is and how people come
to be motivated to act morally. (Carruthers, p 23) Secondly it must deliver
normative principles that do not stray too far from, 'oour considered moral
beliefs". (p 24) These considered moral beliefs are the essential ingredient of
Carruthers' starting point.
Camrthers argues that the approach that best fulfills his two criteria is a
contractualist approach. He characterises this as, "an attempt to justiff a
system of moral principles by showing that they would be agreed upon by
rational agents in certain ideal circumstances." $ 35-6, Italics in original)
According to Carruthers, the contractualist approach meets the first criterion
above because he believes that humans have an essential need to be able to
rationally justify their actions, including their moral behaviour, to one
another, and that this need is "innate (inborn), in such a way as to emerge
gradually at a given stage in maturational development" (p 45). He thinks the
second criterion is met because he believes that the main normative principle
that seems to result from contractualism, a principle of respect for autonomy,
in other words not interfering with one another's plans and projects except in
so far as the plans and projects of others are interfering with one's own, has
"a powerful intuitive appeal" (p 40). Much as Tayler's biocentric outlook on
nature was the theoretical side of his attitude of respect for nature,
contractualism is the theoretical side of Camrthers' considered moral beliefs.
For Carruthers, taking a contractualist approach results in animals not
being accorded the status of moral patients, because they are not rational
agents. "Since it is rational agents who are to choose the system of [moral]
rules, and choose self-interestedly, it is only rational agents who will have
their position protected under the rules." G 98-9) He considers and rejects
two ways in which animals might be accorded status as moral patients under
164
contractualism. The first way would be to assign to some rational agent or
agents the task of representing the interests of animals in the negotiations
during which moral rules are formulated and agreed upon. This is rejected
because it would lead to animals being accorded equal moral status to that of
humans, and Carruthers regards this as not acceptable to the considered
common sense views of ordinary people. (p 99, 72) lt should be obvious by
now that Carruthers' starting point is in complete contrast to Taylor's starting
point.
The second way a contractualist might allow animals as moral patients
would be for the rational agent to regard knowledge of their species as one of
the pieces of information about themselves, along with their race, gender,
level of intelligence, and so forth, that is 'bracketed' as irrelevant whilst
negotiating the moral rules to abide by. Carruthers rejects this because it
"would destroy the theoretical coherence of Rawlsian contractualism," that
he is ultimately relying upon. For the contractualist, "[m]orality is viewed as
constructed 6y human beings, in order to facilitate interactions between
human beings." (p 102, ttalics in original) According to this understanding of
a contractualist morality, being human is a necessary condition for being a
moralpatient.
Camrthers also confronts the question of whether being human is a
suffrcient condition for being a moral patient and concludes that it is. Some
humans, for instance the very young, the senile, and those with mental
disorders, are not rational agents and yet Camrthers argues that they are never
the less moral patients. He has two arguments for this'
The first is a slippery slope argument. According to Carruthers there is a
slippery slope that leads from the position of denying moral patienthood to
those humans who are not rational agents down to the position of denying
moral patienthood to some humans who are rational agents. (p I 14) This is
because there are no clear boundaries between non-rational humans and
rational humans. For instance, it is difficult to say at what point the non-
rational human infant becomes the rational human adult. Unless there is an
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unambiguous declaration that all humans are moral patients there will be
opportunities for the unscrupulous to abuse the imprecise nature of the
distinction between non-rational humans and rational humans. (p 115-6)
Carruthers' second argument for according moral patienthood to all
humans regardless of whether they are rational or not is an argUment from
social stability. Many moral agents are psychologically attached to non-
rational humans to such a degree that a moral system that with-held moral
patienthood from non-rational humans would create social instability, "in that
many people would find themselves psychologically incapable of living in
compliance with it." (p I l7)
So, according to the results of Camrthers arguments animals are not
moral patients, but this does not mean that the way they are treated is of no
moral concern at all. Because some humans are animal lovers who care about
what happens to animals, "causing suffering to an animal would violate the
right of animal lovers to have their concerns respected and taken seriously."
(p 107) He acknowledges that this position conflicts with two common views
about the suffering of animals, firstly that causing suffering to an animal
would be morally wrong even if no animal lovers were ever to find out about
it, and secondly that causing suffering to an animal is morally wrong
"because of what is done to the animal," G 108) and not because of the
distress it may cause to animal lovers.
Canuthers accounts for these qualms by maintaining that the suffering of
animals has indirect moral significance, o'bY virtue of the qualities of
character that [animals] may, or may not, evoke in us." (p 154) Sympathy for
animal suffering is "merely a side-effect" of the sympathy that moral agents
are required to develop for genuine moral patients. Animals themselves are
not moral patients so cruelty to them is not strictly speaking morally wrong'
but cruel treatment of animals demonstrates flaws in moral character that may
also manifest itself in cruel treatment of actual moral patients, that is,
humans. It is because of this possibility that cruelty to animals is to be
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condemned and why it is right to feel sympathy for any animals that are
treated cruelly. (p 156-7)
Throughout his book Carruthers presents many different thought
experiments designed to appeal to a person with a similar starting point to
his. A great deal of the weight of his position is borne by Camrthers'
assumption throughout that his reader will share his intuitions regarding the
different situations he portrays, hence sharing his starting point. Two of the
most important of Carruthers' thought experiments are described below.
It is one of the central tenets of Camrther's starting point that, o'most
ordinary people do not seriously rate animal suffering at all, in comparison to
the sufferings of human beings." $ 72) He presents the thought experiment
of Saul the sadist to show this. (p 67) Saul the sadist has imprisoned and is
constantly torturing a number of different animals and one human being' If
given the opportunity to rescue one and only one creature from Saul's
dungeon, Caruthers thinks it incontrovertible that everyone would accept
that there is a moral obligation to rescue the human rather than any of the
other animals. Even if the human would not undergo any more suffering than
any of the other animals because of their predicament, nor would the human
live any longer if rescued than any of the other animals, never the less, "the
intuition remains that it would be unforgivable to do anything other than
rescue the human." (p 68)
In a related thought experiment designed to show that humans are
considered more morally important than animals, he says that if faced with a
choice between saving from a fire one unconscious, elderly human with no
friends or family, or saving many conscious, caged dogs from the fire, "[o]ur
common-sense, pre-theoretical view is that it would be very wrong to place
the lives of many dogs over the life of a single (albeit old and friendless)
human." (p 96)
Obviously the way in which one reacts to these thought experiments
depends on one's starting point. Although I do not want to comment on the
plausibility of Carruthers' starting point, I do not share his confidence that
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everyone has the same starting point as himself. It may seem inevitable to
Camrthers that his own starting point represents unqualified common sense'
but I would suggest this is just the illusion of perspective. Of course' many
people would share Carruthers' starting point, and react in the same way that
he does to the thought experiments he describes. Within the context of this
starting point, someone would reject the limiting moral principle, 'Animals
are moral patients.'
Taylor and Carruthers put forward their considerations from within the
context of different starting points. These different starting points lead to a
commitment to different limiting moral principles with regard to the question
of whether or not animals are moral patients. Their different starting points
do not seem to be the result of errors about the facts on the part of either of
them. Nor do their routes from their respective starting points to their
respective limiting moral principles seem to be the result of faulty reasoning
on the part of either of them. Taylor and Camrthers are only two of the many
theorists who have proposed various, often incompatible, limiting moral
principles with regard to the question of whether or not animals are moral
patients.
I believe that the notion of different starting points providing the context
from which different theorists reason to different limiting moral principles
provides further grounds for my claim that limiting moral principles are
context-dependent and not universal. However, context-dependent limiting
moral principles are compatible with universal basic moral principles, and
this distinction between different types of principles is how I seek to achieve
my coherentist goal of accommodating both Conviction U and Conviction R'
4.4 Ordering basic moral principles
4.4. I Further relativism.
Although disagreements about limiting moral principles form a considerable
share of the body of cases of moral diversity presented by the moral relativist
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as support for their claim that moral principles are context-dependent, some
of the examples of moral diversity highlighted by the moral relativist do not
seem to be instances of disagreement about who or what are moral patients.
For instance, Wong provides the example of disagreement concerning
whether there is a moral requirement to redistribute assets from the rich to the
poor, and considers this disagreement to be something that the universalist is
hard pressed to account for. (Wong, p 146-153) [t would be a
misrepresentation to claim that this was a disagreement about the criteria for
moral patienthood. Someone who denies that there is a moral requirement to
redistribute assets to the poor is not thereby denying that the poor are moral
patients.
Similarly, Harman points out that there is moral disagreement on the
question of whether killing is worse than letting die. But the person who says
that killing is worse than letting die is not necessarily saying that this is
because someone who is let die does not have the status of moral
patienthood. Similar observations could be made about some of the other
moral disputes that Harman marshals in support of moral relativism, such as
disagreement about the value of artifacts as compared with human life and
about how much help one is morally obliged to give another. (Harman 1996,
p 8-ll) Disputes about these matters do not seem to be disputes about
membership in the moral community, and claiming that they are would
distort what is happening when such disagteements occur. It is in these
disputes that I see another possibility of genuine grounds for moral
relativism.
Earlier I assumed for the sake of convenience that monism with regard to
basic moral principtes is the case and that Principle H: 'To harm a moral
patient is (pro tanto) morally wrong,' is the most general of the basic moral
principles. However, the word 'harm" as it occurs in Principle H, is a word
that may receive various interpretations, because a moral patient may be
harmed in many different possible ways. Often a disagreement may arise
about which of a number of different possible forms of harm are more
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morally reprehensible. This field of dispute concerns the order of priority of
basic moral principles, and I think that such dispute accounts for the
examples of moral diversity that Harman and Wong give above.
For instance, a disagreement about whether it is morally worse to kill a
moral patient or to let a moral patient die is a disagreement over which sort of
harm, killing or letting die, is more morally reprehensible. The question is
really whether 'To kill a moral patient is (pro tanto) morally wrong,' and 'To
let a moral patient die is (pro tanto) morally wrong,' have the same order of
moral priority or whether one of them has a higher order of priority than the
other, and if so, which way around this order of priority is. Arguing that one
moral principle has a higher order of priority than another does not mean that
one is rejecting the latter of the principles as a moral principle' Stating the
order of priority among two basic moral principles may be done using a
metaprinciple, but this is not a requirement. For example: 'Killing a moral
patient rather than letting a moral patient die is (pro tanto) morally wrong,' is
a moral principle, although not a basic moral principle'
If the simplifying assumption of monism is not made, then the claim
about the context-dependency of the order of priority of basic moral
principles becomes stronger. If pluralism is the case and the basic moral
principles ultimately derive from more than one general basic moral
principle, then questions about the order of priority of the basic moral
principles will be more and not less prominent than in a monist system and
will take on more importance as a source of moral diversity' For instance, in
a pluralist system that contained, as well as Principle H, a principle saying
that to treat moral patients disrespectfully was morally wrong, not only will
there be disagreements about whether one sort of harm is worse than another,
but there will also be disagreements about whether one sort of disrespect is
worse than another, and furthermore there may also be disagreements about
what sorts of harm are worse than what sorts of disrespect and what sorts of
disrespect are worse than what sorts of harm.
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The universal nature of basic moral principles is not threatened by
acknowledging context-dependence about their order of priority. lf, in the
context of one group, basic moral principle A is thought to delineate an area
of more significant moral concern than basic moral principle B, while in the
context of another group B is considered more significant than A, this does
not mean that either group has rejected the basic moral principle they
consider to be the less important one. Both A and B are still universal moral
principles, with pro tanto weight in the moral discussions of both groups.
It may also be the case that in some contexts a limiting moral principle
will be considered to have a higher order of priority than a basic moral
principle. This does not change the status of the latter as a universal principle
that has some weight whenever a moral discussion occurs and the former as a
context-dependent principle that has weight only in a certain context. For
instance, in the context of a group that considers sentience as the criterion for
moral patienthood the limiting moral principle, "Killing a sentient being is
morally wrong," may weigh more heavily in their moral discussions than the
basic moral principle, "Lying is morally wrong." Members of such a group
may agree that it is morally acceptable to lie in order to prevent the killing of
a sentient being. Never the less, the first of these principles only has this
weight within the context of such a group, while the second principle has
weight within any moral discussion.
4.4.2 Arrington on prioritY.
Anington seems to take a universalist position on this matter, claiming that
his rules of moral grammar, "usually have a built-in index of priority"'
(Agington, p 2S9) In this section I will consider his argument for this index.
He does concede that this notion is not very plausible when it comes to many
of the more difficult cases in which there may be disagreement about how to
judge the order of priority when his rules of moral grammar appear to
conflict, such as a situation where we are faced with a choice between telling
a lie or breaking a promise. About such cases he says: "The order of priority
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among our moral rules, then, is limited, flexible, and imprecise, and it is the
Source of many of our moral puzzles and our most intractable moral
dilemmas." (lbid) Despite this concession, Arrington wants to maintain that
over and above his rules of moral grammar there is a set of grammatical
metarules about these rules. The purpose of the grammatical metarules is to
rank the order of priority of some (but not all) of the rules of moral grammar
with respect to some (but not all) of the other rules of moral grammar. He
gives two examples of these grammatical metarules: o'One ought to tell the
truth unless doing so would cause grave harm to others," and, "One ought to
keep one's promises unless doing so would involve taking the life of an
innocent person" (Arrington, p 302).
However, these two grammatical metarules do not seem to add anything
to Arrington's account except an extra layer of complexity. They do not
provide a "built-in index of priority" capable of solving the sort of
disagreements we are concerned with here, because they are too vague.
Phrases such as 'ograve harm" and "innocent person" provide plenty of room
for exactly the sort of disputes that I have been claiming are responsible for
moral diversity. Just how grave would the harm have to be in order for it to
be morally worse than being lied to? This is a question about the order of
priority of basic moral principles. Who counts as an innocent person? This is
a question about moral patienthood'
Arrington also seems to have in mind a third grammatical metarule to the
effect that 'Murder is morally wrong' has a higher order of priority than
'Lying is morally wrongo. He says: "That killing a person is a more serious
offence than lying to him is not a matter we ever debate. It is a given of the
moral life" (Arrington, p 291). Arrington seems to be implying here that a
discussion about whether murdering someone is worse than lying to them
could never reasonably occur, that such a discussion must necessarily be
conceptually confused. This appears far too strong a claim, and does not
seem to be at all a given of the moral life.
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If it happens that circumstances arise in which one is faced with a choice
between murder and lying then we may be willing to say that it is likely such
circumstances will demand we make a moral judgement that to lie is the
lesser of the two evils in this case. But it is the circumstances of the case that
we will look to in making this moral judgement, and not an index of priority
contained within a set of grammatical metarules about the rules of moral
grammar. Despite what Arrington says, there is no doubt that we can
conceive of circumstances in which it is possible to conduct a discussion
about whether it is morally worse to murder someone than to lie to them. It is
not so diffrcult to invent such a case. Consider a lie about a person's
parentage or the circumstances of their birth. This lie may induce in the
person such extreme feelings of self-loathing that they honestly believe they
would be better off dead, and may fervently wish to be killed. It seems at
least intelligible to ask whether such a lie is or is not morally worse than the
murder of this person, but if Arington is conect then this question is not a
legitimate one, as we do not ever debate whether it is worse to kill someone
than to lie to them. I see no reason why a debate about the above case could
not occur. Even if our discussion leads to the moral judgement that in this
case it would still be morally worse to murder this person than to tell them
such a lie, this moraljudgement will be the result of our discussion, and is not
a given of the moral life as Arrington claims
Arrington might reply that this objection mistakenly treats his
grammatical metarules as substantive principles (See section 2.9.3). Just as
his rules of moral grammar may be outweighed in some particular
circumstances without this meaning that they lose their relevance in
establishing what is of moral concern, so his grammatical metarules may be
outweighed in some particular circumstances, without this meaning that they
lose their relevance in establishing the order of priority between two rules of
moral grammar. However, this reply does not take into account what has
happened in the latter instance. Consider again the example in the previous
paragraph and imagine that the only possible alternatives available to the
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moral agent are to murder the moral patient or to tell the moral patient the lie
described above. [f moral discussion leads us to make the moral judgement
that the murder is the lesser of the two evils in this case, then this moral
judgement may allow us to reluctantly excuse this particular murder, but it
does not damage the universal nature of the principle that murder is morally
wrong. Murder is still morally wrong, even in this particular case where it is
less wrong than telling a lie. But this moral judgement would damage the
allegedly universal nature of Arrington's grammatical metarule that 'Murder
is morally wrong' has a higher order of priority than 'Lying is morally
wrong'. We cannot say that murder is still morally worse than telling a lie,
even in this particular case in which murder is not morally worse than telling
a lie. Anington's metarules do seem to be substantive principles in this
regard.
It seems to me that the metarules that Aninglon proposes are no argument
against the claim that some instances of moral diversity, such as those
examples given by Harman and Wong in the previous section, are really
disputes concerning the order of priority of basic moral principles. Given
what Arrington says at one point, it seems that he himself ought to concur:
,,We often disagree over and debate whether a particular rule is to override
another on a particular occasion, but this is because there is no a priori order
of priority between these two rules. The debate does not challenge either rule
as establishing a moral presumption." (Anington, p 290)
4.5 Conclusion
In this work I have tried to show that the long-standing dispute between the
moral relativist and the moral universalist is amenable to treatment through a
coherentist approach. Such an approach seeks neither to reject nor to
privilege the fundamental convictions of either side but rather tries to
accommodate them both within a consistent whole.
The main question that I take the moral relativist and the moral
universalist to be in disagreement over is the question I have called Q3: 'Are
174
moral principles context-dependent?' The coherentist answer that I have
proposed is: 'There are two types of moral principles, those that are context-
dependent and those that are not' Moral principles that are not context-
dependent I have called basic moral principles. Underlying many of the basic
moral principles (or perhaps alt of them, depending on whether monism or
pluralism is the case) is the very general basic moral principle I have called
Principle H: 'To harm a moral patient is pro tanto morally wrong.' Moral
principles that are context-dependent I have called limiting moral principles.
These concern who or what counts as a moral patient for the purposes of
applying Principle H. I have also suggested that the order of priority between
basic moral principles is a matter that is context-dependent.
This approach allows the accommodation of Conviction U and Conviction
R - the fundamental convictions behind moral universalism and moral
relativism. Conviction U is the conviction that at least one moral principle is
universal, that is, it counts whenever moraljudgements are made, and it counts
in the same way. Principle H is universal in this sense. It is of relevance
whenever moraljudgements are being made, and it specifies a concem (harm
to moral patients) that always counts as morally wrong. Conviction R is the
conviction that at least some moral diversity is due to different groups being
committed to different moral principles and that not every instance of moral
diversity can be explained away as due to mistake or misinformation' On my
view some moral diversity is due to different groups being committed to
different limiting moral principles, and such commitment is due to these groups
having different starting points, rather than making elrors or being
misinformed.
My approach also allows the major criticisms of each side by the other to
be met. The universalist accuses the relativist of promoting an 'anything goes'
attitude to morality by letting context ovenide all when making moral
judgements. However, basic moral principtes provide a place within morality
for certain central concerns, most prominently that expressed by Principle H,
that may not be relinquished when moral discussion is undertaken' The
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relativist accuses the universalist of implying that great numbers of people
must be in error about morality and the moral judgements they make. However,
on my view, nobody who participates in the practice of morality can be in enor
about the basic moral princiPles.
As I noted in Part One, my solution may leave hardJine adherents to either
moral relativism or moral universalism unsatisfied. It may be objected that
neither Conviction U nor Conviction R have been fully appreciated, but that
each have become a mere shadow of themselves at my hands. This may be so,
but the position I offer is a compromise between two opposing outlooks, and it
is in the nature of a compromise f,or each side to have to make concessions. It is
hoped that the practical benefits to be gained balance the cost of making the
concessions that I have argued for. The everyday business of making moral
judgements may beoome a little easier if it is no longer impeded by the
prospect of a debilitating confrontation between moral universalist and moral
relativist.
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